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1. Introduction  
‘Sustainability’ is a stepping-stone  
in the evolution of our thinking. 
(Klein, 2006)  
 
 
1.1. Research Problem  
 
Sustainable development (SD) today represents a fundamental objective of the 
European Union (EU), guiding all its policies and actions. SD was first anchored in the 
primary law of the EU in 1997.2 In Article 2 of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU 
committed itself “to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of 
social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a 
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising 
of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among Member States.”3 In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon reaffirmed SD as an 
overarching objective of the Community action and placed it at the heart of the 
contemporary EU policy agenda.4 
 
To live up to this long-term commitment to SD, the Göteborg European Council in 2001 
adopted the Sustainable Development Strategy of the European Union (EU SDS),5 
which draws on the Communication of the European Commission (EC) on ‘A 
Sustainable Europe for a better world: A European Strategy for Sustainable 
Development’.6 The EU SDS that was renewed by the European Council in 20067 
provides a long-term vision and constitutes an overarching policy framework for the EU 
                                                 
2 Commission of the European Union, 2009a. 
3 Article 2 of the Amsterdam Treaty (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html). 
4 In Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU committed itself to “work for the sustainable development of 
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement 
of the quality of the environment” (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN: 
HTML). For more see Scrieciu, 2007; McCauley, 2008. 
5 Göteborg European Council, 2001. 
6 Commission of the European Communities, 2001b. 
7 Council of the European Union, 2006a. 
 10
policies. It argues that mainstreaming SD into EU policies represents a serious 
challenge for governance, i.e., for political “steering and coordination of interdependent 
(usually collective) actors based on institutionalised rule systems.”8 The EU SDS9 urges 
policymakers to critically reflect and adapt not only the procedural politics dimension 
(e.g., involvement of private and public actors, organisational culture), but also the 
content policy dimension (e.g., policy instruments, their legal bindingness and 
flexibility), and the institutional polity dimension (e.g., the level of institutionalisation 
of interactions) of governance in order to better promote SD. Outlining an approach to 
better policymaking, the EU SDS shakes some of the central assumptions about 
governance. Among others, it encourages policymakers to address the economic, social 
and environmental challenges jointly with core questions as to what to regulate, when 
and for whom. It also encourages policymakers to develop strategic foresight capacity 
to better anticipate, and to respond to complex dynamic challenges.10 
 
Policymakers in the EU, however, struggle to understand the latitude of fundamental 
implications of the SD objective for governance of the modern society and adapt it 
accordingly.11 As a result, they look for comprehensive and reliable action-oriented 
analysis that would help them tackle the complex governance questions and close the 
governance gaps in promoting SD. In particular, the complex global challenges such as 
climate change increased the policymakers’ demand for prospective knowledge that 
would enable them to envision the future societal and environmental change and 
respond to it by adjusting governance in a way that promotes SD. Policymakers thereby 
increasingly turn to policy analysts for a reasoned policy advice. 
 
In its ideal form, policy analysis represents a sub-discipline of political science that 
aims to apply “theory and methods of analysis from relevant social disciplines to actual 
problem, sharpening the focus of policymakers, identifying critical issues, and 
marshalling rigorous data to identify the costs and benefits of competing alternatives for 
public action.”12 It uses “analytical techniques and knowledge for and in policy-
                                                 
8 Benz, 2004, cit. in Treib et al, 2005, pp. 5.  
9 Council of the European Union, 2006a. 
10 Cf. Council of the European Union, 2006a. 
11 Cf. Voss / Kemp, 2005. 
12 Comfort, 1999, pp. 181. 
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making.”13 In particular, futures research methods (FRM) such as scenario workshops 
and Delphi studies represent increasingly popular analytical methods for ex-ante policy 
analysis that is directed at creating prospective knowledge for development of policy 
strategies, programmes and legislation to promote SD. A particularly lucrative branch of 
ex-ante policy analysis drawing on FRM represents the Foresight research that stands 
for “systematic, participatory, future intelligence gathering and medium-to-long term 
vision-building process aimed at present day decisions and mobilising joined actions.”14 
Not only entrepreneurs, but also governments in the EU Member States established 
several offices that busy themselves with Foresight. The Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies (IPTS) at the Joint Research Centre (JRC), thereby, represents 
the leading EC organisation for consolidation and better structuring of the Foresight 
knowledge base and for providing forward looking intelligence to support decision 
making. 
 
However, in practice, the concept of providing sound ex-ante policy advice for 
governance for SD strengthened by analytical methods such as FRM has contained 
severe tensions.15 On one hand, policymakers complain about the irrelevancy and the 
lacking practical relevance of policy analysis and in particular of Foresight for 
reforming governance for more SD. On the other hand, policy analysts criticise the 
ignorance and blind action of policymakers.16 This is because governance for SD places 
new demands on policy analysis. It not only challenges the conventional forms of 
planning and policymaking but also the traditional conceptions of policy analysis and 
the role of policy analysts.17 In order to solve the theory-practice problem, policy 
analysts thus need to severely refocus their research priorities and to reorient themselves 
towards new research frontiers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Parsons, 1995, pp. xvi. 
14 Malta Council for Science and Technology, 2001, pp. 1. 
15 Comfort, 1999, pp. 18; Roe, 1998.  
16 For more on the theory-praxis problem of policy analysis see Runhaar et al., 2005; 2006; McDaniels, 
2004; Kates et al., 2000; Comfort, 1999; Roe, 1998; Morgan et al., 1999. 
17 Interview with Loikkanen, 2007. See also Runhaar et al., 2006; Comfort, 1999; Morgan et al., 1999; 
Roe, 1998. 
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1.2. Epistemological Frame and Research Questions 
 
This thesis argues that the challenge of bridging the knowledge gap between the results 
of policy analysis and their application by policymakers who are involved in adapting 
governance for more SD can be addressed sufficiently only at the ‘second-order 
observation level’,18 i.e., by exploring ‘the observing’19 instead of ‘the observed’. 
Drawing on Von Foerster’s theory of the observer,20 the thesis claims that facts are facts 
only for the observer, and the observers often do not see what they do not see.21 This 
means that the limitations of human understanding relative to the complexities of policy 
problems force policymakers and policy analysts as observers to operate on the basis of 
simplified representations or ‘cognitive maps’.22 Their cognition,23 no matter how 
sophisticated and varied, is always excluding and selective. The resulting abbreviations 
and simplifications of reality lead to ‘blind spots’24 due to which policymakers and 
policy analysts always oversee something when observing something.25 Consequently, 
they fail to exhaust the vast range of experience. This can lead to major failures in terms 
of understanding and tackling the policy issues at stake.  
 
In the second-order observation perspective, i.e., the perspective of observation of 
observations, policymakers need to frame governance through sustainability in order to 
adjust governance for more SD: “Seeing differently is the first step to doing 
differently.”26 In order to do so, they need to understand their nature and the nature of 
their cognitive processes. This understanding increases their freedom to experience, 
construct, discover and explore new worlds.27 It enables them to perceive qualitative 
                                                 
18 Luhmann, 1984; 1995; Von Foerster, 1993.  
19 Drawing on Luhmann (1984; 1995) and Von Foerster (1993), observing in this thesis is conceived as 
any operation that makes a distinction. 
20 Von Foerster 1993; 1979; 1971.  
21 Baecker, 1993. 
22 Novy / Jäger, 2005. 
23 Drawing on Von Foerster (1993), the cognition, e.g., the cognitive processes are conceived as processes 
through which knowledge is acquired. They are understood as ‚Rechenprozesse’ (Von Foerster, 1993, pp. 
50). 
24 Von Foerster, 1993.  
25 Baecker, 1993. 
26 Hardi /Zdan, 1997.  
27 Scott, 1993.  
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change and prevents them from becoming the ‘silent majority’ that cannot or does not 
want to hear and see how everything is changing in the continuously changing world.  
 
Correspondingly, policy analysts should aid policymakers recognise and overcome their 
perceptual disorders in terms of framing governance in the SD perspective. However, 
also their cognition is theory-laden. In order to support policymakers at perceiving 
governance in the SD perspective, they thus need to be aware and adapt their 
theoretical, epistemological and methodological assumptions and mechanisms behind 
their research practice in response to cognitive dilemmas of policymakers aiming to 
adapt governance for more SD. They should continuously critically reflect how their 
underlying theoretical, epistemological and methodological presumptions determine 
their capacity to assist policymakers at overcoming their cognitive barriers. In other 
words, they need to enhance their systematic reflexivity28, i.e., the epistemological and 
the methodological self-reflexivity and self-control, as well as their capacity to promote 
the self-reflexivity of policymakers.29 In order to help policy analysts do so, the thesis 
thus focuses on the following research questions:  
 
(1) How does the SD concept challenge the existing cognitive maps of 
policymakers and what are the central cognitive barriers that prevent them from 
perceiving governance in the SD perspective? 
(2) How do the mainstream theoretical and research methodological approaches to 
using FRM limit the capacity of policy analysts to help policymakers frame 
governance through ‘sustainability lens’30? 
(3) How do mainstream policy analysts need to rethink and adapt their theoretical, 
epistemological and research methodological reference frames in order to apply 
FRM in a way that enhances their ability to aid policymakers perceive 
governance in the SD perspective? 
 
                                                 
28 Coghlan / Brannick, 2005.  
29 The thesis uses the word ‘reflexivity’ in the methodological sense, i.e., as a cognitive process of 
reflection/selfreflection (Hendricks / Grin, 2006). 
30 The thesis uses the term ‚sustainability’ as a synonym for SD. 
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In this thesis, policymakers and policy analysts involved with governance for SD are 
observed as theory-laden,31 non-trivial,32 reflected observers,33 who continuously 
change under the influence of knowledge. The focus is put on analysing the cognitive 
processes of policymakers and policy analysts in terms of their blindness and insight for 
governance for SD. So as to identify and study the blind spots, i.e., the ‘cognitive 
barriers’34 in the cognitive processes of policymakers and policy analysts, their 
reference frames and methods of perception are brought to surface for conscious 
examination.35 Borrowing from Von Foerster,36 blindness is defined as following: if 
policymakers and policy analysts as observers do not see that they are blind, then they 
are blind. However, if they see that they are blind, then they see. In contrast, their 
insight is conceived as knowledge, i.e., as “the processes that integrate past and present 
experiences to form new activities, either as nervous activity internally perceived as 
thought and will, or externally perceivable as speech and movement.”37  
 
1.3. State of the Scientific Discourse 
 
Over the last decade, the cognitive barriers of policymakers in terms of framing38 
governance in the SD perspective have become a subject of the EU scientific and 
political discourse.39 However, while the existing literature refers to single cognitive 
                                                 
31 Lamnek, 1995. 
32 Von Foerster, 1979a.  
33 Lamnek, 1995. 
34 The concept of ‘cognitive barriers’ in this thesis widely corresponds with what Von Foerster refers to as 
‘perceptual disorders’ or ‘Wahrnehmungsstörungen’ (Von Foerster, 1979a; 1993).  
35 Scott, 1993.  
36 Von Foerster, 1993. 
37 Von Foerster, 1979, pp. 2. 
38 Yanow, 1993; 2000; 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; 2008. 
39 Niu et al. (1993) for example argue that the conceptual and environmental accounting frameworks 
generally lack an emphasis on the spatial dimension of SD. Furthermore, Mira et al. (2005), who studies 
the social representation of environmental problems and aims at identifying relevant variables in the 
formation of pro-environmental attitudes, diagnoses an environmental hyperopia, an attitude that the 
environmental problems are perceived as more worrying when they take place at greater distances. Groff 
(2004) and Mannermaa (2004) explore distinct models of change as cognitive barriers to thinking 
creatively about social reality. Glenn and Gordon (2004; 2005; 2006; 2007) and Glenn et al. (2008; 2009; 
2010) describe the challenges of sensitising policymaking for global and long-term perspectives. 
Meadows (2010) focuses on chances and challenges of identifying and overcoming the limits to our 
thinking by thinking in systems. The cognitive barriers to translating SD into policy making also 
represent a subject of the ongoing EU discourse on the implementation of the EU SDS and of the NSDSs 
not only in political perspective (e.g., Commission of the European Communities, 2007a; 2007c; 2009a 
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barriers of policymakers, it fails to provide a comprehensive, comparative 
systematisation of the cognitive barriers or make an explicit reference to theories of 
cognition and meaning. Moreover, the literature is highly fragmented and without any 
link to discussions on the knowledge gap between policy analysis and governance for 
SD. In consequence, it falls short to explore and determine the new requirements of 
policy analysis for governance for SD in light of the cognitive dilemmas and perceptual 
disorders40 that block policymakers’ vision of governance through sustainability lens. It 
also fails to account in a comprehensive way for chances and challenges of the 
communicative interaction,41 i.e., the negotiation and mediation process of distinct 
reality definitions between policymakers and policy analysts involved in governance for 
SD.  
 
One promising reference in this direction represents the recent debate on the reflexive 
governance,42 arguing that SD policy should have an inbuilt capacity for assessment and 
adaptation,43 and that what is needed are reflexive self-critical modes of steering and 
governance geared toward continued learning and its own reshaping in the course of 
modulating ongoing development,44 rather than toward the maximization of control to 
achieve certain outcomes.45 As a result, the policy analysis tools such as Foresight 
exercises,46 transition management47 and Impact Assessment48 are examined as 
important reflexive techniques that facilitate complex and reflexive learning49 of 
policymakers and help them modify their decision rules and mental modes of the real 
world as they go along.50 However, “while increasing attention has been given to 
                                                                                                                                               
Republic of Austria, 2007), but also in scientific perspective (e.g., Grunwald, 2004; Niestroy, 2005; 
Steurer / Martinuzzi, 2005; 2007; Meadowcroft, 2007; Tils, 2007; Lafferty et al. 2007; Russel, 2007; 
McCauley, 2008). 
40 Von Foerster, 1971, pp. 5.  
41 Lamnek, 1995. 
42 Kemp / Martens, 2007; Voss et al., 2006; Hendricks / Grin, 2006; Voss et al., 2004; Voss / Kemp 2005; 
2006; Grin, 2006. 
43 Kemp / Martens, 2007, pp. 7; see also Voss / Kemp, 2006. 
44 Hendricks / Grin, 2006. 
45 Kemp / Martens, 2007, pp. 7; see also Voss / Kemp, 2006. 
46 Grin / Grunwald, 2000; Brown et al., 2003; Elzen et al., 2004. 
47 Loorbach / Frantzeskaki, 2009; Rothmans et al., 2001. 
48 George / Kirckpatrick, 2007. 
49 Bandelow, 2003. 
50 Kemp / Martens, 2007, pp. 7. 
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theoretical notions of reflexive governance, ideas on its practice are still in their 
infancy.”51  
 
The literature that explicitly addresses the knowledge gap between policy analysis and 
governance for SD provides detailed accounts of the research issues and the questions to 
be addressed by policy analysts,52 the methodical tools and tool-boxes to be applied,53 
as well as the policy-analytical competencies to be developed by policy analysts.54 
However, the level of analysis is largely limited to the ‘first-order observations’,55 
dealing with the observed. Accordingly, the literature studies governance for SD in 
terms of processes, structures and tools for SD, while ignoring its requirements in terms 
of observing processes of policymakers, i.e., the ways in which they as observers 
perceive the world. Policymakers are treated as ‘black-boxes’56, i.e., their observing 
systems are left out of sight. The theoretical and methodological requirements of policy 
analysis in light of the cognitive dilemmas of policymakers struggling to adapt 
governance for SD thus remain widely unexamined.  
 
The current scientific discourses on interpretative and argumentative turn in policy 
analysis57 or the more general discourses on the qualitative social research,58 on the 
reflexive methodology59 and on the mode 2 sciences60 offer valuable inputs on the 
epistemological and methodological requirements of policy analysis in the second-order 
reality perspective. In particular, the discourse on deliberative policy analysis, which 
connects policy analysis to the issue of deliberative democracy,61 represents a promising 
                                                 
51 Hendricks / Grin, 2006, pp. 3. 
52 Meadowcroft et al., 2005.  
53 Runhaar et al., 2005; 2006; Roe, 1998; Morgan et al., 1999; McDaniels, 2004. 
54 Runhaar et al., 2005; 2006. 
55 Von Foerster, 1979a, pp. 2. 
56 Von Foerster, 1982.  
57 E.g., Finlayson, 2004a; 2004b; Fischer, 1993; 2003a; 2003b; Fischer / Forester, 1993; Gottweis, 2003a; 
2003b; Héritier, 1993; Yanow, 1993; 2000; 2003; 2006; 2007; Yanow / Schwartz-Shea, 2006. 
58 E.g., Behrens, 2003; Charmaz, 2006; Denzin / Lincoln, 2000; Flick et al., 2000; Glaser / Strauss, 1967; 
Glaser / Strauss, 1998; Lamnek, 1995a; 1995b. 
59 E.g., Alvesson / Deetz, 2000; Alvesson / Skoldberg, 2000; Coghlan / Brannick, 2005; Sandelowski / 
Barroso, 2002; Schön, 1987.  
60 E.g., Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al, 2001; Hunecke, 2006.  
61 E.g., Fischer, 1993; Wagenaar, 2003b; Wagenaar / Cook, 2003; Yanow, 2003; Hajer / Wagenaar, 2003; 
Héritier, 1993. 
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reference. Also the research methodological discourse on sustainability research62 and 
its sub-type, the social ecology research,63 provide exhaustive insights. However, to 
date, all these discourses largely lack an explicit link to the issue of governance for SD. 
Furthermore, they primarily focus on the applicative potential of the classical social 
sciences methods, while overlooking the applicative potential of FRM as methodical 
solutions for policy research. Nevertheless, the innovative research methodological 
approaches that are advocated within these discourses often do not yet have a secure 
footing in the empirical policy analysis practice. 
 
The same is true for the current EU Foresight research that is practiced across countless 
domains, ranging from policy analysis to public policy, technology assessment, and 
studies for various sectors, firms and industries. While there has been a high level of 
operational use of Foresight, the methodology is rarely spelled out explicitly, but often 
just tacitly assumed.64 In fact, in the Foresight exercises, the methodology and 
theoretical grounding is often being perceived as peripheral to research practice. Glenn, 
co-author of one of the worldwide largest handbooks of FRM hence concludes that 
although much of FRM “have been institutionalized, relatively little documentation, 
evaluation, and agreement exists about how FRM are successful under various 
conditions and requirements.”65 In other words, Foresight methodology lacks 
reflexivity.66 Often, this has to do with the critique that “as the methods debates have 
become more philosophical, or at least epistemological, they have become less useful 
for doing of research.”67  
 
                                                 
62 E.g., Kates et al. 2000; 2001; Clark et al., 2004; Loorbach / Frantzeskaki, 2009; Bolin et al., 2000; 
Flyvbjerg, 2001. For an overview of the ongoing empirical EU research on SD, see the web portal of the 
EC that represents “the entry point to consolidated information on the contribution of the Seventh Frame 
Programme to sustainable development. (…) The Seventh Framework Programme was set up to allow the 
European research to live up to the research and development needs expressed in the EU SDS” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/sd/index_en.cfm). 
63 E.g., Hunecke (2006) proposes a complex research methodological heuristic for social ecology 
research. Jahn (2003, 2005) and Becker and Jahn (2000) discuss the theoretical and methodical problems 
of transdisciplinary in social ecology research. Balzer / Wächter (2002) and Wilms-Herget (2003) outline 
the central research methodological requirements of social ecology research as an experimental field of 
sustainability research. 
64 http://forlearn.jrc.es/guide/2_design/meth_framework.htm  
65 Glenn, 2003a, pp. 17. 
66 Fuller / de Smedt, 2008, pp. 1.  
67 Melia, 1997, pp. 35, cit. in Alvesson / Sköldberg, 2009.  
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While the ‘third generation futurists’ provide some input on the chances and challenges 
for interpretative turn in use of FRM in the broader ‘futures field’68,69 the level of 
research and development of the Foresight methodology remains low. However, it is 
common notion within the EU Foresight discourse that more in depth discussion of 
methodological considerations would be useful for the Foresight community to better 
understand the nature of the Foresight knowledge.70 The IPTS for example points 
towards the high relevance of addressing the question of methodology in Foresight, 
because “it is critical to be clear about methodology when attempting to create an 
understanding of the future. For instance some methodological considerations might 
give guidance on why participation is needed to state anything relevant about the future 
or what it means to be an ‘expert’ etc.”71 Accordingly, in the past decade, there have 
been several efforts taken to fuel the theoretical and methodological discussions within 
the EU Foresight discourse and to provide a coherent framework for communication 
and co-operation among the Foresight researchers at the EU level.72 However, the 
existing Foresight literature fails to establish a clear link to the current EU discourse on 
the theoretical, methodological and methodical issues of policy analysis as well as to the 
recent EU discourse on the requirements of governance for SD.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 The concept of futures field was introduced by US scholar Slaughter, 2001a. He distinguishes three 
core areas of futures activities, including Futures Research, Futures Studies and futures movements. In 
this thesis, Foresight is considered to a further core area of futures activity, typical for EU-based policy 
research.  
69 Cf. Inayatullah, 1992; Inayatullah, 1999; Inayatullah / Wildman, 1999; Inayatullah, 2001; Inayatullah, 
2002a; Inayatullah, 2002b; Inayatullah, 2003; Slaughter, 1984; Slaughter, 1995; Slaughter, 1997; 
Slaughter, 1999; Slaughter 2001; Slaughter 2001a; Slaughter / Inayatullah, 2003; Mannermaa, 1988; 
2000; Gordon / Glenn / Jakil, 2005. 
70 http://forlearn.jrc.es/guide/2_design/meth_framework.htm 
71 http://forlearn.jrc.es/guide/2_design/meth_framework.htm 
72 E.g., the EC Project COST 22 ‘Foresight Methodologies’ in 2003-2007 (http://Costa22.org; Fuller / de 
Smedt, 2008; COST A22, 2007); International Seville Seminars on FTA 
(http://foresight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta.html); FOR-LEARN project 
(http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.htm); ForSociety Initiative (http://www.eranet-forsociety.net); web-
based platform of the European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN) (http://www.efmn.info); 
Practical Guides to Foresight provided by the EC (e.g., Miles et al., 2002; 
http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/0_home/index.htm); the Mutual Learning Platform 
(http://www.innovating-regions.org/network/whoswho/projects_extended.cfm?sub_id=27&project_id=9). 
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1.4.  Research Purpose and Goals 
 
The goal of this thesis is to make an active contribution to the ongoing EU discourse 
about the knowledge gap between policy analysis and governance for SD by proposing 
a comprehensive reference frame for policy analytical Foresight for governance for SD, 
called ‘Sustainability Governance Foresight’ (SGF). This frame should enable policy 
analysts to increase their theoretical, epistemological and methodological reflexivity and 
self-control when using FRM to exercise policy analytical Foresight that is aimed at 
informing governance for SD. It should help them to better understand their emergence 
as observers (‘reflexive cybernetics’73), to critically reflect their ways of knowing 
themselves, to question their own cognitive processes, and to assess the state of their 
receptors in light of the cognitive barriers of policymakers struggling to adapt 
governance for SD. 
 
In order to fulfil this goal, the thesis follows several interrelated objectives. First, it 
strives to elaborate a typology of cognitive barriers and challenges of policymakers in 
terms of perceiving governance in the SD perspective that need to be systematically 
addressed by policy analysts in order to inform governance for SD. This typology 
should enable policy analysts to systematically examine the cognitive maps of 
policymakers and identify their cognitive challenges in terms of perceiving governance 
in the SD perspective. In consequence, it should allow policy analysts to better 
understand the demand of policymakers for policy advice and to provide targeted policy 
relevant knowledge that addresses the cognitive barriers of policymakers.  
 
Moreover, the thesis aims to develop a typology of shortcomings of mainstream 
theoretical approaches to policy analysis for governance for SD. The typology should 
serve policy analysts as a reference frame to critically reflect the selectivity of their 
mainstream theoretical approaches. It should allow them to critically reflect how these 
approaches determine their ability to help policymakers overcome their cognitive 
barriers to framing governance in the SD perspective. Besides facilitating the systematic 
exploration of benefits and limitations of the mainstream theoretical approaches to 
                                                 
73 Von Foerster, 1993.  
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policy analysis, the typology should also serve policy analysts as a matrix to 
systematically identify the central epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SD and to search for alternative theoretical approaches to meet these 
needs.  
 
Nevertheless, the thesis strives to propose a meta-epistemological and methodological 
for SGF that comprises three elements. A paradigmatic typology of FRM should help 
policy analysts critically reflect the epistemological value of the FRM for exercising 
SGF. A typology of epistemologies for SGF should allow policy analysts to critically 
reflect, how different epistemological frames for exercising SGF determine the research 
interest, the goals and the outcomes of SGF and how they influence their ability to meet 
the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. Finally, the frame 
includes a research methodological heuristic for SGF that should enable policy analysts 
to emancipate themselves from the unreflected choice and use of FRM and to critically 
reflect and adapt their research methodological approaches to choosing and using FRM 
in way that is responsive to the epistemological needs. The heuristic identifies a range 
of central research methodological tasks, questions and principles which policy analysts 
need to tackle in order to exercise SGF that allows them to fill the knowledge gap of 
policymakers struggling to adapt governance for more SD.  
 
1.5. Scope of the Thesis 
 
When studying policy analysis, the thesis conceives it exclusively as a sub-discipline of 
political science.74 Schubert and Bandelow75 argue that policy analysis achieved the 
status of paradigm thinking within political science as an action- and policy-oriented 
sub-discipline of political science that is aimed at using analytical techniques and 
knowledge for and in policy-making. Moreover, the thesis focuses exclusively on 
studying the advisory policy analysis,76 i.e., policy analysis that takes the form of 
                                                 
74 E.g., Schubert/ Bandelow, 2003; Fischer, 2003; Bell, 2003a.  
75 Schubert/ Bandelow, 2003. 
76 Bandelow (2003) refers to the advisory type of policy analysis as ‘advisory policy analysis’.  
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‘advisory science’77 striving to develop knowledge relevant to formulation and 
implementation of public policy.  
 
The conception and understanding of governance for SD in this thesis comprises all 
three central understandings of the governance concept in the present EU political 
science debate and research. It refers to the institutional polity dimension, i.e., to the 
“system of rules that shapes the actions of social actors”78 including a wide spectrum of 
governance modes between market and hierarchy. Furthermore, it relates to the politics 
dimension and to the process of policymaking, i.e., to “the ways and means in which the 
divergent preferences of citizens are translated into effective policy choices, about how 
the plurality of societal interests are transformed into unitary action and the compliance 
of social actors is achieved.”79 Moreover, the governance definition covers the policy 
dimension, i.e., the modes of political steering or steering instruments that define how 
particular policy goal should be achieved,80 including different command and control 
instruments, information, deliberation and persuasion or different forms of social 
influence and control.81  
 
In addition, the thesis is based on a broad understanding of governance. Thus it 
observes “every mode of political steering involving public and private actors, including 
traditional modes of government and different types of steering from hierarchical 
imposition to sheer information measures.”82 This understanding differs from the 
narrow governance concept that is established in opposition to traditional, hierarchical 
steering instruments that entails only “types of political steering in which non-
hierarchical modes of guidance, such as persuasion and negotiation, are employed, 
and/or public and private actors are engaged in policy formulation.”83 The narrow 
understanding of governance would thus complicate the task of observing and 
                                                 
77 Héritier, 1993.  
78 Treib et al., 2005, pp. 5. For more see Rosenau, 1992; Mayntz, 2004.  
79 Kohler-Koch, 1999, cit. In Treib et al., 2005, pp. 5.  
80 Héritier, 2002; Windhoff-Héritier, 1987.  
81 Treib et al, Baldwin / Cave, 1999, Windhoff-Héritier, 1987.  
82 Héritier, 2002, pp. 1.  
83 Héritier, 2002., pp. 1.  
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analytically grasping the broad range of different policymaking patterns and policy 
outputs.84  
 
The thesis largely focuses on analysing the EU political and policy analysis discourse in 
order to study the knowledge gap between governance for SD and policy analysis. 
Thereby, three approaches were used to gather data. First, data was collected via 
participatory observation of the working processes and outputs of the Department IV/2 
for Coordination of Environment, Sustainability and Transport in the Federal 
Chancellery of Austria85 and of the work of the Permanent Representation of Austria to 
the EU in Brussels.86 Second, a series of interviews were conducted with policymakers, 
policy analysts and sustainability experts who are actively involved in the EU 
sustainability discourse and champion, oversee, guide, audit or write strategies for SD at 
the EU, national and regional level.87 Moreover, qualitative content analysis of key 
documents with relevance for sustainability at the EU level (e.g., EU SDS, 
communications, minutes and press releases on the SD issues) and at the Member States 
level (e.g., National Sustainable Development Strategies [NSDSs] and progress reports) 
provided a broad picture on the challenges and chances of the evidence and knowledge-
based mainstreaming of SD into policymaking. The thesis furthermore scans the central 
conferences on SD in the EU (e.g., the conference ‘Steuert die EU in Richtung 
Nachhaltigkeitsunion?’, ‘Sustainable Neighbourhood - from Lisbon to Leipzig with 
Research [L2L]’ in 2007,88 ‘11. Jahreskonferenz des Rates für Nachhaltige 
Entwicklung’ in 201089), as well as the web-based portals on SD (e.g., the portal of the 
                                                 
84 Treib et al., 2005; Eberhard et al., 2006.  
85 Since 2007, the author of the thesis is working as a civil servant / desk officer in the Department IV/2 
for Coordination of the Environmental and Transport Policy in the Federal Chancellery of Austria. The 
department is in charge of preparations of the European Council in the field of SD, of implementation, 
monitoring and review of the EU SDS, of development, operationalisation and monitoring of 
‘Gesamtösterreichische Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie - ÖSTRAT’ as well as of preparations of the Annual 
Meeting of Sustainable Development Experts (AMSDE) at the Organisation for Economic Development 
and Co-operation (OECD).The author is a substitute member of the AMSDE since 2007 and she chairs 
the AMSDE Sustainability Impact Assessment Steering Group since 2009. 
86 In 2008, the author was on a two-month rotation to the Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU 
in Brussels, when the negotiations on EU climate and energy package entered the final stage. 
87 Interviews with Dewandre, 2007; 2008; García, 2007; Müller, 2007; Niestroy, 2008; Riegler, 2004; 
Spangenberg, 2008; Steuerer, 2007; Trattnigg, 2007; Türk, 2004. 
88 http://www.fona.de/en/5852 
89 http://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/termine/veranstaltungen-des-rates/10-jahreskonferenz/ 
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EC on SD,90 the EU research portal on SD91), and the governmental and/or civil society 
sustainability networks and initiatives (e.g., European Network of Sustainable 
Development Experts [ESDN]92 initiative ‘Growth in Transition’93). Another relevant 
source of data represents the series of research projects on ‘Sustainability and 
Environmental Communication” at the Institute for Journalism and Communication 
Studies of the Vienna University94 for the Environmental Bureau of Lower Austrian 
Provincial Government and for the ‘Niederösterreichische Landesakademie’.95 The 
thesis also draws on the doctoral research project of the author for the Global Marshall 
Plan Initiative at the Ecosocial Forum Europe between 2005 and 2006.96 
 
The thesis focuses on analysing the futures research discourse in the EU and in the 
United States of America (USA) in order to explore the applicative potential of the 
Foresight approach and FRM in policy analysis for governance for SD. Again, three 
approaches were used to collect empirical data. First, qualitative content analysis of the 
outputs of the Millennium Project of the American Council of the United Nations 
University97 (ACUNU) provided a broad picture of how Foresight is conducted in the 
EU. In particular, the thesis draws on the ACUNU annual series of the ‘State of the 
Future’ reports98 and on the ACUNU CD-Rom on ‘Futures Research Methodology’99 
that is commonly considered to be the world’s largest compilation of FRM.100 Another 
source of data represents the problem-oriented content analysis of the central 
                                                 
90 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/ 
91 http://ec.europa.eu/research/sd/index_en.cfm 
92 The author is a member of the ESDN in her role as the representative of the Austrian Federal 
Chancellery. For more see http://www.sd-network.eu/ 
93 http://www.growthintransition.eu/ 
94 The author acted as a project manager 2002-2004 in her role as a student assistant for Prof. Thomas A. 
Bauer at the Institute for Journalism and Communication Sciences at the Vienna University.  
95 Abedin et al., 2003; Appeltauer et al., 2004a; Ascher et al., 2004b. 
96 The author held a one-year research stipend of the Ecosocial Forum Europe (2005-2006) and was a 
member of the Global Marshall Plan think- tank (2005- 2006).  
97 The author acted as an intern and research assistant at the Millennium Project of the ACUNU in 
Washington D.C. between 2004 and 2007. ACUNU is a global futures research think-tank aimed to 
“assist in organising futures research, improve thinking about future, and make that thinking available 
(…) for consideration in policymaking (…) in order to accumulate wisdom about potential futures”(Glenn 
/ Gordon, 2007). 
98 Glenn / Gordon, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; Glenn et al., 2008; 2009; 2010.  
99 Gordon / Glenn, 2003.  
100 Gordon / Glenn, 2003. 
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anthologies on the futures field,101 including the ‘Knowledge Base of Futures 
Studies’,102 ‘Futures Studies - Methods, Empirical Issues and Civilisational Visions’103 
and ‘Foundation of Futures Studies’.104 In addition, the thesis draws on the 
interpretative content analysis of acknowledged journals in the EU and US futures field 
(e.g., Futures, Futures Research Quarterly, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change), of the web-based EU knowledge platforms on Foresight (e.g., For-Learn 
Online Guide,105 European Foresight site106) and of the outcomes and processes of the 
European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN).107 Also the outcomes of a three-year 
EU-funded research project ‘future-university - European Master in Future and 
Foresight Studies’108 provided valuable inputs on the state of the universitary education 
on Foresight. Second, the thesis scans the central international and EU conferences in 
the futures field, including the World Futures Studies Conferences (in particular, the 
conference in 2005 in Washington),109 the International Seminars on Future-oriented 
Technology Analysis,110 the UNIDO111 Expert Group Meeting on the Future of 
Technology Foresight in 2007112 and the European Foresight Platform Conference in 
2010.113 Third, a series of qualitative expert interviews were conducted with the EU and 
                                                 
101 Direct citations from sources that were published exclusively as a CD-Rom or as a web-site (e.g., 
Inayatullah, 1999; Slaughter / Inayatullah, 2001) are not fitted with corresponding page numbers when 
there are no such indications made in the text cited.  
102 Slaughter, 2001.  
103 Inayatullah / Wildman, 1999. 
104 Bell 2003a; 2003b.  
105 http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/0_home/index.htm 
106 http://foresight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta_2008/intro.html 
107 http://www.efmn.info/ 
108 The author acted as a project manager in her role as a student assistant for Prof. Thomas A. Bauer at 
the Institute for Journalism and Communication Sciences at the Vienna University between 2002 and 
2004. This project was aimed at developing “a Masters level course to run in the partner universities 
which will produce a cadre of experts in Future Study and Foresight/Forecasting in the European context 
in order to professionalise this area of work”(future-university, 2003). The project was conducted by a 
consortium of Karlstads Universitet, Middlesex University, Roskilde Universitetscenter, Uniwersytet 
Jagiellonski, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Universidad de Malaga and Universität Wien between 
2002 and 2004. 
109 http://www.wfsf.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76&Itemid=91 
110 http://foresight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta_2008/intro.html 
111 UNIDO stands for United Nations Industrial Development Organisation. 
112 http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o12296 
113 http://ipg.ict.tno.nl/wordpress/efp/2010/05/06/foresight-and-forward-looking-activities-exploring-new-
european-perspectives/ 
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US experts who are actively involved in futures research and who oversee, guide, audit 
and exercise Foresight.114 
  
1.6. Research Methodological Frame  
 
The inquiry in the thesis is embedded in constructivist grounded theory.115 Accordingly, 
it follows several interpretative qualitative research principles. First of all, the thesis 
takes a process-oriented approach to research.116 The cognitive maps of policymakers 
and policy analysts are not seen as given and static interpretation patterns that exist per-
se, but as patterns that are reproduced and modified through their application, i.e., 
through action and interpretation processes.117 The inquiry, therefore, strives to explore 
the process of constitution of the reality-, interpretation- and action-patterns (‘Deutungs- 
und Handlungsmuster’) with the help of which policymakers and policy analysts 
perceive and practically handle the world.118 It aims to document and analytically 
reconstruct the constitution process of the reality and explain it on the basis of the 
hermeneutic reconstruction. This is done by observing in a methodical hermeneutic 
sense their observations and descriptions of the world as context and language-
dependent results of their individual interpretation processes. The observations by 
policymakers and policy analysts are not explored as static representations of an 
unchanging reality context, but as processual segments of reproduction and construction 
processes of social reality. Following the processuality principle, the thesis always 
attempts to capture of the context of emergence of the social phenomena. It reflects how 
the knowledge gap between policymakers and policy analysts involved with governance 
for SD can be reduced with much variation and how these solutions need to be 
continuously altered and modified in response to new contextual conditions.  
 
                                                 
114 Interviews with Aaltonen, 2007; Cassigena, 20004; Coates, 2004; Da Costa, 2004; 2007; De Fonseca, 
2007; Glenn, 2004-2010; Gordon, 2004; Groff, 2004; Linstone, 2004; Havas, 2007; Keenan, 2004; 
Loikkanen, 2007; Mannermaa, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Scopolo, 2004. 
115 Charmaz, 2000; 2006; 2007; Roessler / Gaiswinkler, 2006. 
116 Lamnek, 1995.  
117 Lamnek, 1995.  
118 Lamnek, 1995.  
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In constructivist perspective, the research data is always conceived in double sense; as 
data for observers and as data of observers. This thesis hence does not claim to have the 
representative, but the specificity status.119 Each interpretation is – in the sense of the 
subjective research – dependent from the perspectivity of the author and of the available 
sources.120 In order to generate knowledge that evokes the grab,121 i.e., that fits closely 
with the research incidents and that captures the attention, the thesis is based on a 
research design that is opened122 towards the research objects, research sources, 
research situation and towards the methodical and theoretical reference frame.  
 
During the course of inquiry, the research data was not forced into the pre-existing 
theoretical categories. Instead, the theoretical frame remained opened until the end of 
inquiry and was refined in continuous exchange between the qualitative research data 
and the theoretical preconception. Then, the conceptual level of the analysis of research 
data was systematically raised. The coding of data,123 i.e., the analytical interpretations 
of research data throughout the research process, enabled to adapt the research process 
in response to new developments and knowledge that were then used to refine and 
modify the preliminary theoretical considerations. Theoretical sampling124 thereby 
largely relied on the comparative method. The observations by the author, by the 
interview partners, by policymakers and policy analysts and in the literature were 
compared in order to develop a set of relevant categories for explaining the data. The 
categories were then matched with the theoretical literature in order to label them with 
commonly used terms in the scientific discourse. This took me back to the field, where 
the categories were compared with new data so as to gain more insight about when, how 
and what extent they were pertinent and useful. Drawing on the hermeneutic cycle 
model,125 the inquiry was conceptualised as an exploration that is primarily interested in 
generating - as opposed to testing - the hypothesis126 on the basis of rich empirical data. 
 
                                                 
119 Von Foerster 1993, pp. 21. 
120 Forschauer/Lueger, 2003, pp. 84.  
121 Charmaz, 2000.  
122 Lamnek, 1995. 
123 Charmaz, 2000. 
124 Charmaz, 2000. 
125 Lamnek, 1995.  
126 Lamnek, 1995.  
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Throughout the inquiry, the communication between the author of the thesis and the 
research objects, i.e., the policymakers and the policy analysts - played a central and 
constitutive part of the research process. This communicative interaction127 served to 
mutually negotiate and mediate the reality definitions between the research objects and 
the observations of the author. It was considered to be a precondition of the research act 
and not a distortion factor that has to be eliminated through refinement and 
standardisation of research methods.  
 
1.7. Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis is structured into seven chapters. Following the introduction in chapter 1, 
chapter 2 outlines the cognitive barriers of policymakers to perceiving policymaking in 
the SD perspective. Drawing on theoretical preconsiderations about the nature and the 
sense of policymaking as advanced by Von Foerster,128 Arendt,129 Orren130 and 
Fischer,131 the focus is put on twofold issues. First, the chapter discusses the cognitive 
barriers of policymakers to accounting for discursive, pluralist and dialogue-based 
nature of the SD concept. Secondly, the chapter critically reflects the capacity of 
policymakers to make a sustainability shift in their political thinking. Borrowing from 
Luhmann’s concept of sense-making and the Von Foerster’s theory of observation, the 
chapter illuminates how the SD concept challenges the existing temporal, spatial, fact, 
dynamic, power and ethical horizons of meaning in political thinking of policymakers.  
 
Chapter 3 critically explores the capacity of policymakers to perceive global change, 
i.e., change in patterns of global affairs in the SD perspective. The chapter draws on the 
Kuhn’s concept of paradigm so as to bring the deeply-rooted assumptions of 
policymakers that constitute the basis for drawing a map of global affairs to surface for 
conscious examination. It inquires, what theories and models of international relations 
(IR) serve policymakers as reference frames to observe global change, what paradigm 
                                                 
127 Lamnek, 1995. 
128 Von Foerster, 1979; 1982; 1993, 2006; Von Foerster / Glasersfeld, 2007. 
129 Arendt, 2003; 2000; 1986a; 1986b. 
130 Orren, 1988.  
131 Fischer, 2003a; Fischer, 2003b. 
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thinking do they derive from, and how do they impact the ability of policymakers to 
perceive global change through sustainability lens. The chapter also studies the potential 
of the global governance theory as a reference point for observing the nature, sources 
and implications of global change in the SD perspective.  
 
Chapter 4 critically reflects the underlying theoretical presumptions of mainstream 
policy analysts that importantly determine their capacity to help policymakers see and 
overcome the central cognitive barriers to and challenges of perceiving governance in 
the SD perspective. In order to determine the ability of policy analysts to assist 
policymakers at accounting for discursive nature of the SD concept, the chapter first 
critically reflect their theoretical assumptions about the role of the SD concept for and in 
policymaking. So as to inquire the capacity of policy analysts to aid policymakers make 
a sustainability shift in their political thinking, the chapter critically reflects their 
assumptions about the ways in which policymakers acquire knowledge. Theories of 
learning ranging from behaviourist to cognitive and constructivist theories of learning 
are consulted as reference frames. Nevertheless, theories of IR are used as reference 
frames for bringing to surface the assumptions of policy analysts about the nature, 
dynamics and implications of global change, which importantly determine their ability 
to help policymakers account for it in the SD perspective. Drawing on the insights about 
theoretical shortcomings, the chapter concludes by outlining the central epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for governance for SD that policy analysts need to tackle so as 
to improve their capacity to inform governance for SD. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the research methodological requirements of policy analysis for 
governance for SD. Thereby, it focuses on analysing the applicative potential of the 
Foresight approach and of FRM for tackling the epistemological needs of policy 
analysis for governance for SD. The chapter outlines why the mainstream positivist 
research methodological approach to policy analysis limits the capacity of policy 
analysts to choose and use FRM in a way that allows them to meet the epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. Moreover, it highlights how policy 
analysts can profit from the policy analysis discourse on interpretative methodology and 
from the current EU Foresight discourse so as to improve their capacity to use FRM in a 
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way that is responsive to the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance 
for SD. 
 
Against this background, chapter 6 proposes a meta-epistemological and meta-
methodological frame for exercising policy analytical SGF. This frame comprises three 
elements that should serve policy analysts as reference frames for critical reflection of 
their uses of FRM in SGF in light of the epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SD: the paradigmatic classification of FRM for SGF, the typology of 
epistemologies in SGF and the research methodological heuristic for SGF.  
 
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of the thesis and gives an outlook on further 
research issues and questions to be addressed in order to advance the political science 
discourse on the knowledge gap between policy analysis and governance for SD and on 
the applicative potential of the Foresight approach and of FRM for the ex-ante policy 
analysis for governance for SD.  
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2. Perceiving Policymaking in Sustainable Development 
Perspective: Cognitive Challenges and Barriers  
 
The significant problems we face cannot  
be solved at the same level of thinking  
we were at when we created them.  
(Albert Einstein)  
 
 
The capacity of policy analysts to inform governance for SD largely depends from their 
ability to adequately address the central constraints and dilemmas of policymakers in 
terms of adapting governance for more SD. However, why do policymakers struggle to 
adjust governance for more SD? What are the barriers that limit their capacity to 
operationalise the SD concept, i.e., to create governance for bringing the society onto 
the tracks of SD? How to identify the reasons for their limited capacity to determine the 
governance operations necessary to translate the concept of SD into policymaking? 
 
The radical constructivist theory offers a promising reference frame to answer these 
questions. It argues that the limitations of human understanding relative to the 
complexities of policy problems force policymakers to operate on the basis of 
simplified representations or ‘cognitive maps’.132 The cognition of policymakers, i.e., 
the way they frame governance and SD, importantly influences their selection and 
pursuit of the SD goals. It deeply affects their judgements, decisions, behaviour and 
actions, and determines their capacity to adapt governance for more SD. Von Foerster 
summarises this problem with the following metaphor: “Perception is action.”133 In 
order to examine and identify the main reasons for the limited capacity of policymakers 
to adjust governance for more SD, this chapter hence aims at exploring: How does the 
SD concept challenge the common cognitive maps and logics behind political thinking 
of policymakers? What are the main cognitive barriers that severely restrict the capacity 
of policymakers to observe governance in the SD perspective?  
 
                                                 
132 Novy / Jäger, 2005. 
133 Von Foerster, 1991.  
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The goal of the chapter is to propose a typology of the central cognitive barriers of 
policymakers in terms of observing policymaking in the SD perspective. Drawing on 
Kreisky,134 the chapter conceives policymakers as both, actors who are professionally 
concerned with policy-making and as political experts who strive for rational 
argumentation and grounding of policymaking. Policymakers thus include politicians, 
civil servants in the public administration, journalists, activists in civil initiatives or 
non-governmental organisations (NGO-s) etc. Political thinking of policymakers is 
conceived as more or less elaborated reflection of policymaking, as reacting on the 
challenges of time and on the problems that concern the human cohabitation, as 
thinking about policymaking and political behaviours and as thinking in political 
disputes.135  
 
The chapter proceeds in three analytical steps. Part 1 discusses the role of the SD 
concept for policymaking by taking two perspectives. First, it reconstructs136 the 
framing of the SD concept and the problem of its implementation in the EU discourse. 
The goal is to document the main observations and framings of the implementation 
problem within the EU SD discourse. The exploration is based on the presumption that 
the concept of SD can obtain greater importance only if political system makes 
references to the concept. Secondly, part 1 critically discusses the theoretical 
perspectives on policymaking in terms of their capacity to serve as reference frames for 
systematic exploration of the relevance of the SD concept for policymaking. Drawing 
on these considerations, part 2 explores the capacity of policymakers to account for 
discursive nature of the SD concept when adapting governance for more SD. Part 3 
discusses the ability of policymakers to update their perspectives on policymaking and 
make a sustainability shift in their political thinking. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 Kreisky, 2003a. 
135 Kreisky, 2003a. 
136 Lamnek, 1995. 
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2.1. Relevance of the Sustainable Development Concept for 
Policymaking  
 
The discourse on the relevance of the SD concept for policymaking is always – 
implicitly or explicitly - determined and informed by a specific understanding of the 
nature and sense of policymaking. In the EU political discourse, SD was elevated to an 
overarching objective in 1997 and broken down to the EU SDS for mainstreaming SD 
into policymaking in 2001. Ever since, mainstreaming SD into EU policies represents a 
priority issue of the EU political debate.137  
 
Also in the political science discourse, the role of ideas such as the SD concept for 
policymaking represents an increasingly prominent issue. The theoretical approaches to 
studying the role of ideas for policymaking thereby range from positivist, behaviourist, 
scientific, dogmatic approaches to constructivist, post-positivist and post-modern 
approaches. These approaches offer different and often opposing answers on the 
following questions concerning the relevance of SD for policymaking: Does SD concept 
have a clearly identifiable causal role in determining action? Does it only mirror the 
events that happen for the reasons related to social structure? And, is SD only 
rationalisation or legitimisation offered to explain what otherwise would appear to be 
strategic manoeuvre to satisfy ones own beliefs?  
 
Much of the current scientific reflection is guided by the positivist138 models of 
policymaking as static policy cycle or stages. However, they are overly descriptive and 
lack the explanatory power concerning the role of ideas in policymaking. Although they 
address the role of ideas, beliefs, norms and institutions in policymaking, they tell us 
little about their relationship to other political factors.139 This thesis distances itself from 
these commonly adopted concepts of policymaking. When exploring the struggle of 
policymakers to adapt governance for more SD, it draws on the radical constructivist 
                                                 
137 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd 
138 In the literature, positivist models of policymaking are also reffered to as behaviourist, dogmatic or 
monoethic models of policymaking. 
139 Fisher, 2003. 
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theory as advanced by Von Foerster140 and on the theoretical deliberations of Arendt,141 
Orren142 and Fischer143 that offer promising reference frames for observing the 
relevance of SD for policymaking and its role in determining policy action. 
 
2.1.1. The Implementation Gap in the European Union  
 
In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty144 governing all EU policies elevated SD to an 
overarching objective of the EU and placed it at the heart of the EU policy agenda. 
Accordingly, the EU Heads of States and Governments at the Gothenburg Summit in 
June 2001 adopted the first EU SDS145 on the basis of the EC Communication "A 
Sustainable Europe for a better world: A European Strategy for Sustainable 
Development".146 The SDS completed the EU's political commitment to economic and 
social renewal and added a third, environmental dimension to the EU Lisbon strategy on 
growth and employment as well as established a new approach to policymaking.147 It 
defined four priority areas: combating climate change, ensuring sustainable transport, 
addressing threats to public health, and managing natural resources more responsibly.148  
 
However, in 2005, the EC elaborated a proposal for a review of the EU SDS. Although 
several strategic initiatives have been implemented to promote SD, the EC concluded 
that “not enough progress has been achieved; unsustainable trends should start to 
reverse.”149 In order to meet this goal, in June 2006 the European Council adopted the 
renewed EU SDS150 that sets out “a single, coherent strategy on how the EU will more 
effectively live up to its long-standing commitment to meet the challenges of 
sustainable development.”151 It introduces a definition of SD combining four key 
objectives: environmental protection, social equity and cohesion, economic prosperity 
                                                 
140 Von Foerster, 1979; 1982; 1993, 2006; Von Foerster / Glasersfeld, 2007. 
141 Arendt, 2003; 2000; 1986a; 1986b.  
142 Orren, 1988.  
143 Fischer, 2003a; 2003b. 
144 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd 
145 Göteborg European Council, 2001.  
146 Commission of the European Communities, 2001b. 
147 Cf. Paragraph 20, Göteborg European Council, 2001. 
148 Cf. Paragraph 27, Göteborg European Council, 2001. 
149 Commission of the European Communities, 2005a, pp. 4. 
150 Council of the European Union, 2006a. 
151 Council of the European Union, 2006a, pp. 3.  
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and the need to meet international responsibilities. According to the EU SDS, 
“sustainable development means that the needs of the present generation should be met 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (…) It 
is about safeguarding the earth's capacity to support life in all its diversity and is based 
on democracy, gender equality, solidarity, the rule of law and respect for fundamental 
rights, including freedom and equal opportunities. It aims at continuous improvement of 
the quality of life and well-being on Earth for present and futures generations. To that 
end, it promotes a dynamic economy will full employment and a high level of 
education, health protection, social and territorial cohesion and environmental 
protection in a peaceful and secure world, respecting cultural diversity.”152  
 
In comparison to the first EU SDS, the renewed EU SDS153 is more comprehensive and 
includes clearer governance and implementation provisions.154 It identifies 
unsustainable trends within seven key policy areas on which action needs to be taken, 
adding three priority areas to the ones identified in the first EU SDS. They include (1) 
climate change and clean energy, (2) sustainable transport, (3) sustainable consumption 
and production, (4) conservation and management of natural resources, (5) public 
health, (6) social inclusion, demography and migration, and (7) global poverty and SD 
challenges. In addition, the EU SDS contains cross-cutting policies that aim to promote 
knowledge society, including the education and training and the research and 
development policy. Each key policy area is determined by detailed operational and 
quantitative objectives and targets as well as by specific measures to attain these 
perspectives at the EU level within the next 10, 20 or 50 plus years. The main focus of 
the EU SDS thus lies on outlining the middle- and long-term challenges and actions that 
are necessary to mainstream SD into policymaking.  
 
According to the renewed EU SDS,155 the European Council will review the progress 
and the priorities and provide guidelines on policies, strategies and instruments for SD 
on the basis of a report of the EC every second year. Drawing on the national progress 
                                                 
152 Council of the European Union 2006a, pp. 2. 
153 Council of the European Union, 2006a. 
154 Berger / Zwirner, 2008.  
155 Council of the European Union, 2006a. 
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reports of the Member States, the first EC progress report on the EU SDS in 2007 
pointed out severe implementation problems, saying that “the picture is one of relatively 
modest progress on the ground whilst policy development in many cases is more 
encouraging this promising more significant impact on the ground in years to come.”156 
In consequence, the European Council in December 2007 invited the EC to “present a 
roadmap together with its next progress report in June 2009 on the EU SDS setting out 
the remaining actions to be implemented with highest priority.”157  
 
Although the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 reaffirmed that SD represents the basic principle 
of the Community action,158 the EC in the same year decided to abdicate the progress 
reports of the Member States and not to provide a roadmap on the EU SDS. This 
decision was heavily criticised by several Member States, including by Austria. The 
EC’s second review report on the EU SDS from July 2009159 largely repeated the 
rhetoric of the first progress report. In December 2009, the Swedish of the EU hence 
pointed out that the challenge continued to lie in “ensuring that the SDS has a real 
influence on the EU policies, to ensure coherence between short and long-term 
objectives and between different sectors.”160 In particular, the Presidency stressed the 
need for strengthened EU SDS governance, stating that “governance, including 
implementation, monitoring and follow-up mechanisms [of the EU SDS] should be 
reinforced for example through clearer links to the future EU 2020 strategy and other 
cross-cutting strategies.”161 Against this background, the European Council later in 
December 2009 confirmed that the EU SDS “will continue to provide a long-term 
vision and constitute the overarching policy framework for all Union policies and 
strategies.” Thereby, it pointed out that “a number of unsustainable trends require urgent 
action,”162 that “priority actions should be more clearly specified in future reviews”163 
of the EC, and that governance of the EU SDS “should be reinforced for example 
                                                 
156 Commission of the European Communities, 2007d. 
157 Council of the European Union, 2007, pp. 16. 
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160 Council of the European Union, 2009a, pp. 2. 
161 Council of the European Union, 2009b, pp. 8. 
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through clearer links to the future EU 2020 strategy and other cross-cutting 
strategies.”164  
 
The rather unambitious EC’s report and European Council conclusions in 2009 show 
that the implementation of SD in the EU level is and remains a highly political issue, 
strongly depending on the political will of the political leaders within the EU that is 
continuously challenged by more urgent short-term political challenges such as the next 
elections or the economic and financial crisis. A key political decision concerning the 
EU SDS is planed for 2011, when the European Council will decide when and if a 
comprehensive review of the EU SDS has to be launched.165 While this opportunity 
could be used to reform the EU SDS and strengthen its role in the EU, the EC and the 
coming EU Presidencies at this point question the necessity for a separate EU SDS, in 
particular, due to adoption of the Europe 2020 Strategy in June 2010.166  
 
At the national level, the renewed EU SDS urges the Member States to develop NSDSs 
by June 2008 or to revise the existing NSDSs in light of the renewed EU SDS.167 
According to a 2008 report of the ESDN,168 twenty-five Member States have adopted 
NSDSs.169 Most of the Member States developed their NSDSs already around 2002 in 
preparation for the World Summit for SD in Johannesburg. The NSDSs thereby largely 
represent a ‘third-way mixture’ between the ‘planning school’ with detailed prescription 
of objectives and actions over a certain period and the ‘learning school’ of informal and 
emergent strategy formulation, which does not necessarily imply the formulation of a 
document.170 Several Member States such as Finland and France have revised their 
NSDSs after the renewed SDS was adopted. Currently, about thirteen Member States, 
including Austria, are in the process of revising their NSDSs in order to bring them in 
line with the objectives of the EU SDS. The national progress reports of the Member 
States and the scientific discussion of the implementation of SD at the national level 
                                                 
164 Council of the European Union, 2009b, pp. 8. 
165 Council of the European Union, 2009a. 
166 EU 2020 was adopted in 2009. It follows the EU Lisbon Strategy as an EU’s new growth strategy. For 
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thereby largely coincide with the EU discourse: the progress on the ground remains a 
serious concern that has to be met by adjusting governance for more SD.171 
 
2.1.2. Pluralist and Dialogue-Based Nature of the Sustainable Development 
Concept  
 
According to Arendt,172 dialogue and plurality represent the existential basis of 
policymaking. In her view, the nature of policymaking is grounded in plurality of 
human beings. This plurality results from capability of human beings to grasp their own 
reality, which represents only one of countless possible realities, and from the existence 
of a political space that allows for cohabitation of diversities as opposed to 
commonalities. In Arendt’s view, policymaking stands for cooperative action of human 
beings that demands continuous preservation and defence of as many political spaces as 
possible. Plurality of humankind and the resulting existence of ‘Unterschiedlichkeit and 
Andersartigkeit’ and surprise are of great importance for the true politics.  
 
Arendt173 argues that securing the pluralist and dialogue-based basis of policymaking 
and preventing its perversion depends on twofold. First, it is conditioned by the 
capability of policymakers to acknowledge the basic differentness of human beings and 
their right to essential equality. This means that human beings need to be acknowledged 
in their individuality and uniqueness instead of being positioned in a world that offers 
no accommodation for an individual. This notion is opposing not only the mythical 
image of human being as more or less successful repetition of the same, but also the 
mythical understanding of politics, which considers the plurality of society and the 
surprise in the social processes as unwanted and disturbing. Secondly, the existence of 
policymaking depends from the capacity of people to acknowledge that the human 
being is an a-political creature, who can establish a communicative space, in which the 
true politics is feasible only in interaction with other human beings. As a result, the 
                                                 
171 For an overview of the implementation in the EU Member States see Niestroy, 2005 and Steurer / 
Martinuzzi, 2007. For a systematic overview of theoretical debate on the means and ends of the NSDSs 
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172 Arendt, 2003. 
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meaning of the true politics is seen in freedom, which can be experienced only in 
intercourse with others and through allowance of dissent in one’s self, as well as 
between ones’s self and the others. These considerations clearly oppose the Artistotle’s 
interpretation of human being as a political animal (‘Zoon politikon’) implying that the 
essence of human beings is political.174 
 
From this point of view, policymaking is grounded in disputes about quality of life and 
the means of realizing it. In consequence, policymaking by its nature centres on 
controversial ideas and beliefs about the best courses of action. It may be seen as a 
complicated collective learning process, in which the participants advocate differing 
ideas in an effort to win one over another.175 The discourse on SD thereby represents 
only one of numerous points of disputes about quality of life. The approaches to 
integration of the SD concept into policymaking are necessarily controversial and often 
opposing, as this is the essential condition for the existence of politics. Any attempt to 
establish a blueprint for operationalisation and integration of the SD concept into 
policymaking would be counter-productive and a-political.  
 
2.1.3. Need for Sustainability Shift in Political Thinking  
 
Policymaking is embedded in a web of social meanings produced and reproduced 
through discursive practices and interactions. In other words, policymaking is taking 
shape through socially interpreted understandings. The meanings and the discourses in 
which they circulate are not of the actors’ own choosing or making. Interests, norms and 
institutional interactions thus represent a firm and closely interrelated part of discourses. 
Discourses give expression to the interests that are shaped by institutional interactions 
and framed by cultural norms. Discourses shape and control political actions as they 
supply them with meaning. The actions of policymakers are thus commonly based on 
normative concepts and images.  
 
The behaviour of individuals, states and other actors is shaped by socially constructed 
rules and cultural practice. The way how individuals talk about the world, shapes their 
                                                 
174 Arendt, 2003. 
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practices. They are capable of changing the world by changing their ideas and 
ideologies. Socially constructed interests and identities, influenced by culture, norms, 
ideas, and interactions thus can change. The structural forces in policymaking are 
dynamic discursive entities that have only a secondary influence on policymaking. 
 
Policymaking is guided by interest and identity that are socially constructed. 
Understanding the discursive struggle to create and control systems of shared social 
meanings, therefore, is basic to understanding policymaking. The scientific observation 
of this struggle has to work on two levels: on the first-order level focusing on 
observations, i.e., interpretations and interests of policymakers (the observed) and on 
the second-order level focusing on the observations of the researchers (the observant).176  
 
From this point of view177, the SD concept represents a firm part of political discourse 
which is continuously shaped by interactions. It is framed by cultural norms and 
challenged by interests. The concept of SD is a socially constructed idea with the 
potential to change interests and identities of people that guide policymaking. The 
introduction of the concept of SD to policymaking importantly challenges the common 
notions of and ways of political thinking and forces policymakers and scholars to update 
their perspectives on policymaking. The adoption of the SD concept as a normative 
imperative of policymaking hence necessarily demands an exploration and reflection of 
premises and uncertainties of the common ways of political thinking. It opens the view 
for questions such as what is the role of identity and interests for policymaking and how 
can actors change their socially constructed interests and identities.  
 
2.1.4. Potential of the Sustainable Development Concept to Guide Political 
Action  
 
Ideas matter beyond interests. While Weber contests that “not ideas, but material and 
ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct,”178 he acknowledges that very frequently, 
the world image that has been created by ideas has determined the tracks along which 
                                                 
176 Von Foerster, 1993.  
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Von Foerster / Glasersfeld, 2007. 
178 Weber, 1948 ( cit. in: Fisher, 2003, pp. 280).  
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action has been pushed by dynamic interests. Similarly, Orren argues that “people don’t 
act on the basis of the self-interest, without regard to aggregative consequences of their 
action.”179 In his view, they are motivated by values, purposes, ideas, and goals, and 
commitments that transcend self-interest or group interest. Fisher180 adds that political 
and opinion research demonstrates that ideas play a special role in the behaviour of 
political leaders, and that their beliefs need to be explained by ideological orientations.  
 
Seen from this perspective, ideas are not individual properties that the actors can 
possess, as this is suggested by the mainstream theories of policymaking such as the 
rational choice theory. Rather, ideas and discourses have a force of their own 
independently of actors, who are in a way properties of discourse. The actions of actors 
and other political entities, therefore, do not only reflect the narrow self-interests as this 
is suggested by common political theories such as rational choice theory of 
policymaking. They are largely guided by shared ideas, values, norms and beliefs such 
as the SD concept. 
 
Borrowing from this notion of policymaking assuming the primary role of ideas for 
policymaking, the thesis argues that the SD concept is an idea, value, norm and shared 
belief with the potential to guide political action beyond the personal interests of 
policymakers. It has the potential not only to guide their social construction of the 
world, but also to invisibly shape and organise the political discourse. As such, it can 
guide political actions beyond the personal interests of policymakers. In short, the 
concept of SD in this thesis is conceived as an inherently normative image that has the 
power to change the world as we know it. Metaphorically speaking, it represents a 
springboard or building block for political thinking, which permits otherwise vague and 
provisional notions about the future to take on greater clarity and form. It transmits the 
image of a desirable future world, i.e., the image of how the world is supposed to be. It 
visualises desirable social development and growth.  
 
To sum up, the thesis is grounded on three assumptions: (1) the existential basis of 
policymaking is pluralist and dialogue-based, (2) policymaking is guided by interests 
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and identity that are socially constructed, and (3) ideas matters beyond the self-interest. 
From this it follows that the nature of the SD concept is pluralist and dialogue-based, 
that the SD concept challenges the common ways of political thinking and that it has the 
potential to guide political action. 
 
2.2. Cognitive Barriers to Accounting for Discursive Nature of the 
Sustainable Development Concept  
 
Mainstream policymakers severely struggle to account for the dialogue-based and 
pluralist nature of the SD.181 In particular, they encounter three main types of cognitive 
barriers to tackling the discursive nature of the SD concept.182  
 
Table 1: Cognitive Barriers to Accounting for Discursive Nature of the Sustainable Development 
Concept 
 
Cognitive Challenges  Cognitive Barriers of 
Policymakers 
Symptoms 
 
Dynamic Nature of the 
SD Concept 
Conception of SD as a 
temporally static concept.  
- lacking capacity to account for the 
continuously changing meaning of 
SD in response to the pressing policy 
problems  
Competing Paradigms in 
Disputes about Quality 
of Life  
Conception of SD as an ideal 
end-stage of societal 
development.  
- lacking sensitivity of policymakers for 
the differences and synergies 
between the SD discourse as well as 
alternative and competing 
development discourses 
- inability to open the SD concept to 
consideration and reconfiguration 
Conflicting Sustainability 
Paradigms and the 
Interpretation Gap   
Conception of SD as 
perspective-independent 
concept. 
- lacking capacity to critically reflect 
ones own understanding of the SD 
concept in light of the numerous 
interpretations of the SD concept  
- lacking sensitivity for opposing 
framings of the SD concept, leading 
to severe political controversies 
and deadlock situations 
 
                                                 
181 See chapter 2.1.2. 
182 See Table 1. 
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First, they tend to disregard the dynamic nature of the SD concept because they 
conceive it as a temporally static concept. Secondly, they fail to position the SD concept 
within the broader political discourse on competing development paradigms and open it 
for disputes about quality of life. This is because they tend to frame SD as an absolute, 
ideal end-state of societal development. Third, policymakers exhibit insensitivity for the 
often opposing interpretations SD concept by policymakers and stakeholders because 
they tend to understand SD as a perspective independent concept. This can lead to 
severe political controversies and deadlock situations.  
 
2.2.1. Dynamic Nature of the Sustainable Development Concept  
 
Policymakers aiming to adapt governance for more SD typically struggle to reflect and 
account for the continuous evolvement of the SD concept and for its inherently dynamic 
nature. The advancement of the SD concept has been subject to intense debate in the 
recent years.183 Scholars thereby agree that its evolution represents a lively process that 
continuously challenges its understanding and operationalisation.184 The beginning of 
the SD discourse is commonly positioned in 1972 when the United Nations (UN) held 
the first ever Conference on the Human Environment. This conference rooted in the 
regional pollution and acid rain problems of northern Europe led to establishment of 
several national environmental protection agencies and of the UN Environment 
Programme.185 It sensitised the world community for the dangers of pollution, 
exhaustion of natural resources, and desertification.186 The discussion was hence 
primarily formed by the sectoral notion of environmental pollution.187 In the same year, 
the Club of Rome published ‘Limits to Growth’,188 a controversial report that highlights 
the consequences of exceeding the carrying capacity of the natural environment. The 
report predicts dire consequences if growth is not slowed. It introduces a mind-shift in 
spatial dimensions of political thinking about environmental pollution as it redirects the 
focus of policymakers from local pollution to the use (and misuse) of resources in a 
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184 See Figure 1. 
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global context. It also refocuses political attention toward possible global futures.189 
However, the report was subject to extensive critique. While the developed countries 
criticized the report for not including technological solutions, the developing countries 
were incensed because it advocated abandonment of economic development.190 
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Figure 1: Sustainable Development Timeline 
 
In the years following, the scientific consensus on the importance of ecological 
imbalances further specialised. Eventually, the scientific insight that damage inflicted 
by human activities on the environment renders these activities unsustainable triggered 
the need for a new worldview, which would serve as unifying basis for global 
consensus. This need was met with introduction of the SD concept.191 The term ‘SD’ 
was first given currency in 1980 by the World Conservation Strategy.192 This strategy 
“primarily sought to protect essential ecological processes, life-support systems and 
genetic diversity through the sustainable utilisation of natural resources. (…) It gave 
increased prominence to the root social, political and economic causes of the 
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environmental crisis.”193 Its section “Towards Sustainable Development” identifies the 
main causes of habitat destruction such as poverty, demographic pressure, social 
inequity and trading regimes. It calls for a new international development strategy to 
reduce inequalities.194 
 
In 1987, the concept was reinforced and brought to the mainstream political debate 
when the World Commission on Environment and Development published the report 
‘Our Common Future’, which is better known under the name ‘Brundtland report’.195 In 
this report, the definition of SD contains two key concepts: first, the concept of needs, 
in particular the essential needs of the world's poor to which overriding priority should 
be given and second, the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and 
social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.196 
Moreover, the report identifies three leading, interconnected principles of SD: (1) 
environmental efficiency as imperative of sustaining the natural life-support systems on 
the planet in response to the perceived need to stop environmental degradation and 
ecological imbalance, (2) intergenerational social justice as the ethical imperative of 
equity between generations aimed at addressing the need to avoid impoverishment of 
future generations, and (3) intragenerational social justice as the ethical imperative of 
extending the opportunity to improve quality of life of all humankind in order to 
promote the equity of the present-day populations. The Brundtland report stresses that 
environmental problems cannot be considered in isolation from other issues, such as 
poverty and social disintegration problem and it appeals strongly to responsibility of the 
present generation. The report hence blends together the social, economic, cultural and 
environmental issues and global solutions.197  
 
The concept became a global norm at the World Summit in Rio in 1992, where 
countries of the world signed the Rio declaration, in which they committed themselves 
to comply with the SD concept. Ever since, the SD concept became one of the leading 
intellectual and symbolic resources for exploration and shaping of the future. It invisibly 
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organises and designs the policy discourse, challenging the common notions and 
understandings of policymaking. Furthermore, the global environmental problems 
became a part of development policies and studies. However, despite this progress, 
several important aspects such as the growth dogma and the implications of free trade 
were discussed only in informal preparatory meetings and were excluded from the 
discussions at the formal meetings.198  
 
The above line-up captures only a small fragment of the ongoing evolution of the SD 
concept at the global level. However, it shows in an exemplary way that the essence 
(‘das Wesen’) of the SD concept comes to surface when the idea is understood in the 
ontogenetic way. While the ‘ontogenesis’ concerns the process of becoming (‘Prozess 
des Werdens’), the ‘ontogenetics’ concerns the research of this process.199 In the 
ontogenetic perspective, the SD concept is continuously filled with content. In order to 
understand the essence of the SD concept, policymakers hence need to account for 
dynamic ‘becoming’ instead of the static ‘being’ of the SD. The question is not what is 
SD, but where does the SD concept come from and how does it evolve?  
 
Instead of taking into account the procedural aspects of the SD concept, policymakers 
tend to understand and treat it as a ready-made solution. One of the main symptoms of 
the lacking capacity to account for the dynamic nature of the SD concept, among others, 
represents the common objective of policymakers to elaborate and rely on permanently 
valid blueprints for achieving SD that would apply independently from the contextual 
conditions. This is because the ambiguous, intangible and dynamic nature of the SD 
paradigm represents a source of conflict and uncertainty in policymaking that is seen by 
policymakers as highly discomforting. Thus they often strive to develop clear guidelines 
for achieving SD, which would apply equally in all countries and at all times.200 
However, given that the SD concept is continuously disputed within the policy 
discourse, a universally and permanently valid blueprint cannot be given, certainly not 
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one that applies equally in all countries. The only point of agreement that can be 
achieved is “that sustainable development means different things to different people.”201  
 
2.2.2. Competing Development Paradigms in Disputes for Better Life  
 
The EU policymakers largely fail to position SD within the broader political discourse 
on competing development and growth paradigms. This is because they tend to 
conceive SD as an ideal end-stage of societal development. Thus they struggle to 
identify the added value of the SD model of growth and its synergy with the newly 
emerging alternative concepts of growth. They lack the ability to open it for disputes 
about quality of life and find it increasingly hard to counter the growing criticisms that 
the SD community wants to do more of the same. 
 
 
Figure 2: S-Curve (accelerating growth followed by limits to 
growth) leading to breakdown202 
 
SD represents a concept of desired social transition that emerged as a response to the 
notion that the change in patterns of global resource use and consumption takes the 
form of an accelerating and exponential growth.203 This type of growth begins slowly 
but accelerates over time and often gets out of control before people realise that there is 
a problem. After the period of accelerating growth, the existing world system can reach 
its limits to growth.204 This is the state, where the environment does not contain enough 
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resources to support unlimited future quantitative growth economy and society. When 
this point is reached, it creates a major crisis of the system. The system responds to the 
limits to growth with an overall breakdown.205  
 
The SD concept evolved to articulate concerns about the existing practices and patterns 
of global development which emerged over the course of the twentieth century 
especially with respect to the destruction of global ecosystems, and the urgent needs of 
the poor. The concept proposes an alternative path where development meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their 
needs.206 In reaction to the above worst case scenario, the SD concept advocates the 
steady state of economic growth.207 It was developed and adopted by actors who worry 
about the increasing global population, the finite world resources, and the protection of 
the environment as a life support system and the creation of the foundation for 
economic development for the entire world population. The SD movement is also 
referred to as the ‘regenerative design movement’,208 because it recognizes that nature 
will regenerate itself if we take care of it and do not take from nature at a faster rate than 
it can replenish itself. It strives to achieve steady growth after the limits to growth are 
achieved and calls for responsible and adequate development policies before global 
consumption goes further out of control.  
 
 
Figure 3: S-Curve (accelerating growth followed by limits to 
growth) leading to steady-state growth209 
                                                 
205 See Figure 2.  
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207 See Figure 3. 
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Moreover, the SD concept also opposes the increasingly popular model of growth 
leading to a quantum jump. This model predicts a breakthrough of a system to a 
completely new system due to technological change and innovation as the system’s 
response to the limits of growth.210 Policymakers advocating it believe that a 
technological innovation such as genetic engineering, nanotechnologies, resource 
efficient technologies or clean technologies will solve the problem of scarce natural 
resources. This is a legitimate and powerful argument of policymakers aiming to retain 
the status quo. As the breakthroughs cannot be anticipated, they offer broad space for 
optimist speculation about totally new emergencies (e.g., new technologies) in order to 
overcome the limits to growth. As such, this growth paradigm seriously undermines the 
SD concept. 
 
 
Figure 4: S-Curve (accelerating growth followed by limits to 
growth) leading to breakdown of the system followed by a 
quantum jump / breakthrough to a new system level211 
 
The most prominent derivates of this paradigm presently include the green economy 
concept and the green growth concept that entered the mainstream political debate in 
2008. Currently, there are numerous initiatives in the EU with the political intention to 
establish the green growth concept as a new national and global development paradigm 
vision for the coming years. For example, the EU Environment Council in October 2009 
recognised the urgency of turning the current multiple crises into an opportunity by 
shifting to a safe and sustainable low carbon, resource-efficient economy and stressed 
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that “a transition to an eco-efficient economy represents new business opportunities, 
and, given adequate framework conditions, will boost EU competitiveness and stimulate 
significant employment growth.”212 Also the EU 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth is largely informed by this model of growth.213 At international 
level, the initiatives aimed at promoting the concept of green growth include the 
preparations of the Green Growth Strategy by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD),214 the Green Growth Initiative for the Asian and 
Pacific Region by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,215 
as well as the Green Jobs Initiative216 and the Green Economy Initiative217 by the UN 
Environment Programme. They call for low-carbon economy and green growth as new 
objectives for the future economy, leading governments to increasingly invest a portion 
of their economic stimulus in environmental actions and measures. 
 
The main dispositive behind the green growth concept represents the principle of ‘eco-
efficiency’218, i.e., the objective to minimise the amount of environment used per unit of 
economic activity. Thereby, the green growth concept implies that the Gross-Domestic 
Product (GDP) as an indicator for value-added money-based economic activities should 
rise.219 Typical policy instruments to achieve eco-efficiency, among others, include 
investing in low-carbon infrastructure and research and development of green 
technologies, eliminating environmentally harmful policies (e.g., subsidies for fossil 
fuels), and promoting trade liberalisation for environmental goods and services. While 
the green growth concept recognises that economic growth must factor in environmental 
impacts (notably, climate change and biodiversity losses), it refers to SD as 
environmental dimension of growth. While it emphasises the environmental and 
economic sustainability, the social dimension is brought up solely in the context of 
labour markets, skills sets and education. In the SD perspective, these aspects are not 
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sufficient to portray the social dimension as an integral part of growth. In particular, the 
green growth concept disregards the distributive and equal opportunity aspects as well 
as the social protection level issues (especially regarding pensions and health) that play 
an integral role in the sustainability context. However, policymakers largely fail to 
critically reflect how the green growth concept220 and other derivates of the third model 
of growth221 undermine or complement the SD concept. 
 
2.2.3. Conflicting Sustainability Paradigms and the Interpretation Gap  
 
Policymakers typically struggle to account for and acknowledge the interpretative 
nature of the concept for SD. They fail to critically reflect their own understanding of 
the SD concept in light of the numerous other interpretations of the concept. As a result, 
they fail to explicitly take into consideration the often opposing framings of the SD 
concept by other actors and partners. 
 
Ever since the term ‘SD’ was first introduced to the global political debate, scholars and 
political leaders have attempted to dissect this highly ambiguous term and 
operationalise it for policymaking.222 In 1997, the European Environment Agency223 
counted over three hundred published definitions of SD. Kelly et al.224 argue that in the 
past decade, this number further increased. This broad range of SD definitions 
represents a product of diverse worldviews and competing vested interests. Several 
contributions in the EU discourse on the conceptual, ethical and paradigmatic issues of 
SD enable to bring different understandings of the SD concept to surface for conscious 
examination, comparison and critical reflection. Smith et al.225 for example argue that 
the operationalisations and definitions of SD can differ in the choice of object of 
sustainability. Thereby, they highlight three central approaches to operationalising SD 
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that are commonly applied in the EU: 1) the ‘capital approach’ focusing on the economy 
of sustainability,226 2) the approach focusing on sustainability of human development 
(social and economic) and 3) the ‘three pillar approach’ to SD that focuses on 
sustainability of the environmental, social and economic system concurrently. The three 
pillar approach highlighting the economic, social and ecological pillar of sustainability 
thereby represents the most commonly adopted approach to mainstreaming SD into 
policymaking.227  
 
All three above approaches to SD have one thing in common. They raise a highly 
disputed question of whether natural capital can be substituted by other forms of capital 
such as the social, economic or human capital. Referring to these questions, Kelly et 
al.228 locate the existing operationalisations and definitions of SD in the EU discourse 
along the continuum of two types of sustainability paradigm, the weak and the strong 
sustainability paradigm. According to Neumayer,229 proponents of the weak 
sustainability maintain that such substitutability of the natural capital is possible, whilst 
followers of the strong sustainability regard natural capital as non-substitutable. This is 
why the strong sustainability paradigm is often coterminous with what some call 
‘ecological sustainability’230 or ‘eco-centric paradigm’231 that are primarily aimed at 
conservation of the natural capital. The strong sustainability paradigm is also associated 
with a robust approach to community and social issues such as equity and active 
participation.  
 
The decision for either of these two paradigms is a highly political decision as they both 
are subjected to severe criticism. Referring to the strong sustainability paradigm, 
Gremmen and Jacobs point out that “trying to direct each of the three dimensions, 
ecology, economy and society toward sustainable futures often results in the dilemma 
that the proposed solutions are incompatible with each other, i.e., that a sustainability-
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oriented solution for one dimension is not sustainable for another.”232 Keiner shares this 
opinion by arguing that “the main objectives of the three pillar model, i.e., produce 
more, distribute more justly, and preserve the future are hardly compatible.”233 In his 
view, such ideal solutions are not achievable in a closed system like our planet as - 
according to the second law of thermodynamics (entropy) - each increase of one value is 
at the same time accompanied by a decrease of another value. Also Marcuse joins this 
critique by pointing towards the problem that the “sustainability and social justice do 
not necessarily go hand in hand.”234 He points out that the programmes and policies can 
be environmentally and economically sustainable and socially unjust, too. Steurer235 
criticises the concept of strong sustainability as out of touch with reality in an ecological 
as well as a political sense. Referring to the weak sustainability paradigm, Keiner236 
argues that policymaking drawing on weak sustainability paradigm cannot lead to 
sustainability in a comprehensive sense. In his view, a solution for one dimension is 
sustainable only if its effects are sustainable for the other two dimensions, too.  
 
The interpretative nature of the SD concept implies that it is of utter importance that 
policymakers account for different interpretations of the SD concept of all relevant 
stakeholders before policymakers engage in discourses and disputes about ways to 
move forward. 237 However, chaos of definitions of SD remains one of the biggest 
challenges to be tackled by policymakers. As Kelly et al. argue, SD “remains a concept 
intuitively understood by many but still very difficult to express in tangible or 
operational terms.”238 One of the central reasons for the lacking capacity of 
policymakers to account for numerous interpretations of the SD concept represents their 
habit to use the SD concept in an uncritical and unreflected way. They treat it as a 
given, absolute and static concept. They tend to assume that their understanding and 
interpretation of SD is the only (right) one. Consequently, they fail to acknowledge that 
“what is considered sustainable is to a great extent subject to personal and societal 
preferences with respect to economic development, environmental quality, assessment 
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of (future) technological possibilities, and the attitude towards risks and uncertainty.”239 
Thus policymakers disregard the perspectivity and selectivity of their interpretation of 
the SD concept and how it is embedded in different schools of political thinking.  
 
The difficulty of policymakers to account for the interpretative nature of policy making 
and the plurality of understanding and operationalisations of the SD concept explicit 
results in what is labelled as the ‘interpretation gap’.240 The gap has highly negative 
consequences for mainstreaming SD into policymaking as it typically leads to severe 
political controversies and deadlock situations. There are numerous cases of the 
interpretation gap in empirical practice that show what happens if policymakers fail to 
bring different interpretations of the SD concept to surface for conscious examination in 
order to achieve common understanding in consensus or in difference before disputing 
about the ways to move forward. One such example is the French experience in the 
initial period of Natura 2000241 from 1992 to 2003. It illustrates the importance of 
explicit accounting for different interpretations of the SD concept by all relevant 
stakeholders before policymakers engage in discourses and disputes abut ways to move 
forward. On one hand, this period was characterized by a clear misunderstanding 
between French government and the EC regarding the interpretation of Natura 2000 
objectives and principles.242 On the other hand, there was confusion among different 
sectors in France as to the objectives and implications of Natura 2000.243 Consequently, 
“each policy area (agriculture, transport, fisheries) adopted its own standpoints as to 
what implementation of Natura 2000 should actually involve.”244 The Environment 
Ministry charged with the implementation of the Natura 2000 in France ignored this 
multitude of interpretations of SD by the ministries. In particular, the differences in 
interpretations between the Agricultural Ministry and the Environmental Ministry were 
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disregarded. After the Environment Ministry decided to ignore the societal concerns and 
to focus uniquely on science, France faced a collection of infringement procedures and 
high profile court cases brought by the EC. The ignored interpretation gap translated 
into strong political controversies that eventually resulted in the official suspension of 
all Natura 2000 activities between 1996 and 1999. To date, France remains within the 
group of most problematic EU Member States in terms of implementing Natura 2000.245  
 
2.3. Cognitive Barriers to Sustainability Shift in Political Thinking  
 
It is now common notion that the SD concept severely challenges the political thinking 
of policymakers in the EU. Cognitive maps and logic commonly informing the political 
thinking largely restrict their capacity to perceive policymaking processes through 
sustainability lens. However, policymakers have difficulties to take the necessary self-
reflexive position and critically reflect the cognitive maps and methods behind their 
political thinking. As a result of the lacking insight into the nature of their own political 
thinking, they struggle to recognise, what mind-shifts in political thinking they need to 
make, and how to make them in order to frame policymaking in the SD perspective. In 
other words, they fail to see and critically reflect the blind spots of their cognition of 
policymaking in the SD perspective. As Von Foerster246 would put it, the problem is 
that policymakers do not see that they do not see what they do not see. Consequently, 
they fail to overcome the cognitive barriers that block their view on policymaking in the 
SD perspective.  
 
The current literature recognises the need for the sustainability shift in political thinking 
of policymakers. Thereby, it tends to come in two extremes. On one hand, it discusses 
in the normative way the principles of political thinking in the SD perspective247 while 
treating policymakers as a black box. It thus leaves their observing systems and 
cognitive barriers to sustainability shift largely out of sight. On the other hand, 
policymakers’ cognitive barriers to translating SD into policymaking have been subject 
                                                 
245 McCauley, 2008. 
246 Von Foerster, 1993. 
247 Commission of the European Communities, 2005c; Council of the European Union, 2006a.  
 55
to intense debates in particular in the implementation reports on the EU SDS.248 
However, the conceptualisation of cognitive barriers and the link to theories of 
cognition, theories of observer and theories of meaning are weak. Instead, the literature 
offers largely unsystematic, iterative lists of cognitive barriers and dilemmas that 
policymakers encounter when aiming to adjust governance for more SD. Only few 
works, which provide theoretically grounded reflection of the cognitive challenges and 
barriers of framing governance in the SD perspective, focus on policymakers’ 
perception of the environmental dimension of SD, while ignoring other dimensions of 
SD such as the social or economic dimension.249  
 
Against this background, this chapter proposes a typology of cognitive barriers of 
policymakers to observing policymaking in the SD perspective that should enable 
policy analysts to systematically explore how the multidimensional SD concept 
challenges the political thinking of policymakers. The typology draws on the 
Luhmann’s250 theory of meaning in order to deconstruct or - as Luhmann puts it - to 
decompose the political thinking of policymakers. The theory offers a valuable 
orientation frame for exploring why and how the commonly adopted cognitive maps of 
policymakers are ill-adapted for observing policymaking in the SD perspective. It 
represents an approach to bring the cognitive maps of policymakers that influence their 
ability to frame policymaking in the SD perspective to surface for conscious 
examination.  
 
Drawing on Luhmann,251 the typology argues that political thinking can explored as the 
experience of meaning or of meaningful action that represents a process taking place in 
reference to different dimensions of meaning. Luhmann thereby distinguishes three 
meaning dimensions, i.e., the referential structures of meaning in political thinking of 
policymakers. They include the temporal dimension, the fact dimension, and the social 
dimension. For him, the primary decomposition of meaning in general “lies then in 
these three dimensions, and everything else is a question of their recombination.”252 
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Luhmann argues that each experience of the world and the fixation of its meaning can 
be ordered only according to the temporal, fact and social dimension. These meaning 
dimensions also offer important possibilities for regulating the borders of the political 
sense-making. Through temporal, fact and social dimension, policymakers regulate, 
what problems are considered relevant, what behaviour and courses of action come into 
consideration in a system, and what is the behaviour that is attributed to the 
environment. Thereby, “each of these dimensions acquires its actuality from the 
difference between two horizons. Thus each is a difference differentiated against other 
differences. Each dimension is given as universally meaningful, which implies - 
formally speaking - no constraints on what is possible in the world.”253 
 
In Luhmann’s view, the temporal dimension organises the ‚when’ as opposed to the 
‚who/what/where/how’ of human experience and action. The dimension is “constituted 
by the fact that the difference before and after, which can be immediately experienced 
in all events, is referred to specific horizons, namely is extended into the past and the 
future. (…) Time is the interpretation of reality in light of the difference between past 
and future.”254 Setting of boundaries to time typically leads to abbreviation of the 
temporal horizon and consequently to the commonly known problem of ‘scarcity of 
time’.255 For example, the time between the implementation and the visible positive 
impacts of policies becomes scarce when a fixed boundary such as the next elections is 
drawn between them.  
 
Moreover, Luhmann argues that “one can speak of the fact dimension in relation to all 
objects of meaningful intensions (in psychic systems) or themes of meaningful 
communication (in social systems).”256 The dimension is “constituted in that meaning 
divides the reference structure of what is meant into ‘this’ and ‘something else’”257, into 
‘internal’ and ‘external’. In his view, “‘internal’ and ‘external’ present themselves as 
bundled references, combined in the form of horizons.”258 For example, policymakers 
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tend to think that they deal with things (e.g., issues, resources or money) to which they 
can ascribe any qualities, relations, activities or surprises. Things thereby “produce 
handy clues for managing references to the world.”259 However, “the thing schema (and 
correspondingly the interpretation of the worlds as ‘reality’) offers only a simplified 
version of the fact dimension. Things are constraints of possibilities of combination in 
the fact dimension.”260  
 
Luhmann, furthermore, distinguishes the social dimension as a meaning dimension that 
enables „a constantly accompanying comparison with what others can or would 
experience and how other could position their actions.”261 The social dimension refers 
to horizons of experience and behaviour of the others.  
 
Nevertheless, Luhmann also argues that space represents a basic model for the 
development of logic and meaning that is based on the assumption that “two things 
cannot occupy the same place at the same time.”262 He points out that space can be 
‘decomposed’ as a mechanism for preventing contradictions (‘Raumstellen’). Such 
prevention of contradictions can take place in two ways: either as a sharp border in 
reference to which all is situated on the one or on the other side, but never on the both 
sides at once; or as a distance between two points that is closer or farther in relation to 
all borders. This second notion of space represents a relational notion of space. 
 
While Luhmann’s theory of meaning facilitates the coding of the research data about the 
cognitive barriers of policymakers in terms of framing policymaking through 
sustainability lens, it fails to account for all dimensions of political sense-making that 
proved to be relevant in empirical practice. In order to propose a comprehensive 
typology of cognitive barriers of policymakers in terms of observing policymaking in 
the SD perspective, the thesis thus enhances the Luhmann’s model of meaning in 
response to research data.263 It adds two further dimensions of meaning that proved to 
be essential for thinking policymaking in the SD perspective. First, it distinguishes two 
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sub-dimensions of the social dimension: a power264 and an ethical dimension of 
meaning.265 Moreover, it adds a dynamic dimension of meaning that concerns the 
notion of the dynamic nature of society.266  
 
The power dimension concerns the space, where the decisions about the type and form 
of participation and inclusion of society into policymaking are made. According to 
Arendt,267 it serves policymakers to make sense of the collective action and 
communication and to define the political-public space for political action. In contrast, 
the ethical dimension of political thinking refers to the conditions under which the 
persons respect or disrespect each other.  
 
The dynamic dimension concerns the way that policymakers perceive how everything 
around them changes and evolves. According to Von Foerster,268 the level of 
trivialization of the functional characteristics of societal phenomena is decisive for the 
way how policymakers observe and perceive change. With other words, the capacity of 
policymakers to perceive change differs in relation to the level of trivialisation of the 
societal phenomena that they observe. Policymakers who observe the societal 
phenomena as trivial machines tend to perceive change as a linear predictable process 
that is characterised by an invariate one-to-one relationship between its ‘input’ 
(stimulus, cause) and its ‘output’ (response, effect). So as to understand change, they 
tend to focus on the internal operations of the societal phenomena that remain in one 
internal state. In contrast, policymakers that conceive societal phenomena as non-trivial 
machines, tend to perceive change as a complex process, in which the output once 
observed for a given input will most likely be not the same for the same input given 
later. As a result, their focus is put on observing the shifts of the societal phenomena 
from one internal state to another in order to understand how they change. The level of 
trivialization, therefore, importantly determines the horizon of political thinking about 
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global change. It regulates, what problems are considered relevant and what behaviour 
and courses of action come into consideration in a system.269  
 
In continuation, the chapter hence outlines a six dimensional typology of cognitive 
barriers of policymakers to framing policymaking in sustainability perspective.270 It 
should allow policy analysts to reflect, how SD concept challenges the political thinking 
of policymakers at six meaning dimensions: the temporal, the spatial, the fact, the 
dynamic, the power and the ethical dimension. In particular, it should aid them to 
identify the central cognitive barriers of policymakers to adopting temporal, spatial, 
fact, dynamic, power and ethical horizons that enable to perceive policymaking in the 
SD perspective. 
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Table 2: Cognitive Barriers to Sustainability Shift in Political Thinking  
 
 
Requirements of 
Sustainability Mind 
Shift 
 
 
Cognitive Barriers of Policy 
Makers 
(exemplary list) 
 
Symptoms of Cognitive Barriers in 
Policy Practice 
(exemplary list)  
Structural preference of the 
present in contemporary 
democracies  
 
- uncontrolled use of limited natural 
resources without consideration of 
their availability in the future  
- production of nuclear waste that 
threatens the well being of numerous 
future generation 
Temporal Dimension: 
Long-Term Futures 
Horizon  
 
Dictate of the neoliberal 
paradigm  
 
- global race to the bottom 
- developing countries focusing on 
short-term export-led growth 
- Washington Consensus policies (e.g., 
reliance on cheap labour, minimum 
regulations) 
Spatial Dimension: 
Global Horizon of 
Meaning  
Notion of space as an absolute 
entity 
 
- state-centred perspective 
- local-centred perspective 
- eurocentrism 
Fact Dimension:  
Multi-Issue Horizon of 
Meaning 
The principle of the necessary 
and sufficient cause  
- issue-centred perspective (e.g., the 
abbreviation of environmental policy 
on the climate protection and 
adaptation policy) 
- sectoral compartmentalisation of 
policy and regulatory responsibilities 
- primacy of the economic perspective 
(e.g., the use of GDP as the standard 
indicator for the overall societal 
development)  
Dynamic Dimension: 
Nontrivial Notion of 
Change 
Principle of conservation of rules - trend thinking  
- linear model of growth 
- cultural contempt 
- overenthusiasm and disparagement of 
everything new 
Governing concept  
 
 
- participation crisis 
- lacking adequate input opportunities 
for the individuals to interact with their 
society 
Power Dimension:  
Multi-Party Horizon of 
Meaning  
Positivist notion of policy making 
 
- interpretative gap 
- predefinition of policy problems 
Concept of representative 
democracy 
 
- absence of direct participation Ethical Dimension: 
Micro-Ethical Horizon 
‘I will, if you will’ mentality  
 
- deadlock in political negotiations and 
debates (e.g., the climate efforts 
sharing debate between the EU 
member states and between the 
industrial and developing states)  
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2.3.1.  Mind-shift in Temporal Dimension  
 
The SD concept introduces the necessity for a mind-shift in the notion of the temporal 
dimension of political thinking.271 According to Kelly et al.,272 by advocating 
intergenerational justice, the concept explicitly expresses the necessity of accounting 
not only for the well being of the present but also of future generations. Almost all 
published definitions of the concept are generally motivated by a real concern for the 
long-term well-being of humanity. Furthermore, Grunwald273 argues that by 
highlighting the need to care for ecosystems as well as for people, the concept advocates 
the need for adopting temporal horizon that extends decades, centuries and beyond. The 
concept spans both, the human time scale and the ecosystem-based temporal horizon. It 
implies that problems of sustainability can be ascertained only by observing specific 
parameters over long periods of time. Hardi and Zdan274 thus point out that the SD 
concept stresses that policymakers need to adopt the multigenerational temporal 
horizon, meaning that the long-term implications of decision making are considered and 
anticipated.  
 
However, the research data show that while the present and short-term orientation 
represents the primary temporal horizon of policymakers, the concern for the long-term 
implications of policymaking is a novelty and a great challenge for policymakers. One 
of the most commonly perceived cognitive obstacles to adopting a long-term 
perspective in political thinking represents the inherent tendency of contemporary 
democracies to prefer the present and neglect the future. For example, each national 
political party faces the necessity to win majorities in short intervals and to orient itself 
towards the interests of the voters. The next generations cannot participate in the 
process of procurement of majorities. Policymakers hence feel little pressure to consider 
long-term perspectives. In contrast, there is a common belief that who thinks further 
than to the point of next elections and strives for a long-term oriented policymaking, has 
a competitive disadvantage in relation to the political competitors who promise short-
                                                 
271 See Table 2.  
272 Kelly et al., 2004. 
273 Grunwald, 2004.  
274 Hardi / Zdan, 1997.  
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term benefits.275 Consequently, policymakers tend to give priority to immediate issues 
in order to retain power and largely disregard the long-term implications and 
consequences of policy strategies and measures for the common wealth of future 
generations. The uncontrolled use of limited natural resources without consideration of 
their availability in the future or the production of nuclear waste that threaten the well 
being of future generation represent typical symptoms of such neglect of the long-term 
implications of policy decisions. 
 
Another often perceived cognitive barrier to intergenerational political thinking 
represents the subservience of policymakers to the neoliberal dictate at all levels of 
policymaking. For example, the neoliberal economic theories produced today’s 
economic globalisation as well as the international financial institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation.276 
These financial and trade institutions and other major economies forums such as G7277 
and G8278 today have considerable impact on policymaking. Henderson279 for example 
points out that the World Bank’s advice, which was based on the neoliberal paradigm 
that is characterised by a short-term profit-oriented view, led developing countries to 
focus on short-term export-led growth and resulted in many of today’s glutted markets 
in commodities, from coffee to computer chips. She argues that the resulting “short-
term strategies, often with tax holidays, export platforms, and reliance on cheap labour, 
minimum regulations, and all the other Washington Consensus policies, have led to 
today’s global ‘race to the bottom’.”280  
 
To conclude, the concept of SD represents a normative concept and symbolic resource, 
which makes it possible and even necessary to consider long-term futures. It refers to 
both, present and future generations, and it is generally motivated by a real concern for 
the long-term well being of humanity. With other words, the paradigm of SD calls for 
                                                 
275 Tremmel, 2005a; 2005b. 
276 Henderson, 2004.  
277 G7 is a group of seven industrialized nations of the world, formed in 1976 when Canada joined the 
Group of Six (USA, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom). 
278 G 8 is a group of eight industrialized nations of the world formed in 1997, when the G7 was joined by 
Russia. 
279 Henderson, 2004.  
280 Henderson, 2004, pp. 305.  
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redirecting the political attention to long-term perspectives in addition to short- and 
middle-term perspective on policymaking. The SD concept urges policymakers that 
every human interference into the ecological, economic and social systems has to be 
reflected in relation to its long-term futures impact. Thus sustainability is often 
discussed also as a ‘futures competence’ of policymakers.281 However, so as to develop 
such sustainability competence, policymakers need to emancipate themselves from 
several cognitive maps that inform the temporal dimensions of their political thinking 
such as for example the notion of the contemporary democracy model or the neoliberal 
paradigm. For they tend to fuel and legitimise the short-term horizon of political 
thinking. 
 
2.3.2. Mind-shift in Spatial Dimension 
 
The SD concept introduces the necessity for a mind-shift in the spatial dimension of 
political thinking.282 By referring to the intragenerational interdependence and by 
advocating social justice for all humankind, the concept embraces global thinking. It 
(re)directs the attention of policymakers toward global extensive interconnections 
across space. It refers to the necessity to consider a bigger, global picture in addition to 
the commonly adopted narrower spatial horizons, including the local and the national 
horizon. It urges policymakers to integrate the effects of key policymaking processes 
across the full range of scales from local to global.283 In short, the SD concept demands 
the adoption of space horizons that would enable a comparative evaluation of 
policymaking at different spatial levels in order to recognise the trade-offs of policies 
and to achieve what is commonly referred to as the ‘vertical policy integration’.284 
 
This plea for political thinking in a global context is informed by “the ethical postulate 
to not pass on the social and ecological costs caused by own prosperity to other 
countries. In this respect, the SD concept calls for fairness between north and south. If 
goods are imported from other countries, we must not close out eyes to the 
                                                 
281 Institut für Umwelt-Friede-Entwicklung, 2005, pp.3.; Glenn / Gordon, 2005.  
282 See Table 2.  
283 Bolin et al, 2000.  
284 OECD, 2002, pp. 141 / Steurer, 2007. 
 64
environmental and social conditions that prevail in the extraction of those raw 
materials.”285 It is also based on the fact that, in the age of globalisation, living 
conditions in all parts of the world are highly interdependent. For example, a decision 
made by citizens in the EU Member States has an impact on the living conditions in 
developing countries. At the same time, poverty and environmental damage of other 
continents affect EU Member States through increased migration or regional 
conflicts.286 
 
In the SD context, policymakers are expected to make comparative evaluation of 
policies not only at the global, national, or local scales, but also to account for other 
relevant spatial levels of policymaking regarding available options and alternative 
actions for the healthy development of their respective societies such as for example the 
regional level or the metropolitan-area level, representing increasingly relevant 
networks of social relationships expressed in space. However, the existing spatial 
horizons of policymakers are often ill-adapted for taking into account the global 
interrelations and interdependencies across space.287 
 
The central cognitive barrier represents policymakers’ notion of space as an absolute 
entity, as opposed to the notion of space as a relative and relational entity. This notion 
derives from Newton’s physics and mechanics.288 It considers space as an unlimited 
physical and empirical entity that exists by itself and that is independent from things 
and human experience. Consequently, space is considered as something fixed. 
Policymakers tend to visualise space in a geometric way, either as a three-dimensional 
container (global-national-local) or as a two-dimensional area (national-local). Space 
thereby exhibits borders within which policymakers tend to uncritically assume uniform 
patterns: „Es gelten die gleichen Gesetze, es agieren ähnliche AkteurInnen, 
Unternehmen und Arbeitskräfte verhalten sich ähnlich, was zur Folge hat, dass die 
wirtschaftlichen Kennzahlen ähnlich sind.”289 Depending on how and where the borders 
                                                 
285 The Federal Government of Germany, 2008, pp. 20. 
286 The Federal Government of Germany, 2008. 
287 Niu / Lu / Khan, 1993. 
288 See Table 3. 
289 Novy / Jäger, 2005. 
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between the spaces are drawn, different space containers (‚Behälterräume’290) arise; 
local, national and international. These containers of power (‘Machtbehälter’291) are 
then filled with things, people and relationships.  
 
There are numerous symptoms of policymakers’ absolute notion of space. One of the 
most commonly perceived symptoms for example represents the state-centred 
perspective of policymakers. Even when they acknowledge the importance of the global 
view, they continue to assume the primacy of states in the governance context. This 
clearly makes it impossible for them to perceive and grasp the increasing ‘extensive 
global interconnections’292 across space. The state-centred perspective severely 
diminishes their competence to make decisions that promote intragenerational justice.  
 
Another symptom of the absolute notion of space represents the tendency of 
policymakers to adopt a local-centred perspective. Downs293 argues that being 
motivated to maximize the welfare of their own constituents, policymakers tend to 
disregard the impacts on residents of other localities. This leads to a range of 
environmental and social problems, including for example traffic congestion, air 
pollution, inadequate provision of new infrastructures, shortages of affordable housing 
in the metropolitan periphery, and problems related to the concentration of poverty in 
the ghettos such as high crime rates, poor quality public schools and failure to integrate 
workers into the mainstream work force in the older core areas. In this context, states 
are often too large, and localities too small in order to fit current regional realities and to 
tackle the policy issues in sustainable way. 294  
 
Nevertheless, ‘eurocentrism’295 as a derivate of ‘ethnocentrism’296 is another commonly 
perceived consequence and symptom of the absolute notion of space of policymakers. 
They often tend to place an emphasis on European or Western concerns, culture and 
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values at the expense of those of other cultures. This severely hinders any type of global 
partnership as promoted by the SD concept.  
 
To conclude, the concept of SD demands an enhancement of the spatial horizon of 
political thinking in order to allow for vertical policy integration, i.e., for simultaneous 
consideration of implications of policymaking at different spatial levels. However, as it 
was shown, the spatial horizons of policymakers deriving from the absolute notion of 
space clearly disable their account for the geographic realities of the world as framed 
through sustainability lens. The adoption of the SD concept demands an emancipation 
of policymakers from the notion of space as an absolute and static entity. Instead, it 
demands a mind-shift toward the relational notion of space as a fluid entity that is 
constructed in the heads of policymakers and that they should continuously critically 
reflect in response to policy problems and contexts.  
 
2.3.3. Mind-Shift in Fact Dimension  
 
The SD concept introduces the necessity for a mind-shift in the fact dimension of 
political thinking.297 It advocates the importance of simultaneous consideration of 
economic growth, environmental protection and social equity in policymaking. 
Furthermore, it highlights the necessity to study the reciprocal effects between these 
three political areas and turns it into a guideline for political action.298 By underlining 
the need of adopting a multi-issue, macro or multi-sectoral approach to policymaking, 
the concept introduces the necessity for what is commonly referred to as horizontal 
policy integration. Thereby, policymakers answer the question of whether natural 
capital can be substituted by other forms of capital such as the social, economic or 
human capital differently - depending on the point of reference, i.e., the strong or the 
weak sustainability paradigm.299 Proponents of weak sustainability maintain that such 
substitutability is possible, whilst followers of strong sustainability regard natural 
capital as non-substitutable.300 
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According to research data, policymakers struggle to adopt an integrated macro 
approach to policymaking due to several cognitive barriers. First, policymakers usually 
rest their cognitive functions on what Von Foerster301 calls ‘the principle of the 
necessary and sufficient cause’. This principle forces policymakers to reduce their 
perception of effects of policymaking further and further until they have hit upon the 
“necessary and sufficient cause that produces the desired effect: everything else in the 
universe shall be irrelevant.”302 When a system or a problem is too complex in order to 
be understood, then policymakers tend to mince it into smaller pieces. If these pieces are 
still too complex, they are minced until the pieces are so small that at least one of them 
is understandable to policymakers. However, this method clearly prevents policymakers 
to develop an integrative, holistic political thinking as advanced by the concept of SD.  
 
The literature points toward a range of symptoms of the political thinking that is based 
on the principle of the necessary and sufficient cause. One of the most commonly 
perceived symptoms is the primacy of the issue-centred perspective in political 
thinking. Policymakers typically focus on one issue and can be overwhelmed by the 
difficulty of addressing multiple interdependent issues on a global basis.303 Such issue-
centred perspective can have severe negative consequences for SD. For example, the 
increasingly popular abbreviation of environmental policies to reducing the greenhouse 
gas emissions provides legitimacy to the recent renaissance of nuclear power in the EU. 
It enables policymakers to frame nuclear power a clean and even sustainable energy 
technology that enables to achieve the EU climate goals in a timely way and that has a 
positive impact on environment. The exclusive focus on the effects of the nuclear power 
for tackling climate change disregards the severe negative long-term environmental 
impacts such as the burden of nuclear waste. Another example represent the recent 
debates on biofuels in the EU that took place without a sufficiently broad assessment of 
their potential impact on land-use, biodiversity, food prices and the overall impact on all 
emissions that contribute to climate change. By advocating the necessity of an account 
for the transversal nature of policymaking, i.e., for a cross-cutting approach to 
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policymaking, the concept of SD challenges such reductionist, single issue-centred 
political thinking.  
 
Another symptom of political thinking that is based on the principle of sufficient cause 
represents the traditional sectoral compartmentalisation of policy and regulatory 
responsibilities (‘Ressort-Politik’) in the EU and its Member States and in the EU. For 
example, the current structures of the EC, the Council and the European Parliament 
committees do not allow a sufficiently coherent policy response to new major policy 
challenges, cutting across the traditional sectoral policy compartments. Similarly, the 
OECD argues that “the evolution of the modern state has been toward an increasing 
degree of sectoral specialisation, in order to respond more effectively to complex and 
differentiated problems.”304 However, by demanding political thinking that cuts across 
the traditional sectoral policy compartments, the SD concept implies the necessity to re-
design governance of the EU and Member State governments.  
 
The principle of sufficient cause also fuels the primacy of economic perspective in 
political thinking of policymakers. The most visible example of the primacy of 
economic perspective in the EU discourse represents the tendency to view economic 
globalisation from the perspective of states and markets, i.e., to observe globalisation as 
a worldwide tilt from the state to the market.305 Policymakers observing economic 
global change typically tend to uncritically examine only the linear and one-way 
dependence of the state from the internationalisation of the world market. Another 
example represents the uncritical reliance of policymakers on GDP306 as the standard 
indicator for the overall societal development.307  
                                                 
304 OECD, 2002, pp. 141.  
305 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999. 
306 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) = private Consumption + Investment + Government Consumption + 
(Exports – Imports). The framework and rules on how to calculate it are listed in the European System of 
accounts which is broadly consistent with the UN System of National Accounts.  
307 GDP represents the best known measure of macro-economic activity, whose history goes back to the 
1930ties. At the time, there was a strong need felt by governments to be able to measure the activity in the 
economy, i.e., the national production or income. GDP aggregates the value added of all money-based 
economic activities and is based on a clear methodology that allows comparisons to be made over time 
and between countries and regions. However, over the years GDP evolved to a “proxy indicator for 
overall societal development and progress in general” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2009a, pp. 2). Several policy decisions and instruments in the EU are based on GDP. For example, in the 
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The GDP was originally conceptualised as a measure of macro-economic activity. Thus 
it fails to measure environmental sustainability and the social inclusion that represent 
central elements of the SD concept.308 Wijkman hence warns that by measuring societal 
progress in terms of the GDP is to narrow and it sends the wrong signals to society. He 
argues that “most people seem to think that everything is fine as long as consumption 
increases. That may have been a reasonable way of measuring progress when living 
conditions were poor and economic activity was limited and nature was plentiful. But 
this is no longer the case.”309 Referring to GDP, Gorbachev points out that “capital 
accumulation and individual consumption are (…) given a primary status in relation to 
social and spiritual values or cultural heritage. Ideology and policies of the neo-liberal 
globalism initiated by the countries that have benefited most from globalisation make 
this trend that much stronger. The cumulative results of all the individual decisions 
based on this logic in the long run lead to unforeseen and dangerous consequences.”310 
Due to its short-sightedness, the GDP model of growth causes severe social costs, waste 
and ecological destruction. 
 
To conclude, the SD concept empowers the integrated macro approach to policymaking. 
However, the policymakers’ tendency to rest their cognitive functions upon the 
principle of the necessary and sufficient cause is highly counter-productive in 
contemplating the multiple dimensions of policymaking. In order to frame 
policymaking in the SD perspective, policymakers thus need to make a mind-shift from 
such reductionist approach to political thinking toward an enhanced, integrated, macro 
approach to policymaking.  
 
2.3.4.  Mind-shift in Dynamic Dimension  
 
The SD concept as a development-oriented approach highlights the necessity for 
transformation of the way in which governments think the societal systems and the 
                                                                                                                                               
growth, GDP growth represents a key indicator to assess the effectiveness of the EU and national 
governments’ recovery plans (Commission of the European Communities, 2009a).  
308 For more on limitations of the GDP in the SD perspective see Stiglitz et al., 2009.  
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dynamics of societal change.311 According to Groff,312 it represents a concept of desired 
societal transition that evolved as a response to the alarming finding that the change in 
patterns of global resource use and consumption takes the form of an accelerating and 
exponential growth.313 As a response, the concept calls for a steady state of societal 
growth as a system’s response to the limits of growth.314 Instead, the SD concept 
advocates a holistic, systemic notion of societal systems as a ‘non-trivial machine’315 or 
non-linear system, whose development represents a complex non-linear process, in 
which the outputs for a given input will most likely not be the same for the same input 
given later. Gordon, Glenn and Jakil argue that „linear systems can be stable (that is, 
when perturbed, the system settles to some stable value), can oscillate (that is, when 
pertubated, the system settles into a periodic cycle), or can be unstable (that is, when 
pertubated, the system movements become very large and continually increase or 
decrease). When the systems are non-linear, however, a fourth state of behaviour can be 
triggered; chaos. In this state, the system appears to be operating in random fashion, 
generating what appears to be noise. In this state, the system behaviour is still 
deterministic but essentially unpredictable.”316 The SD paradigm thus challenges the 
common conception of societal transition as a linear predictable process that is 
characterised by the invariant input-output. Consequently, the SD concept, among 
others, points towards the necessity to observe the dialectic implications of linear 
growth for the well-being of societies and to perceive societal transition as a qualitative 
change, e.g., as a change of the subject-object and subject-subject relationships. 
 
However, the tendency of policymakers to rest their observation of the societal 
evolution on the ‘principle of conservation of rules'317 represents one of the central 
cognitive barriers to contemplating qualitative growth, i.e., the transition of society in 
the SD perspective. This principle suggests that the rules observed in the past shall 
apply to the future. In this perspective, the concept of ‘societal change’ as suggested by 
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 71
the SD concept is inconceivable, for change in the SD perspective is the process that 
obliterates the rules of the past.  
 
Scholars point out several symptoms of the tendency of policymakers to ground their 
political thinking on the principle of conservation of rules.318 For example, a completely 
new branch of business has emerged in the EU that aims at predicting the future by 
applying the rules of the past in order to protect the society from the dangerous 
consequences of change. These experts are commonly referred to as the ‘futurists’. 
Their expertise is highly counter productive in terms of promoting SD: “Their job is to 
confuse quality with quantity with quantity, and their products are ‘future scenarios’ in 
which the qualities remain the same, only the quantities change: more cars, wide 
highways, faster planes, better clean technologies etc. While these ‘future scenarios’ are 
meaningless for understanding the non-linear nature of changing world as advanced by 
the SD concept, they represent a lucrative business for entrepreneurs, who sell them to 
the corporations that profit from designing for obsolescence.319  
 
Trend thinking represents another symptom of political thinking that is grounded on the 
principle of conservation of rules. The basic postulates of trend-faith are “unchanging 
change and unchanging non-change.”320 While policymakers acknowledge the existence 
of social change, they thus believe that a certain object of observation has changed 
according to a certain pattern (i.e., it followed linear or exponential growth, cyclical 
fluctuations, or come combinations of them), and that the same pattern will hold true in 
the future, too. With other words, trend thinking is guided by the assumption that 
structures do not change. Mannermaa hence argues that “structural changes or breaks, 
such as the system break due to limited natural resources, therefore, remain outside the 
reach of trend thinking.”321 The trend thinking disregards the question of limits to 
growth and naively assumes the self-sustaining nature of growth. This is why it clearly 
represents a barrier to adopting the concept of SD that implies to sustain the natural life 
support systems on the planet.  
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Another commonly perceived symptom of political thinking based on the principle of 
conservation of rules represents the linear model of growth. Groff322 describes this 
model as one of the most popular expressions of unchanging change in political 
thinking. In this model, the future has typical characteristics. It is seen as more of the 
past; i.e., as an extension of past trends. It is predictable, i.e., there are an equal absolute 
number of units of increase per unit of time. Moreover, it is unlimited in nature. Such 
linear model of growth informs numerous worldviews, which traditionally inform 
contemporary policymaking. Drawing on Groff,323 several depleted worldviews 
represent the main cognitive barriers of policymakers to make mind-shifts toward a 
comprehensive approach to growth. First, policymakers often take a Western cultural 
worldview from the 19th century assuming that linear progress is the norm and that the 
future is predictable and that it always represents an improvement upon the past. 
Secondly, many policymakers tend to perceive the world through the Darwin’s theory 
of biological evolution positing that biological evolution from one species to another 
was via slow change. Its derivates in the social sciences include evolutionary theories of 
social change, which assume that social change is a slow and gradual change from one 
system to another and informing phase models of change. Nevertheless, policymakers 
also often rely on the Newtonian (or 19th century physics) model of reality that 
interprets the universe as a clockwork machine, where a change in A always leads to 
predictable change in quantity of variable B. In consequence, they disregard the 
possibility of uncertainty and unpredictability. They strive to control societal change by 
considering all structural or unpredicted changes as bad.324 
 
Borrowing from Mannermaa,325 the ‘cultural contempt’ represents another commonly 
perceived symptom of the lacking capacity of policymakers to think societal change in 
the SD perspective. Due to past success of the actor or the system in question, like 
government, national culture, neoliberal economy or a dominating company, 
policymakers are tempted to think that they are so good that they don’t have to try new 
                                                 
322 Groff, 2004. 
323 Groff, 2004, pp. 87.  
324 Groff, 2004, pp. 87.  
325 Mannermaa, 2004. 
 73
concepts. This kind of political thinking for example reduces the sensitivity of 
policymakers to their own vulnerability due to their dependence on the scarce natural 
resources.326 A typical case of such cultural contempt represents the advocacy of the 
‘wealth centred economy’,327 the growth of which is primarily based on prosperity 
created earlier. The cultural contempt hence clearly limits the ability of policymakers to 
make a sustainability shift in their political thinking.  
 
Another attitude toward change and future that is fuelled by the principle of 
conservation of the rules and that reduces the ability of policymakers to frame policies 
in the SD perspective is the policymakers’ overenthusiasm of everything new. 
According to Mannermaa,328 this thinking pattern is based on the belief that a major 
technological or other breakthrough will bring the system faced with limits of growth to 
a whole new system level.329 
 
All in all, the mind-shift toward thinking societal transition in the SD perspective is 
related to the capacity of policymakers to explicitly account for the limits to growth and 
to integrate all externalities of policymaking. Thinking societal transition in the SD 
perspective severely challenges the tendency of policymakers to rest their cognitive 
function upon the principle of conservation of rules that proved to be highly counter-
productive in contemplating the society in transition from the SD perspective.  
 
2.3.5.  Mind-shift in Power Dimension 
 
The concept of SD introduces the need for a mind-shift in the power dimension of 
political thinking of policymakers.330 By advocating what is commonly referred to as 
multi-actor and multi-stakeholder approach, it calls for a new power ambience of 
policymaking, i.e., of the relationship between the state and citizens.331 It urges 
policymakers to involve a balanced and broad range of stakeholders in the policymaking 
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processes, who differ in their disciplinary focus and sectoral (natural and social 
scientists) as well as geographic background (third and first world countries, local, 
national, EU and global background), in their age (youngsters and elderly people), 
gender (women and men), and in their social status (including the ‘underdogs’ of 
society), always in response to the distinct policy problems and policy context. It calls 
for political steering that involves public and private actors and including traditional 
hierarchical as well as non-hierarchical modes of government. Thereby, the SD concept 
turns the focus of policymakers towards observing the changing levels of power and 
influence among conflicting actors and towards exploring the relationship between state 
intervention and societal autonomy.  
 
However, policymakers encounter several cognitive barriers to accounting for the multi-
actor horizon of policymaking.332 The conception of policymaking as traditional state-
centred, hierarchical ‘governing’ represents the central cognitive barrier to embracing 
the multi-stakeholder approach to policymaking as advanced by the SD concept.333 
According to Benz,334 at the polity level, policymakers informed by the traditional 
notion of policymaking as ‘governing’ for example typically focus on the role of the 
national state, while neglecting the integrated approach to policymaking. At the politics 
level, they tend to focus on the competition for power and influence between political 
parties and interest groups and on the conflict resolution by governmental bodies, while 
ignoring the conflicts between the governing/leading and the governed/affected actors 
and the negotiation solutions and adaptations of institutional control systems. 
Nevertheless, at the policy level of policymaking, policymakers informed by the 
governing model of policymaking are primarily concerned with questions of legislation 
and the distribution of public services, while neglecting the questions of communication 
and compromises as well as network management. 
 
The participation crisis represents one of numerous symptoms of the restricted notion of 
policymaking as ‘governing’ that is typical for political thinking of mainstream 
                                                 
332 For an overview of the EU debate on governance see Treib et al., 2005. For an overview of the global 
governance debate see Pattberg, 2006.  
333 Eberhard et al, 2006. 
334 Benz, 2004.  
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policymakers. It is characterised by missing adequate input opportunities for the 
individuals to interact with their society. In consequence, the individual is increasingly 
excluded from participation in policymaking processes: „Die Gesellschaft wird zum 
‚System’, zum ‚Establishment’ oder was auch immer, zu einem unpersönlichen 
kafkaesken Monster von eigensinniger Böswilligkeit.“335 Due to absence of feed-back 
channels, the system is growing over the heads of the individuals.  
 
Another commonly perceived barrier represents the positivist notion of policymaking 
that leads to what is often referred to as the ‘interpretation dilemma’.336 For example, 
policymakers tend to inform the public about policy problems, policy decisions and 
policy solutions in a technical political language, i.e., as if information speaks for itself. 
Thereby, they disregard the existence of the ‘epistemological and interpretative gaps’337 
between different communities (e.g., citizens, politicians, and administrators) leading to 
severe political controversies and deadlock situations.338 Such technical rationality is 
informed by the positivist conception of reality, ignoring the importance of social values 
of people, including of role of narrative storytelling about policy problems.339 As a 
result, policymakers fail to communicate across the discursive barriers of different 
discourse coalitions.  
 
Moreover, when interacting with stakeholders, policymakers tend to involve them in the 
processes of policy implementation and evaluation of policy outcomes, while excluding 
them from the processes of the problem recognition and policy formulation. They 
largely disregard that the action taken to solve the problem largely depends on the 
definition of the problem. Even more, they fail to see that both, the definition of the 
problem and of the action to solve it, largely depend on the view which individuals or 
groups that discovered the problem have of the system to which it refers.340 
Policymakers hence typically have a positivist notion of policy problems as given.  
 
                                                 
335 Von Foerster, 1993, pp. 344-345. 
336 McCauley, 2008; Russel, 2007.  
337 Fischer, 2003b. See chapter 2.3.3. 
338 See chapter 2.2.3. 
339 Lösch, 2005. 
340 Von Foerster, 1979a. 
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To conclude, policymakers need to change their understanding of the power ambience 
of policymaking in order to frame policymaking in the SD perspective.341 In particular, 
they need to emancipate themselves from the tendency to think policymaking as 
‘governing’ and from their technical positivist notion of policymaking and conceive it 
as multi-actor governance and as a discursive value-loaded interpretative process 
instead.  
 
2.3.6. Mind-shift in Ethical Dimension 
 
The SD concept introduces the need for a mind-shift in the ethical dimension of 
political thinking.342 By pointing towards the necessity for privatisation of personal 
responsibility, the concept of SD raises fundamental questions of social and political 
responsibility in political proceses.343 The concept urges policymakers to recognize the 
autonomy of every individual in order not to promote a society that attempts to honour 
commitments and forgets about its responsibilities. The SD concept also advocates a 
new ethic of responsibility in time and in space.344 By pleading for intragenerational 
responsibility, it highlights the necessity of the ethics of responsibility for all 
humankind, i.e., for a comprehensive, value-oriented awareness or each one of us. It 
calls for responsibility of each individual for the common - social, environmental and 
economic - wealth. In particular, it demands a commitment to assess the personal and 
societal levels of consumption in terms of environmental and social justice. It also 
advocates a devalorisation of material values as well as the genesis and return of non-
materialistic values to ensure human living conditions.  
 
The ethical propositions of the concept of SD severely challenge the existing ethical 
horizon in political thinking of mainstream policymakers. In particular, the concept of 
representative democracy and the ‘I will if you will’ mentality represent severe 
cognitive barriers to their mind-shift in the ethical dimension of political thinking.  
                                                 
341 Rüdiger, 1992. 
342 See Table 2. 
343 Cf. Comfort, 1999. 
344 In this thesis, responsibility is conceived as a relational variable that is always ‘owned by someone’ 
and that relates to something or someone. It is conditioned by the notion of personal or collective power 
to change, shape or make the future (as opposed to powerless and resignation). 
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The concept of representative democracy largely deprives civil society from its personal 
responsibility for (global) commonwealth due to its structural characteristics such as 
absence of direct participation and influence of civil society and citizens in 
policymaking processes. This is because the concept implies that responsibility for 
global and common wealth is primarily national and state phenomenon, which lies in 
the hands of states and governments and thus does not concern civil society or 
individuals.  
 
Moreover, policymakers involved in SD often exhibit the ‘I will if you will’ 
mentality.345 They are primarily concerned with comparing their efforts to promote SD 
with the efforts of other EU Member States and industry and international community. 
Typical symptoms of this mentality for example include the ongoing debates on effort 
sharing among EU Member States regarding the implementation of the EU climate and 
energy package and between developed and developing countries in the global fight 
against climate change in the international debates on the post-Kyoto Agreement. Such 
mentality of policymakers leads to severe deadlocks in terms of implementing SD.  
 
To sum up, the above typology of cognitive barriers of policymakers to framing 
policymaking in the SD perspective is not an exhaustive one.346 Although the discussed 
dimensions of political thinking that are challenged by the SD are highly 
interdependent, they were discussed separately only for the reasons of analytical clarity. 
The typology does not illuminate how setting of borders in one dimension of political 
thinking (e.g., the abbreviation of temporal horizon of political thinking) restricts and 
influences the borders in other dimensions of political thinking (e.g., the issue-
orientation determining the choice of relevant issues). For example, the advocacy of the 
re-privatisation of individual responsibility for common wealth (ethical meaning 
dimension) is closely related with its plea for a shift in approach to participation that 
encourages a more proactive role of civil society and requires from stakeholders to 
                                                 
345 For more on the ‘I will if you will’ mentality in context of sustainable consumption see Sustainable 
Development Commission / National Consumer Council, 2006. 
346 See Table 2. 
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promote collective responsibility for actions (power meaning dimension). These issues 
represent important points for further research. 
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3. Observing Global Change in Sustainable Development 
Perspective: Cognitive Challenges and Chances  
 
The definition of a problem and the action taken to solve it 
 largely depend on the view which the individuals 
or groups that discovered the problem have  
of the system to which it refers.  
(Brün, 1971) 
 
Policymakers struggle to adapt governance for more SD not only due to their limited 
capacity to account for the discursive nature of the SD concept, but also because the 
concept severely challenges the predominant modes of political thinking.347 The 
previous chapter shows that the SD concept demands a new dimensionality of political 
thinking and argumentation. Policymakers need to rethink temporal, spatial, fact, 
dynamic, power and ethical horizons of their political thinking in order to frame and 
understand governance in the SD perspective. 
 
However, there is another third central factor that severely limits the capacity of 
policymakers to adapt governance in a way that enables to bring the society on the 
tracks of SD and that has been widely left out of sight. In these turbulent times, 
policymakers largely fail to perceive the continuous and highly dynamic non-linear 
change in patterns of global affairs, i.e., for global change in the SD perspective. 
Thereby, the EU discourse fails to provide a systematic insight about how the struggle 
of policymakers to adapt governance for more SD is related to their lacking capacity to 
account for global change in the SD perspective.348  
 
The goal of this chapter is hence to elaborate a typology of central cognitive challenges 
of policymakers in terms of taking into account the implications of global change in the 
SD perspective. Thereby, the chapter focuses on exploring the following two questions: 
How does the SD challenge the existing reference frames of policymakers for observing 
the world politics? And, what is the applicative potential of the newly emerged theories 
                                                 
347 See chapter 2, Table 1 and 2.  
348 See chapter 1.3. 
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of IR such as the global governance theory to serve as a reference frame for framing 
global change through sustainability lens?  
 
The chapter proceeds in three analytical steps. So as to avoid the conceptual polysemy, 
part 1 first outlines how is the term ‘global change’ framed in this thesis and how this 
framing determines the inquiry of the relevance of global change for adapting 
governance for more SD? Part 2 then sets out the main epistemological challenges of 
tackling global change and the shortcomings of the existing perspectives of 
policymakers for observing global change through the sustainability lens. Thereby, it 
aims to outline how the lacking capacity of policymakers to frame global change in the 
SD perspective impacts their ability to adapt governance for more SD. Drawing on 
these insights, part 3 offers an insight into how the global governance theory can be 
used by policymakers as a reference frame to grasp and study the long-term, global, 
multi-issue, dialectic, multi-party and micro-ethical perspectives of global change when 
adapting governance for more SD.  
 
3.1. Relevance of Observing Global Change  
 
Global change represents an increasingly important issue within the current EU 
scientific and political debate. Still, no uncontested definition and no common 
understanding of what the term refers to may be given. While term ‘global change’ is 
often applied in contemporary literature in a naïve, unreflected and self-explanatory 
way, there are numerous, highly diverse meanings and uses of the term global change.  
 
3.1.1.  Global Change as Structural Change in the Global Governance Patterns  
 
This thesis inquires global change exclusively as the structural change in patterns of 
global governance arrangements. This understanding is confined to large-scale and 
complex non-linear transformations of patterns of political organisation in time, which 
profoundly alter our understanding of who is doing what for whom in world’s politics.  
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The explicit account for global change, i.e., for transformation in global political 
organisation is essential for adjusting governance for more SD at least for two reasons. 
First, the reshaping of governance for more SD is always implicitly or explicitly 
informed by distinct understanding of sources, nature and implications of change in 
global governance patterns. Secondly, governance for SD needs to remain flexible and 
adaptable to quickly changing general conditions of global affairs. The governance 
structures, tools and processes for more SD should not be static and homogenous but 
highly sensitive and responsive to continuous simultaneous structural changes and new 
emergencies in cooperative patterns of global affairs. 
 
The understanding of global change as change in patterns of global cooperation and 
collaboration adopted in this thesis differs severely from alternative common uses and 
meanings of the term global change within the EU political and scientific debates on 
SD. Among others, this notion of global change in this thesis contrasts the 
understanding of global change as a human-induced environmental change that is either 
global in nature or pervasive across the world. This framing of global change enables 
policymakers to focus on interplay of components of the ecosystem. However, it closes 
their view for other dimensions of global change (including for its social, economic and 
political dimensions). In the current literature, global change is also often understood as 
economic globalisation. In this case, global change is viewed primarily from the 
perspective of states and markets. According to Hewson and Sinclair,349 the existing 
notions of global change as economic globalisation thereby severely differ in the way 
they conceive the relevance of the world market for global governance. The extreme 
myth of global change for example argues that the world market is levelling states to 
produce a ‘borderless world’. The sophisticated view assumes that the 
internationalisation of markets has direct implications for coalitions of domestic 
interests rather than for states. Nevertheless, the historical view observes that global 
markets have no influence on national policy, as they are not new and they don’t form a 
single integrated world economic space. 
 
 
                                                 
349 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999.  
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3.1.2. Growing Complexity and Dynamics of Global Change  
 
The literature commonly points out two interrelated factors that severely challenge 
capacity of policymakers to observe global change. First, the complexity of global 
change is increasing. In particular, policymakers struggle to account for the increasingly 
multilevel nature of the patterns of global interactions, interdependencies and 
interlinkages between increasing number of individuals, groups, social layers and 
classes, institutions. Moreover, they have difficulties to grasp the multidimensional 
dependencies of norms, values and behaviours, and to take account of the wide range of 
issues considered on international agenda and for the multilevel nature of global 
economy and of the modern administrative state. Secondly, the dynamic of global 
change is increasing. In other words, the relationships and dependencies between as 
well as within the elements of global governance are subject to increasing 
comprehensive and continuous change. While the literature identifies a broad range of 
reasons for the increased complexity and dynamics of global change such as for 
example the global diffusion of technology or the end of Cold War, the scholars 
commonly agree about the time of emergence of the global international system. The 
beginning of the explosive creation of the unprecedented extensive and intensive levels 
and types of global interactions, problems and dependencies is commonly positioned in 
the late twentieth century.350  
 
Due to increased complexity and dynamic of global change, policymakers are 
confronted with an infinite number of possible social scenarios of global change, i.e., of 
unrealised but realistic possibilities of how global cooperative interactions will evolve 
in the future. Consequently, they face deep uncertainty when adapting governance for 
more SD. The increasing complexity and dynamics of the global cooperative patterns 
continuously challenges the limits of their understanding and reduces the explanative 
potential of their reference frames for understanding the situation at hand and the future 
outcomes of different courses of action. In particular, it continuously challenges the 
existing ways of thought about the IR.  
 
                                                 
350 Rosenau, 1999. Dougherty / Pfaltzgraff, 2001. Hewson / Sinclair, 1999. 
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3.2. Epistemological Foundations of Framing Global Change 
 
Policymakers exhibit highly restricted capacity to adequately account for the sources, 
nature and implications of changing patterns of global affairs due to the growing 
complexity and dynamics of global change, and the limited scope of the reference 
frames used to observe it. As policymakers cannot grasp global change in its entirety, 
they select some features of the ongoing scene as important and dismiss the rest as 
trivial. Their simplifications of the nature, sources and implications of global change 
have one in common. They represent outcomes of process of abstraction, in which 
policymakers face two challenges of perception: the challenge of selecting a relevant 
part of social reality to observe, and the challenge of choosing the perspective of 
observation. Depending on the part and perspective of social reality they choose to 
focus on when observing global change, the patterns of global interactions may be 
perceived and explained in highly differing ways. The abstraction process, i.e., the 
choice of relevant part and perspective of social reality to observe thereby largely 
depends from the subjective experience of policymakers, who themselves represent a 
part of the ‘objective reality’ that they explore.351 This means that perspective-
dependence, selectivity and social conditionality is inherent to any type of knowledge 
and political thinking on global change. There is thus no ‘best jar’ to perceive global 
change.  
 
Policymakers summarise their understanding of global change by reference to few 
organising principles, which represent their orientation points for understanding it. 
Consequently, their perception of change in patterns of global governance depends on 
diverse assumptions that they rely on in order to organise their thinking of world 
politics. In order to deconstruct the struggle of policymakers to frame governance in the 
SD perspective, it is hence necessary to examine, how do policymakers choose 
perspectives and aspects to observe and explore in order to tackle the sources, nature 
and implications of global change?  
 
 
                                                 
351 Von Foerster, 1993. 
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3.2.1. Meta-Physic Foundations of Political Thinking on Global Change  
 
Political thinking of policymakers on global change is - implicitly or explicitly - 
informed by distinct assumptions about epistemology, ontology, methodology, 
teleology, axiology and ideology. These six types of assumptions originating from the 
realm of philosophy constitute a basis for drawing a map, i.e., for social construction of 
global governance. As such, they represent the reference points for understanding 
complex global change within specific context and time. They comprise philosophical 
foundations on which policymakers base their knowledge on global change in the past, 
the present and the future.  
 
Epistemological assumptions are assumptions about the nature of knowing, i.e., about 
the capacity of policymakers to uncover the truth.352 Epistemology353 for the world 
politics thus represents a theory of knowledge for the truth claims about change in 
global governance patterns. It serves policymakers to determine the limits of their 
knowing about global governance, including their capacity to grasp the complexity, 
dynamics and uncertainty of global change.  
 
Ontological assumptions are assumptions about the essence, sense and primary reason 
of reality and human beings.354 Applied to the field of global governance, they consist 
of assumptions that people make about the realities of global governance. They serve as 
an intersubjective basis for understanding the essential underpinnings of the world 
political organisation. They refer to the essential components of the whole that they 
comprise. The ontological assumptions, therefore, identify what actors engage in what 
forms of behaviour to sustain a particular system.355 These assumptions for example 
serve policymakers to organise their thinking about the world affairs as they tell them, 
what is significant in a particular world that they delve into and what are the basic 
entities and key relationships in global governance.  
                                                 
352 Aaltonen / Barth, 2005. 
353 Epistemology is a Greek term referring to absolutely certain knowledge as ‘episteme’, while calling 
mere opinion ‘doxa’. 
354 Aaltonen / Barth, 2005. 
355 In contrast, paradigm as conceived by Kuhn, defines the relationships between these components (see 
chapter 3.2.2.). 
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The methodological assumptions refer to appropriate choice and uses of research 
methods as techniques for perceiving and understanding the social reality.356 They serve 
policymakers to identify what are the appropriate methods and how to use them for 
collection, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of data about the social reality. 
These assumptions for example tell them how to observe global change. Further 
assumptions that commonly inform the political thinking of policymakers on global 
change include assumptions about the purposes of theory (teleology), about the value of 
ethics (axiology), and about nature of power (ideology) in observing global 
governance.357 
 
Viewed from the all encompassing perspective in which policymakers perceive and talk 
about the social reality of global affairs, the above six types of assumptions are highly 
interdependent and cannot be delineated clearly from each other. These 
interdependencies can be illustrated with an example from the policy analysis praxis. 
Policy analysts ontologically assuming that there is no objective reality tend to rely on 
explorative methodology, i.e., they choose and use methods in a way that enables them 
to bring implicit assumptions about the social reality to surface for conscious 
examination or to involve multiple perspectives in order to generate knowledge about 
the research object. In contrast, policy analysts assuming that they may uncover 
objective reality will rather take explicative or descriptive research paths that allow 
them to measure and describe the social phenomena in objective way or to find final 
solutions to pre-existent problems.  
 
The above meta-physic assumptions represent a common notion of an epoch and as 
such play an orientation function for emergence of different empirical specifications 
commonly referred to as paradigms. Policymakers need to continuously reflect, 
question and – if necessary –update or transform these assumptions, in order to maintain 
their orientation function for political thinking that is responsive to changing social 
realities, as well as to profoundly transformed conditions of peoples’ existence, and to 
changed awareness of people. Their transformation thereby represents a difficult and 
long-running process as they are extremely deep-rooted due to their orientative function.  
                                                 
356 See chapter 5.1.  
357 Aaltonnen / Barth, 2005. 
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The highly complex nature of the meta-physic assumptions informing the political 
thinking of policymakers raises several questions concerning the modalities of critical 
reflection of political thinking about global change: How can all six types of meta-
physic assumptions that serve policymakers’ as an orientation in observing global 
change, be delineated in their specific interdependency? How can they be brought to 
surface for conscious examination? How to account for the continuous transformation 
of these assumptions informing policymakers’ observation of global change? In 
continuation, the chapter aims at these questions in greater detail.  
 
3.2.2. Paradigmatic Nature of Political Thinking on Global Change  
 
The science theory discourse commonly uses the concept of ‘paradigm’ to refer to the 
empirical specifications of what follows from assumptions about epistemology, 
ontology, methodology, teleology, axiology and ideology.358 Paradigm refers to the way 
in which the elements of social reality are interactively organized and the order is 
imposed upon them. It allows for the movement on the part of the components and 
enables to focus on changes and stabilities that comprise the whole. The paradigm is, 
therefore, commonly seen as the main point of reference for understanding social 
reality.359  
 
The concept of paradigm thinking was first introduced by Kuhn in the beginning of the 
late 1960ties. The paradigm concept that was first published in his book ‘The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions’360 quickly evolved to a well-known and often used concept in 
the social sciences. The word paradigm “comes from the Greek word ‘paradeigma’, 
which means a mode or pattern of thought. To Plato, paradeigma meant the real world 
of ideas, of which the visible world is only reflection.”361 Kuhn developed his concept 
of paradigm in an attempt to understand the structure of scientific revolutions. He 
defined a paradigm as the existing wisdom of discipline or research areas, which tells 
experts from the discipline what is the predominant way of thinking accepted by the 
                                                 
358 Kuhn, 1962.  
359 Mannermaa, 2004. 
360 Kuhn, 1962, 
361 Mannermaa, 2004, pp. 42. 
 87
scientific community in the field at a specific time.362 In Kuhn’s363 perspective, 
paradigm thus refers to scientific problem solving, which became a guiding thought-
model in a certain discipline and which creates a new research tradition. 
 
Kuhn understands paradigm as the specification of the common sense of an epoch that 
form the basis of analytic habits. It represents the existing wisdom of a discipline or of a 
domain outside science that determines how to make science, what are the accepted 
methods, what kind of research data is to be used, what is the nature of results, what are 
the dominating results now, into what direction should new research be directed or what 
are the leading journals and who are the opinion leaders and gate keepers.364 Paradigm 
thus defines the field of action, its boundaries, its problems, its practitioners, and its 
direction of work. As such, it also determines the emergence of certain types of middle- 
and lower-level theories about social reality. According to Kuhn,365 it has the potential 
to achieve the stage of complete dominance in a field of science or expertise; that’s 
when the stage of ‘normal science’ is achieved. 
 
Inherent to any paradigm is that it is extremely deep-seated and rooted.366 In 
consequence, paradigms do not readily yield to evidence of obsolescence. This is 
because one of their primary functions is to retain the whole, i.e., the existing system. 
The paradigm thinking, therefore, can cause the lacking sensitiveness and 
responsiveness to social reality as it prevents from seeing factors outside the adopted 
paradigm(s). This problem is commonly known under the term ‘paradigm blindness’. 
That is when the stage of beginning of doubt occurs.367 At this stage, the inconsistencies 
and uncertainties are no longer easily resolved within the dominant paradigm and 
become recognised as persistent anomalies. Therefore, the members of a paradigmatic 
community begin to ask questions that have no clear and apparent answer within the 
dominant paradigm. According to Kuhn, this phase is followed by scientific revolution, 
when a new and competing paradigm is proposed as an acceptable alternative to the old 
                                                 
362 Kuhn, 1962. 
363 Mannermaa, 2004. pp. 42. 
364 Mannermaa, 2004, pp.43. 
365 Kuhn, 1962. 
366 Rosenau, 1999.  
367 Mannermaa, 2004, pp.43. 
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paradigm. After a period of struggle between the adherents of the old and the new 
paradigm over disciplines resulting in the domination of new paradigm over the field, 
the stage of normal science reoccurs.368  
 
Kuhn’s concept of paradigm thinking is in many ways restricted and outdated in that it, 
among others, disregards the possibility of multi-paradigm thinking, characterised by a 
cohabitation of several equally important paradigms or prevalent ‘Weltanschaungen’ in 
one field of expertise and discipline. Moreover, it was originally developed to as 
reference frame to observe and understand scientific revolutions and not the perception 
of policymakers. However, despite these shortcomings, the concept of paradigm 
thinking represent a promising frame for the exploration of the meta-physical 
assumptions behind the political thinking of policymakers on global change. Arguing 
that paradigm thinking represents one of the most common means of policymakers to 
reduce the complexity of global change, the thesis in continuation focuses on exploring, 
what types of paradigms policymakers can rely on in order to perceive global change in 
the SD perspective. 
 
3.2.3. Old versus New Paradigm Thinking on Global Change  
 
The SD concept represents a derivate of a certain type of paradigm thinking, i.e., it can 
be ascribed to a certain model of thought. In order to gain policy-relevant knowledge 
about global change for reforming governance for more SD, policymakers need to rely 
on concepts and theories that derive from the same type of paradigm that inform the SD 
concept. In other words, their perception of global change needs to be guided by the 
principles of thought that are coherent with those grounding the concept of SD. But 
what are these principles of thought informing the SD concept? 
 
Groff distinguishes two types of paradigms that commonly inform the contemporary 
political thought; the ‘old paradigm’ and the ‘new paradigm’.369 She delineates the main 
                                                 
368 Kuhn, 1962. 
369 Old paradigm thinking is typically referred to as the positivist- or rationally-oriented paradigm 
thinking. New paradigm thinking is commonly discussed as the interpretative or post-positivist paradigm 
thinking. All these alternative terms refer to the distinct science theory tradition (positivist, rationalist, 
interpretative, post-positivist) behind the paradigm thinking. However, this thesis will use the terms ‘old 
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differences between both types of paradigm thinking in the following way:370 
 
 
Table 3: Comparative Typology of the Old and the New Paradigm Thinking371 
 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
‘Either/Or’ thinking (beginning with Aristotle). ‘Both/And’ thinking. 
Based on old physics (Newton). Based on new physics (Einstein). 
Reality made up of separate parts. Reality made up of interdependent parts. 
Whole understood as the sum of separate parts. Parts are not separate, but understood only in their 
relationship to the whole. 
Reductionist worldview. Holistic worldview. 
Materialistic worldview. Recognition of the invisible/unseen/spiritual behind 
the material. 
Mechanistic worldview, world as a linear machine. Organic worldview, world as a non-linear machine 
Focus on structure. Focus on process. 
Belief that science can arrive at total truth about 
social reality. 
Belief that science can give only interpretations of 
the social reality. 
Absolute relationships and predictions possible: 
know if you change variable X by a certain 
amount, it will lead to a set, predictable amount of 
change in variable Y. 
Statistical probabilities only; cannot predict with 
certainty whether a photon will be a particle or a 
wave. 
Absolute time and space as two totally separate 
entities. 
Time and space as interrelated and relative to each 
other (curved time-space). 
 
Groff’s differentiation between the old and new paradigm thinking by no means 
represents an exhaustive model for understanding political thinking of policymakers 
about global change. Groff sums up the main implicit ontological, epistemological, 
teleological, axiological and ideological assumptions behind two types of paradigm 
thinking that commonly determine the observation processes of policymakers. She 
points out that old paradigm thinking urges policymakers to rely on concepts and 
theories that are characterised by ‘either/or’ thinking, that are based on old physics, that 
perceive reality as made of separate parts, that see the whole made out of the sum of 
separate parts, that are characterised by reductionist, materialistic and mechanistic 
                                                                                                                                               
and new paradigm thinking’ because the alternative terms tend to be used and understood in highly 
heterogeneous way.  
370 Groff, 2003. See Table 3. 
371 Adapted from Groff, 2003. 
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worldview, that focus on structure as opposed to process, that strive to uncover the 
absolute truth, that assume the possibility of absolute relationships and predictions, and 
that conceptualise time and space as two separate and absolute entities. In contrast, new 
paradigm thinking supports the use of theoretical approaches which exhibit ‘both/and 
thinking’, which are based on new physics, which assume that the reality is made up of 
interdependent parts, which study and understand part of the whole only in relationship 
to the whole and not separately, which have a holistic and organic worldview, which 
recognise the existence of invisible unseen spiritual behind the material, which focus on 
the process instead of on the structures, which share a belief that science can give only 
approximations of truth (statistical probabilities), and which conceptualise time and 
space as interrelated and relative to each other (curved time-space).  
 
The above list of features of the two central types of the contemporary paradigm 
thinking about social reality enables to conclude that the SD concept represents a 
derivate of new paradigm thinking tradition. By advocating the intragenerational and 
intergenerational justice for all humankind, the concept, among others, exhibits a 
holistic view on the world and acknowledges its interdependent nature. By advocating 
the necessity of personal responsibility ethics it recognises the importance of invisible 
norms and values for policymaking and the necessity of tracing knowledge to sources 
that lie beyond empirical observation.  
 
In order to gain relevant insights about the impact of global change on adjusting 
governance for more SD, the framing of global change thus needs to be informed by 
new paradigm thinking. This means that to assure the consistency and relevance of 
knowledge on global change for implementation of SD, the political thinking of 
policymakers about global change needs to be informed by theories and concepts that 
are ascribed to new paradigm thinking, for they direct the focus of policymakers at the 
perspectives and aspects of global change that occur relevant through sustainability lens. 
In contrast, the reliance of policymakers on theories deriving from old paradigm 
thinking372 clearly diminishes their capacity to gain insights that are relevant to 
implementation of the SD concept into policymaking, because the derivates of old 
                                                 
372 See Table 3. 
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paradigm thinking direct the focus of policymakers towards the aspects and the 
perspectives of social reality, which seem irrelevant in the SD perspective.  
 
To conclude, theories deriving from new paradigm thinking have a greater 
epistemological value thinking for exploring global change in the SD perspective than 
theories that represent derivates of old paradigm. The capacity of policymakers to 
observe global change through sustainability lens, in consequence, largely depends from 
their ability to find and rely on theories deriving from new paradigm thinking. In the 
following, the thesis thus discusses what theories policymakers tend to rely on so as to 
tackle global change, and what type of paradigm thinking they derive from. 
 
3.2.4. Theories of International Relations as Reference Frames  
 
Theories of IR represent the main orientation points for policymakers aiming to grasp 
global change in order to adapt governance for more SD. Policymakers implicitly or 
explicitly rely on various theories of IR so as to make sense of the nature, sources and 
implications of changing patterns of global governance, for they focus on the nature and 
dynamics of the world politics and offer promising reference frame for studying global 
governance.373 However, the applicative potential of theories of IR to help policymakers 
frame global change through sustainability lens differs highly in dependence from the 
type of paradigm thinking that they derive from.  
 
Policymakers striving to tackle how the patterns of global governance change in time 
largely tend to rely on theories of IR that are ascribed to old paradigm thinking.374 They 
include (1) the liberalism, also known as idealism, and its modern day version, the 
neoliberal institutionalism and the neoliberalism, as well as its various middle-level 
versions such as the functionalism, the international regimes theory and the collective 
and public goods theory, (2) the realism and its middle-level derivates, including the 
neorealism, the structural realism, the strategic and the rational choice theory and the 
                                                 
373 There are several further relevant perspectives and conceptual frameworks on global change (the 
economic theories perspectives etc.), which continuously represent important complementary 
perspectives on global change and even sources for theories of IR. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to pursue the discussion of further theories informing the perception of global change.  
374 See Table 3. 
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hegemonic stability theory, and (3) the pluralist and the globalist models. These theories 
are characterised by the positivist epistemology, i.e., by philosophy of knowledge based 
on the positivist outlook of social scientists who sought to emulate methods of natural 
sciences such as for example quantitative measurements and testing of hypotheses. In 
consequence, theories interpret the global governance patterns as an order or as a static 
structure.375 In this view, the patterns of global governance are unchanging and static. 
These theories restrict the view of policymakers to the point that they are capable of 
recognising only two sharply opposed forces that may shape our future world order: a 
balkanised world of sovereign tribes each guarding its sacred patrimony or a global 
shopping mall managed by a consortium of profiteering corporate giant under the 
protective shield of capitalist superpowers.376 Although the capacity of these theories of 
IR to illuminate and explain global change in turbulent times is highly disputed, they 
continue to dominate the post-Cold-War-view on international and global affairs. 
Representing the cornerstone of much theoretical debate within the discipline they are 
thus often referred to as the mainstream theories of IR.  
 
While theories of IR deriving from new paradigm thinking377 still seldom inform the 
policymakers’ observation of global change, they gain on relevance and popularity 
among policymakers aiming to tackle the changing patterns of global cooperation in 
order to build governance arrangements for SD. They include several macro theories 
and their corresponding middle-level derivates such as (1) the constructivist theory of 
IR, (2) the critical theory including the feminist theories, the postmodernism, the 
poststructuralist theories and the Marxist and the neo-Marxist theories with their 
derivates – the dependency and the world systems theory, and (3) the global governance 
theory. These theories occurred since the end of Cold War due to disillusionment and 
dissatisfaction with the quantitative-empiricist-positivist-cumulative epistemology that 
is characteristic of theories of IR deriving from old paradigm thinking.378 According to 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff,379 they constitute the aggregate of the ‘third paradigm’. 
 
                                                 
375 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999.  
376 Dougherty / Pfaltzgraff, 2001. 
377 See Table 3. 
378 Dougherty / Pfaltzgraff, 2001. 
379 Dougherty / Pfaltzgraff, 2001, pp.38. 
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If the map of global governance would be drawn in the perspective of the mainstream 
theories of IR deriving from old paradigm thinking, global change would be depicted 
differently than from the perspective of theories of IR to be ascribed to old paradigm 
thinking. On one hand, the mainstream theories of IR – the liberalist, the realist, the 
pluralist and the globalist theory - that are largely ascribed to old paradigm thinking 
have very low or no epistemological value for grasping global change through 
sustainability lens. On the other hand, theories of IR deriving from new paradigm 
thinking - constructivism, critical theory or global governance theory - have a high 
potential to serve as reference frame for grasping global change in a way that is relevant 
for aligning governance to SD. They represent promising theoretical perspectives for 
observing those features of global change that seem relevant in the SD perspective and 
that lie out of reach of theories of IR deriving from old paradigm thinking.  
 
However, this is not to say that policymakers should not rely on IR theories deriving 
from old paradigm thinking when exploring its impact, sources and nature. Their 
applicative potential is by no means obsolete as they enable to explain and explore 
certain issues and aspects of global change within their epistemological restraints. 
Despite the limitations in their capacity to acknowledge the complex, non-linear and 
dynamic nature of global change, theories of IR deriving from old paradigm thinking 
can prove highly beneficial when it comes to studying change within existing structures 
and systems of governance. Hewson and Sinclair for example argue that realism 
“remains relevant in the sense that politics is a power struggle,”380 and that the “kinds of 
power and the organising principles that form patterns of global governance need to be 
brought into any comprehensive account of global change.”381 However, their capacity 
to capture the meta-change, i.e., to question the existing global governance system and 
the broader rule and paradigms within which they operate, is highly limited.  
3.3. Global Change in Global Governance Theory Perspective  
 
To date, the applicative potential of global governance theory as an alternative 
theoretical tool for framing global change through sustainability lens received only 
                                                 
380 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999, pp. 4.  
381 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999, pp. 4. 
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minor attention within the contemporary political and scientific discourse. However, 
scholars commonly argue that global governance theory represents a promising 
theory,382 scientific concept,383 and not yet but soon to be paradigm of IR384 for 
observing global change in the SD perspective, as it is informed by new paradigm 
thinking. Global governance theory emerged in the late 1990ties in the context of the 
prevailing multilayer IR debate on the sources, extents and implications of global 
change. Accordingly, it primarily aims to address and outline the dynamic and complex 
nature of the changing patterns of global governance. It is grounded in the older 
political science debates, including the globalisation debate, the transnational relations 
debate addressing issues such as the end of the state, the transformation of sovereignty, 
the emergence of global civil society, government without government, the 
intergovernmental relations, the transnationalism and the polyarchy, and the debate on 
multilateralism and organisational reforms of international organisations.385  
 
To date, the applicative potential of global governance theory as an alternative 
theoretical tool for framing global change through sustainability lens received only 
minor attention within the contemporary political and scientific discourse. There is 
already extensive literature offering comprehensive insight about the analytical and 
explanatory potentials of the global governance theory for identifying the patterns of 
global governance and studying how they change in time. However, these reflections 
offer little or no explicit insight on the potential of this theoretical approach to account 
for perspectives relevant for the translation of the concept of SD into policymaking.  
 
In order to close this knowledge gap, the thesis in continuation draws on global 
governance theory to develop a typology of central cognitive challenges of 
policymakers in terms of taking into account the implications of global change in the 
SD perspective that policy analysts need to address in order to inform governance for 
SD.386 The typology follows twofold purposes. First, it wants to identify the main 
assumptions and categories of global governance theory that are concerned with the 
                                                 
382 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999.  
383 Pattberg, 2006.  
384 Rosenau, 1999. 
385 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999; Pattberg, 2006; Woodward, 2006. 
386 See Table 4.  
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temporal, spatial, fact, dynamic, power and ethical perspectives of global change. 
Secondly, it critically reflects, how can these assumptions and categories sensitise 
political thinking of policymakers for those dimensions of global change that are 
considered relevant in SD perspective. In particular, it highlights how the global 
governance theory perspective increases the capacity of policymakers to take a long-
term, global, multi-issue, nontrivial dynamic, multi-party and the micro-ethical view on 
global change. 
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Table 4: Cognitive Challenges of Perceiving Global Change in Sustainability Perspective 
 
Meaning 
Dimensions in 
Political 
Thinking on 
Global 
Change  
Horizons of 
Thinking 
Global 
Change in the 
SD 
Perspective  
 
 
Features of Global Change in the SD Perspective 
Temporal 
Dimension  
Long-Term 
Futures 
Horizon  
- acceleration of pace of global change at all levels of 
policymaking due to confounded spatial and temporal 
dimensions of policymaking  
- sovereignty of states as a fluid and dynamic concept 
Spatial 
Dimension  
Global 
Horizon  
- allocations of values in spheres of authority which may or may 
not be coterminous with a bounded territory 
- fragmegrative dynamic of global change, i.e., simultaneous 
shifts of authority to transnational and to sub-national level 
Fact 
Dimension  
Multi-issue 
Macro Horizon 
- reciprocal interdependence between market and state 
- international regimes as ‘patchwork patterns’ that are centred 
around multiple issues  
- multi-dimensional nature of globalisation, concerning 
informational, civil and social dimensions besides the economic 
dimension 
Dynamic 
Dimension  
Limits to 
Growth  
- global change and, in particular, the economic globalisation are 
dialectic processes with contradictory effects on human well 
being 
- global order is ‘all-encompassing’ and represents an ‘organic 
whole’ 
Power 
Dimension  
Multiparty 
Horizon 
- patterns of global affairs as interactions between differing and 
interdependent systems of thought  
- the sovereignty concept is continuously contested and varies 
across time, place and issues 
- the shifts of authority to subnational, transnational and non-
governmental level are normal387 features of global change 
- delocalisation of authority of territorial states in multiple 
directions causes a variety of newly emerging types of 
governance 
- the chains of causation in governance processes and structures 
follow crazy-quilt fussy patterns of interaction  
- states and governments are relevant to and consequential for 
the course of events along with a host of other actors 
- the increasing role of emerging global civil society  
- the rising power of transnational globalising hyper-capitalist 
elites  
- the rising power of the emerging global informational elites  
- the world is comprised of spheres of authority  
Ethical 
Dimension  
Micro-ethical 
Horizon 
- the intensive nature of globalisation  
- the rising skills and capacities of individuals  
- the altering horizons of identification in patterns of ‘global life’388  
                                                 
387 In accordance with the Kuhn’s concept of ‘normal science’ this thesis uses the term ‘normal features’ 
as generally accepted and dominantly perceived features of global change.  
388 Rosenau, 1995. 
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3.3.1. Accelerating Pace of Global Change at all Levels of Policymaking 
 
Global governance theory offers several insights about the temporal underpinnings of 
global change that can serve as valuable orientation points to policymakers aiming to 
observe it in the SD perspective.389 It represents a historical, change-oriented approach 
to study of global affairs390 that explicitly focuses on the process of change in 
development of global affairs patterns. Global governance theory attempts to treat the 
temporal dimensions as no less significant as the spatial dimensions of changing 
patterns of global governance. Therefore, it significantly differs from the mainstream 
theories of IR, which tend to study global governance as a static entity and as an order 
that is deprived from the temporal dimensions.  
 
Global governance theory, among others, has the potential to open the view of 
policymakers for the long-term futures horizons of global change by pointing out that 
whilst the logic of governance in the past was following the hierarchical lines, today the 
logics of global change follows the ‘fragmegrative dynamics’,391 i.e., it is subject to 
simultaneous fragmentation and integration processes. The term was coined by 
Rosenau392 to describe the contrasting simultaneous and interactive forces toward policy 
integration and fragmentation. He argues that the processes of aggregation and 
disaggregation are occurring and interacting so rapidly to the point of being 
simultaneous. Consequently, they rid event sequences of any linearity that they ones 
had. The events occur roughly at the same time at different levels of policymaking, 
leaving actors, as always, in the mode of seeking to catch up with the consequences of 
their decisions. In this way, Rosenau points towards the necessity to observe its 
temporal dimension against the background of boundary change and erosion. He 
highlights the need to observe the confounded spatial and temporal dimensions of 
policymaking development so as to account for global change. He also stresses the 
importance to explore and explain the increasing pace of dynamic of global change at 
                                                 
389 See chapter 2.3.1. 
390 See Table 4. 
391 Rosenau, 1999; 1995.  
392 Rosenau, 1999. 
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all levels of policymaking when studying its nature, sources and implications for 
governance SD.  
 
Moreover, global governance theory views the sovereignty of states as a fluid and 
dynamic feature of changing patterns of global interactions. Accordingly, it has the 
potential to enhance the view of policymakers for the non-existent future and enables 
them to consider the long-term, still non-existent, yet possible future constellations and 
aspects of global governance. It allows policymakers to emancipate themselves from the 
past and the present. For example, global governance theory opens the view of 
policymakers for the possibility that governance may culminate in a modicum of 
worldwide coherence that consists of widely disaggregated goal-seeking entities, which 
supplement or even supplant states as prime sources of governance on a global scale. 
This possibility is excluded by the mainstream theories of IR that treat sovereignty of 
states as a static feature. 
 
3.3.2. Fragmegrative and Nonterritorial Nature of Global Change  
 
Global governance theory offers policymakers several reference points for observing the 
spatial dimension of global change in the SD perspective393as it provides in-depth 
insights about the change in the spatial and territorial underpinnings of patterns of 
global cooperation and collaboration.394 Among others, it introduces the idea of ‘spheres 
of authority’, which are “distinguished by the presence of actors who can evoke 
compliance when exercising authority as they engage in the activities that delineate the 
sphere.”395 The theory thus enables policymakers to observe the authority as a relational 
variable. Its existence is given, when it is both exercised and complied with.396 Stripped 
from its territoriality and its totality, the authority may or may not be bounded to a 
territory. This notion of authority is sharply opposed to the notion of authority that is 
common to mainstream theories of IR, which see it in possession of actors or embedded 
in roles.  
                                                 
393 See chapter 2.3.2. 
394 See Table 4. 
395 Rosenau, 1999, pp.295  
396 Rosenau, 1999. 
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Global governance theory allows to observe global governance patterns as consisting of 
types of different types of spheres of authority: of the territorial spheres of authority, in 
which allocation of values remains linked to geographic space and of the nonterritorial 
spheres of authority, in which those who comply can be spread around the world and 
hence do not need to be located in the same geographic space. In this way, the theory 
points towards the necessity to account for the allocation of values happening in the 
spheres of authority which may or may not be coterminous with a bounded territory 
when observing the spatial dimension of global change.397  
 
By acknowledging the nonterritorial and the non-linear nature of global order, global 
governance theory enables policymakers to depart from conventional IR thinking and 
account for the relocated authorities to transnational level and emergence of 
nonterritorial, non-linear politics. By arguing that those who comply may be located in 
the same geographic space and have the same organisational affiliations or they may be 
spread around the globe having no territorial relationship, it opens the view of 
policymakers for the truly global transnational scope of the patterns of governance. For 
policymakers who take the global governance theory point of view, the Westphalian and 
territorial state system is no more that one and only form of contemporary global 
governance.  
 
Global governance theory moreover points toward the fragmegrative dynamics of global 
change as the pervasive principle iterative between the societies.398 In this perspective, 
the shifts of authorities from the national level have a dialectic and contradictory nature. 
The shifts of authorities toward the transnational level occur simultaneously with the 
shifts of authority to the subnational (local, communal) level. Consequently, global 
change is conceived as being composed not of one overarching trend from national 
toward transnational level (‘either/or’ thinking) but of several dialectical and 
contradictory tendencies (‘both/end’ thinking). In this way, global governance theory 
highlights the necessity to account for both, the globalising and the localising tendencies 
of global change when adapting governance for more SD. It makes clear that the 
                                                 
397 Rosenau, 1999, pp. 296. 
398 See chapter 3.3.1. 
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understanding of the global dimension of global change demands the consideration of 
interdependencies between the simultaneous shifts of authority from the national to the 
global and the subnational level.  
 
3.3.3. Multi-Dimensional Nature of Global Change  
 
Global governance theory represents a promising reference frame for tackling the fact-
dimensions of global change in the SD perspective, i.e., to tackle its macro-issue 
nature.399 Its goal is to end with the primacy of economic perspective on globalisation 
that is commonly advocated by the neo-liberalist economic theory400 and to open the 
view of policymakers for the reciprocal interdependence between the market and the 
state. It stands for a critical attitude toward the market-state relationship, arguing that 
the mainstream notion of relationship between the state and the market as a linear on-
way dependence is highly restricted.  
 
The theory, among others, has the potential to enhance the view of policymakers on 
global change that is often restricted to observing the economic dimension of global 
change. By pointing towards the civil dimension (e.g., the emergence of global civil 
society), the informational dimension (e.g., the occurrence of epistemic authority, 
growing importance of epistemic authority) and the social dimension (e.g., the 
emergence of intellectual and political elites) of global change, the theory offers 
reference points to study the multidimensional nature of global change.401 In particular, 
it enables policymakers to spot the interdependencies of the social and the 
environmental dimension with the economical dimension of global change, which are 
considered as highly relevant in the SD perspective.  
 
In the global governance theory perspective, international regimes are framed as 
‘patchwork patterns’,402 i.e., as systems and clusters of international governance. By 
changing the focus from an ‘issue-area’, which is typical for the mainstream theories of 
                                                 
399 See Table 4 and chapter 2.3.3. 
400 Henderson, 2004. 
401 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999. 
402 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999. 
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IR, to a ‘system’, the theory opens the view of policymakers for the multi-issue nature 
of regimes and relaxes the brackets around the issue-centred notion of global 
governance arrangements in order to situate them within the context of multiple 
overlapping patterns of global interactions. The theory thus provides an innovative way 
of overcoming the major cognitive barriers of policymakers to accounting for the 
macro-nature of global politics due to their reliance on the mainstream theories of IR 
such as the realist and liberalist theory. 
 
3.3.4. Dialectic Nature of Global Change  
 
Global governance theory represents a promising reference frame for observing the 
dynamic nature of global change in the SD perspective.403 It points towards several 
cognitive challenges to adopting a differentiated and critical – as opposed to 
deterministic - understanding of global change as a non-linear complex process.404 From 
global governance perspective, global change is seen as being composed not of one 
overarching trend but of several dialectical and contradictory tendencies.  
 
Among others, the theory points towards the dialectic nature of the economic 
globalisation that has contradictory effects on the human well being. Such notion of 
global change allows policymakers to explore both, the positive as well as the negative 
impacts of global change on the social and the environmental systems in time and space. 
Global governance theory hence allows policymakers to open their view for social, 
conceptual and material limits of economic growth in time and space.405 It enables them 
to emancipate themselves from the commonly adopted models of growth deriving from 
old paradigm thinking such as for example the liberalist models of growth that largely 
disregard the negative impacts of global change and in particular its negative impacts on 
the social or the environmental aspects of societal transition.  
 
In the global governance theory perspective, global order is conceived from the point of 
view of universal dependence on the biosphere, i.e., as an ‘all-encompassing’ and 
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‘organic whole’.406 Such holistic notion of IR promotes the capacity of policymakers to 
account for the limitations to societal growth such as the scarcity of the natural 
resources and of the social capital. It acknowledges the interdependencies between the 
environmental, social and political dimensions of societal growth and opens their view 
for boundaries and limits that these interdependencies pose to growth. 
 
To sum up, the differentiated notion of dynamic of global change offered by global 
governance theory opens the view of policymakers for the limits to economic and 
societal growth and enables to adapt governance for more SD in a way that is sensitive 
to the need for promoting a self-sustaining growth. The theory also offers important 
insights and categories to explore how the self-sustaining growth may be achieved 
politically at the global level. 
 
3.3.5. Ongoing Extension of Democratic Space  
 
Global governance theory offers a promising frame for observing the power dimension 
of global change in the SD perspective, i.e., to account for the multi-actor policy context 
in the changing global affairs patterns.407 The theory´focuses on issues related to 
ongoing extension of democratic space in patterns of global cooperative interactions and 
thus offers policymakers valuable categories, perspectives and terms to tackle it. By 
arguing that the world is comprised of spheres of authority,408 global governance theory, 
among others, enables policymakers to move beyond the restricted actor-oriented and/or 
state-centred observation of global affairs and global change. The relational notion of 
authority as basic analytical units opens the view of policymakers for the multi-actor 
perspective on global change, which is widely disregarded by the traditional theories of 
IR. For example, it allows policymakers to account for the power dimension of the 
highly dynamic and fluid global governance arrangements that take the form of 
networks that are not territorially bounded. 
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408 See chapter 3.3.1. 
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In the global governance theory perspective, sovereignty of states is perceived as a 
dynamic and complex phenomenon that is continuously contested and that varies across 
time, place and issues. The theory argues that states retain their sovereign rights, but the 
spatial realms within which these rights can be exercised have diminished. This notion 
of sovereignty enables policymakers to depart from the realist notion of sovereignty as a 
static entity, and to develop a more differentiated and in-depth evolutionary view on the 
continuously changing character of sovereignty. It allows them to systematically 
examine how the sovereignty of territorial states has been changing in time, space and 
issues. 
 
Moreover, global governance theory points out that the global affairs patterns do not 
follow hierarchical lines, which are characterised by linearity in time and space. Rather, 
the chains of causation in governance processes and structures are conceived as 
following the crazy-quilt, fussy patterns of interactions. By introducing the idea of 
fragmegrative dynamics of global change, the global governance theory enables 
policymakers to study the relocations of authority and control mechanisms from 
territorial states upwards to transnational and supranational organisations, sideward to 
social movements and NGOs, and downwards to subnational groups. In this 
perspective, states and governments are not necessarily central to the course of events in 
the global political processes. Policymakers can hence draw a fine line between the 
following two extreme positions: the dismissal of the role of states and governments in 
political process as secondary and peripheral and the centrality and primacy of states 
and governments for global political processes. They can account for the extension of 
democratic space as an inherent and normal features of global governance that promotes 
and not endangers the existence of global order. This theoretical perspective 
significantly differs from the state-centred mainstream theories that largely disregard the 
shifts in authority away from territorial states or conceive them as anomalies that 
endanger the existing global political systems.  
 
By arguing that global change in this epoch follows a fragmegrative dynamics,409 global 
governance theory not only allows policymakers to consider the increased diffusion of 
                                                 
409 See chapter 3.3.1. 
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authority and for diminution of hierarchy, but also the enormous variety of forms global 
governance modes. It enables them to observe the diversity of newly emerging complex 
types of governance arrangements stretching between the “transnational and the 
subnational, the macro and the micro, the informal and the institutionalized, the state-
centric and the multi-centric, the cooperative and the conflictual.”410 By relativising the 
primacy of governments and states in global governance arrangements, it opens their 
view for interactions between new types of actors. Global governance in particular 
points towards the rising importance of global civil society and of transnational 
hypercapitalist elites and in the governance arrangements as well as towards the 
changed nature and societal status of expert knowledge.  
 
Global governance theory first points towards the rising importance of global civil 
society and global life. Thereby, it frames civil society as an arena of transnational 
ideological tendencies, worldwide movements and initiatives. By acknowledging the 
increasing orientation of civil society to a worldwide scale, it opens the view of 
policymakers for the necessity to account for the democratic and the normative potential 
of diversified and engaged realm of global civil society when observing the power 
dimension of global change. As a result, it for example allows them to anticipate and 
understand the increasing relevance of grassroots movements such as the global anti-
globalisation movement, a movement against market-driven fundamentalism that is in 
favour of an alternative development model. The international social democracy, rural 
people, ‘green’ movements worldwide, and thousands of NGOs form a powerful force 
whose pressure is being increasingly felt by the ruling elite.411 
 
Furthermore, global governance theory highlights the increasing relevance of the 
transnational hyper-capitalist elites in the global governance arena, i.e., of key 
intellectual, business and political elites in particular in the G7 zone oriented toward a 
‘hyper liberalism’ in the global political arena. The theory argues that these elites 
emerged due to the renaissance of the power of the money capital in the global political 
economy in the late twentieth century. They are conceived as a symptom of 
restructuring of political economy and as collective actors who shape the predominant 
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form of global governance today. Global governance theory also points towards the 
emergence of social forces that oppose and negate the neoliberalism and the hyper-
capitalist elites. The theory, therefore, not only enables policymakers to account for the 
role of hyper-capitalist elites for reforming governance for more SD, but also for the 
‘post globalisation’ forces, which seek to re-embed the world economy in social 
norms.412  
 
Another aspect concerning the power dimension of global change that merits attention 
from the viewpoint of global governance theory represents the changed nature and 
societal status of the expert knowledge. The theory highlights the growing importance 
of globally oriented epistemic and informational elites as a new type of actor in global 
governance arrangements.413 They are conceived as knowledge brokers of the high level 
symbolic analysis who direct the emerging information order. Their salience is thereby 
seen as being loosely associated with the technologies of the emerging world wide 
knowledge order. The global governance theory hence points towards the relocation of 
authority from states and governments to informational elites that receive an increasing 
epistemic authority. Epistemic authority is thereby framed as “an ability to produce 
attention, respect, trust at a distance based on expertise and professional eminence.”414 
The theory thus allows policymakers to account for the rising importance of the 
informational dimension of global change and observe it as a process of elevating global 
knowledge, i.e., the sorts of intelligence and communication that contribute to and help 
to coordinate other aspects of global change. It enables them to observe the rising 
importance of various types of epistemic communities such as policy networks, think-
tanks etc. when adapting governance for more SD. 
 
Nevertheless, by conceiving the patterns of global affairs as interactions between 
differing and interdependent systems of thought, global governance theory enables 
policymakers to study global change as change in interactions between different 
systems and communities. As a result, it allows them to take into account the 
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interpretation gaps and the mixed level of uncertainty due to differing systems of 
thought in the global governance arrangements.  
 
3.3.6. Increasing Individual Responsibility  
 
The exploration of discourse about the utility of theories of IR for grasping global 
change shows that global governance theory represents a promising frame for exploring 
the ethical dimensions of global change in the SD perspective.415 It provides relevant 
input on the micro-ethical perspective of global change that is considered to be relevant 
in the SD perspective. Global governance theory argues that the nature of globalisation 
is not only extensive, forming interconnections across space, but also intensive, i.e., 
reaching into the level of personal conduct. It conceives global governance as one that 
emerges from bottom-up; from the increased skills and capacities of individuals. In this 
way, global governance theory directs the focus of policymakers towards the ‘micro-
level’ of global order, i.e., towards the capacities and orientations of individuals and 
small groups.  
 
Moreover, global governance theory highlights that the skills and capacities of citizenry 
are rising and that their horizons of identification in patterns of ‘global life’416 are 
altering. Hence it enables policymakers to address and study the personal responsibility 
that represents a central element of the SD concept as a symptom of altering ethical 
horizons of identification in patterns of global life and affairs. For example, it allows 
them to anticipate and understand the increasing intensity and importance of activities 
of philanthropists when adjusting governance for more SD.417 In fact, the end of the 20th 
century saw a flowering of wealth due to globalisation processes in combination with 
the rising asset prices and technology. By pointing the view of policymakers on the 
micro-ethical dimensions of global change, global governance theory allows 
policymakers to detect processes such as the allocation of the biggest chunk of 
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philanthropic capital in history that was made in June 2006 by Warren Buffet. 
Furthermore, it opens the view of policymakers for the private donor foundations as a 
source of discipline and innovation for charities. For example, in 2010, Bill Gates and 
Warren Buffett have secured $125 billion from forty families and individuals on the 
Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans, who have pledged at least half of their 
wealth to charitable causes. 
 
To conclude, this chapter shows that theories of IR offer exhaustive inputs on how 
global change, i.e., change in the patterns of global governance occurs. However, 
although there is no ‘best jar’ to observe global change, these theories differ highly in 
their capacity to serve as reference frames for observing it in the SD perspective. The 
chapter shows that in order to tackle global change in sustainability perspective, 
policymakers need to emancipate themselves from framing it in terms of the realist, 
pluralist and globalist theories of IR that represent derivates of old paradigm thinking. 
As the concept of SD origins from new paradigm thinking, they should rely on 
theoretical derivates of new paradigm thinking in order to perceive global change in a 
way that is relevant through sustainability lens. In particular, global governance theory 
proved to be a promising reference frame for observing global change in the SD, as it 
offers several categories, perspectives and tool for observing the global, long-term, 
multi-issue, dialectic, multi-actor and micro-ethical aspects of global change. In this 
way, global governance points towards some of the central cognitive challenges of 
policymakers in terms of accounting for implications of global change in the SD 
perspective that policy analysts need to address in order to inform governance for SD.  
 
However, the critical discussion of the utility of global governance theory for framing 
global change through sustainability lens in this chapter is subject to several limitations. 
First, the exploration of the epistemological value of global governance theory focuses 
exclusively on its strengths in terms of informing the political thinking. The analytical 
and conceptual shortcomings and limitations of global governance theory are 
disregarded, as this is of minor relevance to the central interest of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the thesis also does not examine numerous chances and challenges of 
integration of the theory of global governance with other theories of IR in order to gain 
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a further and even more comprehensive insight into the nature, sources and implications 
of global change. All these limitations represent areas for further research.  
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4. Theoretical Shortcomings of Mainstream Policy Analysis 
for Governance for Sustainable Development 
 
 
The world, as we perceive it, is our own invention. 
(Heinz von Foerster, 1984) 
 
 
When aiming to adapt governance for more SD, policymakers encounter a broad range 
of complex cognitive barriers.418 In consequence, they increasingly turn to policy 
analysts for reasoned and strategic policy advice. However, policy analysts face a 
number of cognitive dilemmas when trying to inform governance for SD. The chapter 
explores these dilemmas in greater detail by critically reflecting the mainstream 
theoretical approaches to policy analysis. It strives to bring the often deeply-rooted 
implicit theoretical reference frames of policy analysts to surface for conscious 
examination. Drawing on the interpretative methodology, it is argued that the perception 
of policy analysts is always theoriebeladen.419 As a result, their capacity to support 
policymakers at overcoming the cognitive barriers in terms of perceiving governance in 
the SD perspective is importantly determined by the underlying theoretical 
presumptions that serve them as orientation points for observing the societal reality and 
for designing policy advice.  
 
In order to determine the epistemological shortcomings of the mainstream theoretical 
approaches to policy analysis in terms of informing governance for SD, the chapter 
focuses on exploring how they limit the capacity of policy analysts to help policymakers 
grasp the discursive nature of the concept of SD,420 to make sustainability shift in their 
political thinking,421 and to account for global change through sustainability lens.422 The 
chapter thereby follows twofold purposes. On one hand, it aims to propose a typology 
of epistemological frontiers of mainstream theoretical approaches to policy analysis for 
governance for SD. On the other hand, it strives to outline the epistemological needs 
                                                 
418 See chapters 2 and 3.  
419 Lamnek, 1995, pp. 24. 
420 See chapter 2.3. 
421 See chapter 2.4. 
422 See chapter 3. 
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that policy analysts should address when aiming to adapt their theoretical frames as to 
increase their capacity to inform governance for SD. Policy analysis is thereby studied 
exclusively as a sub-discipline of political science. 
 
The chapter is structured in four parts. Part 1 outlines how the distinct notion of policy 
analysis adopted in this thesis determines the scope of inquiry of the capacity of 
mainstream policy analysts to inform governance for SD. Thereby, it focuses on 
outlining the analytical foci of policy analysis that importantly determine the capacity of 
policy analysts to help policymakers overcome their cognitive barriers to adapting 
governance for more SD and the mainstream approaches to its conduct. Part 2 studies 
the capacity of policy analysts to assist policymakers at accounting for discursive nature 
of the SD concept by eliciting their theoretical assumptions about the role of the SD 
concept for and in policymaking. Part 3 inquires the ability of policy analysts to aid 
policymakers make a sustainability shift in their political thinking by critically 
reflecting their assumptions about the ways in which policymakers acquire knowledge. 
Learning theories, ranging from behaviourist to cognitive and constructivist learning 
theories are consulted as reference frames. Part 4 relies on theories of IR to deconstruct 
the cognitive dilemmas of policy analysts in terms of promoting policymakers’ ability 
to account for global change in the SD perspective. Part 5 illustrates the main 
epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD that should serve policy 
analysts as orientation points in enhancing their theoretical frames. 
 
4.1. Policy Analysis as Social Praxis 
 
Today, policy analysis represents a highly heterogeneous research field that “appears as 
a jungle of diverse and conflicting modes of inquiry, full of inconsistent terminologies, 
divergent intellectual styles – perhaps, indeed, incommensurable paradigms.”423 
However, when scholars discuss the analytical and the epistemological value of policy 
analysis, they often discuss it as a monolithic and static tool, which is largely de-
privatised from persons and contexts behind its conduct.  
                                                 
423 Torgerson, 1986, pp. 33. 
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This thesis distances itself from the notion of policy analysis as a monolithic entity that 
exists independently from context and actors. When inquiring policy analysis, it 
approaches it as a social praxis that is conducted by policy analysts with highly diverse 
backgrounds and experiences. Instead of focusing on the basic facts about policy 
analysis (‘know-that’) or on the tools and procedures to be used in policy analysis 
process (‘know-how’), the thesis focuses on the mind-set of policy analysts. It observes 
the cognitive frames that importantly determine the observation and the practice of 
policy analysis for governance for SD (‘knowing-in-action’, ‘reflection in action’).  
 
4.1.1. Policy Analysis and Political Science  
 
From historical point of view, policy analysis first emerged as a programme of scholarly 
work in 1951 in the USA when the US political scientist Harold D. Lasswell published 
first proposals and frameworks for policy analysis in the book ‘The Policy Sciences’.424 
Initially, he saw policy analysis as a multidisciplinary project devoted to the norms and 
values of democratic governance with the aim “to bring the theories and methods of 
social science to bear on pressing social and economic problems confronting modern 
society.”425 The original concept of policy analysis also outlined its distinct teleological 
component (i.e., informing decision making), its axiological component (i.e., ethical 
value belief in democracy) and its ideological component (i.e., creating knowledge to 
support better humankind, freedom and welfare for future generations).  
 
After a slow start in the 1950ties, policy analysis has been progressing with high speed 
since the early 1960ties. In the USA, policy analysis evolved into a professional activity 
by the mid-1970ties and is now represented in universities and institutes, PhD degree 
programmes as well as in professional journals and textbooks.426 In the EU, policy 
analysis became an acknowledged field of study with some delay and programmatic 
deviations in the late 1970ties.427 Over the last three decades, policy analysis however 
                                                 
424 In the US American literature, ‘policy analysis’ is also referred to as ‘policy sciences’.  
425 Fisher, 2003, pp. 17.  
426 Bell, 2003a, pp. 53.  
427 Héritier, 1993; Holzinger, 2004. 
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grew into a full-fledged professional activity in the EU that is practiced across many 
domains, ranging from social sciences such as economics and political science. It now 
represents an internationally acknowledged and institutionalised field of applied 
research. As the relevance of policy analysis for practical policy advising has been 
rising,428 policy analysts became part of decision-making process in wide variety of 
programmes all over the world. 
 
This thesis focuses exclusively on studying the advisory policy analysis,429 i.e., policy 
analysis that takes the form of ‘advisory science’430 aiming to develop knowledge 
relevant to formulation and implementation of public policy. Moreover, policy analysis 
is discussed exclusively as a sub-discipline of political science.431 Schubert and 
Bandelow432 argue that policy analysis achieved the status of paradigm thinking within 
political science as an action- and policy-oriented sub-discipline of political science that 
is aimed at using analytical techniques and knowledge for and in policy-making. 
However, policy analysis lacks a unified theoretical, methodological or methodical 
body of its own.433 Political scientists tend to rely on diverse theoretical and 
methodological approaches as well as methods that were developed within other 
scientific disciplines. 
 
4.1.2. Analytical Dimensions of Advisory Policy Analysis  
 
Policy analysis represents a distinctive perspective on the world of politics. It is a 
manner of simplification of the complexity and dynamics of the political affairs. This 
raises the question how does the capacity of policy analysts to support policymakers at 
tackling the cognitive barriers to framing governance in the SD perspective434 depend 
from their way to study the central analytical dimensions of policy analysis?  
 
                                                 
428 Héritier, 1993; Majone, 1993; Bandelow, 2003; Wewer, 2003. 
429 Bandelow (2003) refers to the advisory type of policy analysis as ‘advisory policy analysis’.  
430 Héritier, 1993.  
431 E.g., Schubert/ Bandelow, 2003; Fischer, 2003; Bell, 2003a.  
432 Schubert/ Bandelow, 2003. 
433 Torgeson, 1986; Schubert/ Bandelow, 2003. 
434 See chapters 2 and 3. 
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The content dimension of policy processes, better known as the ‘policy dimension’435 of 
policymaking, represents the central research object of policy analysis.436 Policy 
analysts typically focus on questions such as what do political actors do, why they do it, 
and what difference it makes.437 They are primarily interested in reasons, requirements 
and implications for the creation of political contents as well as with their consequences 
and effects. For example, they are concerned with the question, what political strategies 
and actions (materialised for example in form of political programmes or coalition 
contracts between parties) are/were necessary to achieve political goals such as the 
long-term objective of the EU objective to work for the SD of Europe. According to 
research data, the distinct notion and understanding of the content dimension of 
policymaking importantly determines the capacity of policy analysts to help 
policymakers account for discursive nature of the SD concept. 
  
Secondly, the capacity of policy analysts to assist policymakers at making a 
sustainability shift in their political thinking is in large part determined by their 
understanding of policy learning and knowledge. The generation and dissemination of 
policy relevant knowledge represents a central purpose of advisory policy analysis. 
With other words, policy analysts commonly share the aim to develop a science of 
policy forming and execution, and contribute to the decision process by creating 
relevant information and interpretations to policy issues.438 They explore policy 
processes with the aim to provide policy relevant information and knowledge to assist 
decision making processes of individual or collective actors.439 This aim represents a 
distinct inherent teleological orientation of policy analysts.  
 
Nevertheless, the capacity of policy analysts to facilitate the policymakers’ perception 
of global change in the SD perspective largely depends from the theoretical frames that 
                                                 
435 This focus is informed by a three-dimensional ‘policy-politics-polity’ concept of policymaking. 
According to Rüdiger (1992), the three-dimensional model of policymaking represents the most widely 
adopted concept in policy sciences. ‘Polity’ factors represent the formal dimensions of policy processes 
and for example include political order, institutions and norms. ‘Politics’ means the procedural dimension 
of policy processes and includes factors such as for example more or less conflictual processes of 
enforcement of goals, contents and distributional decisions.  
436 Saretzki, 2003.  
437 Interview with Holzinger, 2004; Interview with Wagenaar, 2003; Schubert/ Bandelow, 2003. 
438 Bell, 2003a.  
439 Bell, 2003a.  
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they rely on in order to observe the changing IR. This is by far not an exhaustive list of 
the central analytical foci of policy analysts that determine their capacity to help 
policymakers at accounting for discursive nature of the SD concept, making 
sustainability shifts in political thinking and at tackling global change through the 
sustainability lens. However, it enables to systematically outline the capacity of policy 
analysts to provide policy advice that would support policymakers at tackling these 
three cognitive challenges, the exploration needs to focus on the threefold basic 
analytical dimensions of policy analysis: (1) content dimensions as the research focus of 
policy analysis, (2) policy learning as its purpose, and (3) global change as the 
contextual condition.440  
 
4.1.3. Theoretical Approaches to Policy Analysis 
 
Policy analysts tend to adopt highly differing theoretical approaches to observe policy 
dimension of policymaking as their research object, to promote policy learning as the 
research purpose, and to observe the changing IR as the research context. These 
approaches enable them to simplify the complex reality. They guide the selectivity of 
policy analysts’ perception, i.e., they determine their sensitivity and blindness for 
aspects of social reality.441 In turn, they importantly determine the foci and the 
outcomes of their policy inquiry.  
 
The theoretical approaches taken by policy analysts largely represent derivates of the 
distinct paradigm thinking that they are ascribed to. The conduct of policy analysis is 
thereby commonly informed by two schools of paradigm thinking. On one hand, policy 
analysts ascribed to old paradigm thinking442 commonly adopt the ‘positivist’, 
‘behaviourist’, ‘empiricist’, ‘critical rationalist’ or the ‘technocratic’ approaches to 
policy analysis. On the other hand, policy analysts ascribed to new paradigm thinking443 
typically follow ‘constructivist’, ‘constructionist’, ‘postmodernist’, ‘post-positivist’, 
                                                 
440 See chapters 4.2., 4.3. and 4.4. 
441 Héritier, 1993; Fischer, 2003b. 
442 Drawing on Fischer (2003), this thesis uses the term ‘positivist policy analysis’ when referring to the 
policy analytical research that follows the principles of old paradigm thinking. See Table 3. 
443 Fischer, 2003; Hewson/ Sinlair, 1999; Interview with Wagenaar, 2003. For more on new paradigm 
thinking see Table 3. 
 115
‘post-empiricist’ ‘interpretative’, ‘discursive’ or ‘deliberative’ approaches to policy 
analysis. These approaches began to emerge after the ‘argumentative turn in policy 
analysis and planning’444 as a reaction to the criticisms of the mainstream positivist 
approaches to conduct of policy analysis in the early 80ties.445 Policy analysts following 
these approaches distance themselves from the causal and deterministic explanations of 
policymaking common to positivist policy analysis and, instead, aim at exploring and 
enhancing the argumentative spectrum of policymaking.  
 
Depending on their distinct paradigm thinking, policy analysts study the three basic 
analytical dimensions of policy analysis in different ways. Policy analysts relying on old 
paradigm thinking tend to have highly fragmented and static understanding of policies 
as final static outputs and outcomes of single phases of policy process. In contrast, 
policy analysts ascribed to new paradigm thinking largely understand and inquire policy 
processes as a discourse. The discursive perspective enables them to account policies as 
fluid discursive entities, which are continuously subverted to ‘political life’.446 
Depending on their paradigm thinking, policy analysts also tend to exhibit highly 
differing notions of policy learning.447 Policy analysts informed by the paradigm 
thinking for example tend to understand and support policy learning as adaptation and 
improvement learning. As a result, they strive to support policymakers in a way that 
promotes their ‘simple learning’, ‘single-loop learning’, ‘proto-learning’ and 
‘instrumental learning’. In contrast, policy analysts ascribed to new paradigm thinking 
tend to rely on the notion of policy learning as complex learning that results in change 
of values and beliefs and goals of policymakers. They see their primary task in assisting 
policymakers to understand how the basic paradigms behind political programmes 
change. In short, they strive to promote their ‘change learning’ or ‘double-loop 
learning’. Only since recently, some policy analysts increasingly rely on the post-
modern notion of policy learning as reflexive learning that represents a derivate of new 
                                                 
444 Fischer / Forester, 1993.  
445 Fisher, 2003; Héritier, 1993. 
446 Fischer, 1989. For an exhaustive discussion of models of policy processes to be observed within the 
policy analytical discourse see also Sabatiér, 1999.  
447 For more on models of policy learning see Bandelow, 2003.  
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paradigm thinking.448 They are primarily concerned with helping policymakers to react 
on new information more rapidly and flexibly. They understand policy learning as 
learning how to learn. Their primary goal is thus to support the learning capacities of 
policymakers. Nevertheless, while policy analysts relying on old paradigm thinking 
observe the change within the existing structures and systems of global governance, 
policy analysts relying on new paradigm thinking focus on studying the meta-change, 
i.e., the restructuration of the existing systems and change of paradigms within which 
policymakers operate.  
 
To conclude, the distinct paradigm thinking of policy analysts, guiding their choice of 
theoretical frames, importantly determines the epistemological power and value of 
policy analysis for informing governance for SD. Drawing on Fischer,449 this thesis in 
continuation uses the term ‘positivist policy analysis’ when referring to the policy 
analytical research that follows the principles of old paradigm thinking450 and the term 
‘constructivist policy analysis’ to refer to policy analysis following the principles of 
new paradigm thinking. Now, let us take a look which type of paradigm thinking –
positivist or constructivist - represents the mainstream reference point of policy analysts 
in empirical practice.  
 
4.1.4. Mainstream Positivist Approach to Advisory Policy Analysis  
 
According to research data, policy analysts tend to rely on both, positivist and 
constructivist approaches to policy analysis. However, while both paradigmatic 
approaches co-exist in the policy research practice, they are by far not equally 
acknowledged and adopted by the policy analysis community. Although neither the 
constructivist nor the positivist approach to exercising policy analysis has the status of 
complete dominance in the EU policy research, scholars451 agree that positivist 
                                                 
448 In contrast to ‘simple learning’ and ‘complex learning’, which represent the types of ‘proto-learning’ 
or ‘first-order learning’, the ‘reflexive learning’ represents a type of ‘meta-learning’ and is also referred to 
as ‘deutero learning’, ‘second-order learning’ or ‘process-learning’(Bandelow, 2003). 
449 Fischer, 2003b.  
450 Haas, 1992. 
451 Morgan et al., 1999; Hajer / Wagenaar, 2003; Fischer / Forester, 1993; Fischer, 2003a; 2003b; 
Gottweis, 2003a; 2003b; Finlayson, 2004a; 2004b; Yanow / Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Yanow, 1993; 2000; 
2003; 2006; 2007. 
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approach clearly dominates the empirical practice of policy analysis. It represents the 
institutionalised form of policy research and a general preference of policy analysts. 
Thereby, Fischer warns that “although few [policy analysts] describe themselves as 
positivists in traditional terms, many of positivism’s basic tenets are still well embedded 
in both research practices and institutional decision processes.”452  
 
Positivist approach to conduct of policy analysis hence represents the ‘mainstream’ 
approach to practice of policy analysis. It importantly defines the capacity of policy 
analysts to gain policy-relevant insights as it determines their preference for research 
perspectives, aspects and tools chosen when conducting policy analysis. In fact, “the 
past three decades have witnessed an explosive growth in the development and use of 
tools for quantitative policy analysis.”453 When inquiring and discussing mainstream 
policy analysis practices, this thesis hence focuses exclusively on critically discussing 
the practices and conduct of positivist policy analysis that is based on theories deriving 
from old paradigm thinking.  
 
4.2. Limited Capacity to Account for Discursive Nature of the 
Sustainable Development Concept 
 
The research evidence shows that the reliance of mainstream policy analysts on the 
positivist models of policymaking that derive from old paradigm thinking454 severely 
restrict their capacity to help policymakers tackle the discursive nature of the SD 
concept.455 In particular, the conception of policymaking as phase-focused and rational 
processes and the notion of policies as bounded and invariable outputs restrict their 
ability to provide targeted policy advice on adapting governance for more SD. 
 
 
 
                                                 
452 Fischer, 2003, pp. 210. 
453 Morgan et al., 1999. 
454 See Table 3. 
455 See chapter 2.3.  
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4.2.1. Phase-focused and Rational Notion of Policy Process  
 
By drawing on the positivist theories of policymaking, mainstream policy analysts 
ground their empirical research on the following assumptions about the nature of 
policymaking that limit their ability to help policymakers empirically account for 
discursive nature of the SD concept: 
 
Assumption that policymaking represents a one-way cycle, consisting of functionally 
separated rigid phases that follow each other as if on assembly line. Policy analysts 
tend to rely on the phase-model of policymaking that typically includes the following 
three phases: policy formulation (problem perception, problem definition, agenda 
setting, goal formulation and decision finding), policy implementation (programme 
operationalisation, acquirement of resources, value distributions, application of norms 
and policy decisions), and policy impact and evaluation.456 Such production line model 
also informs the research design of policy analysis as a process that is divided into 
separate phases; problem definition, weighting of alternative solutions, assumptions of 
one solution, and testing and evaluating the outcomes.457 The reliance of policy analysts 
on such a phase-model of policymaking enables them to study policy processes in 
manageable segments.458 However, it is highly inappropriate for helping policymakers 
to tackle the discursive nature of the SD concept, for it implies that the SD concept 
represents a static concept that may be ‘injected’ into single phases of policy processes. 
It also suggests that it is not necessary to account for simultaneous and multidirectional 
emergence of phases or for their mutual interdependence when integrating the concept 
of SD into policymaking.459 
 
                                                 
456 Holzinger, 2004.  
457 The phase heuristic was originally developed on the basis of writings by Easton (1965) and Lasswell 
(1951). While Easton developed a rather functionally-oriented model of policy process (consisting of 
input, throughput, output and feed-back), Lasswell introduced a rather advise-oriented set of phases 
(including information collection, recommendation, prescription, advice, invocation, application, 
compliance and completion) (Sabatiér, 1993). 
458 The model, among others, contributed to development of the process-perspective on policy process, of 
analysis of phenomena that transcend the institutional borders and of focus on policy implications. 
(Sabatiér, 1993, pp. 117). 
459 Sabatiér, 1993; Héritier, 1993.  
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Assumption that policymaking represents a rationality project. Policy analysts tend to 
conceive the policymaking as a rationality project, in which ideas, values, arguments 
and beliefs serve exclusively to legitimise the interests. The change in policies is in the 
first place ascribed to the change in economic conditions, group pressures, new 
technologies and institutional changes. With other words, policy analysts understand 
policymaking solely in terms of power and interests.460 On the basis of such 
instrumental understanding of policy process, policy analysts fail to explore the 
relevance of values and ideas such as the SD concept for policymaking. Consequently, 
they miss the opportunity to see the SD concept as a chance to further develop human 
capacities and to transform preferences. Furthermore, they fail to capture the struggle 
over different concepts of SD as “a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even 
more powerful than money and votes and guns.”461 The model of policy process as a 
rationality project virtually “bleeds the political life out of the policymaking process, 
leaving little room for the dilemmas, contradictions, and paradoxes that characterize the 
interesting and difficult political problems.”462 
 
The reliance of policy analysts on the phase-focused and rationalist models enables 
them to gain a certain degree of analytical clarity. However, these models are highly 
inappropriate reference frames for conducting policy analysis for governance for SD as 
they severely restrict the capacity of policy analysts to help policymakers tackle the 
discursive nature of the SD concept. 
 
4.2.2. Policies as Bounded and Invariable Outputs  
 
When grounding their research on the positivist models of policymaking, mainstream 
policy analysts tend to adopt the following assumptions about the nature and 
implications of policies that severely restrict their capacity to assist policymakers at 
accounting for the concept of SD as a discursive, fluid, socially constructed concept that 
demands continuous justification and negotiation in public debate:  
 
                                                 
460 Héritier, 1993, pp.17. 
461 Stone, 1988, pp. 7.  
462 Fischer, 1989, pp. 994. 
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Assumption that policies represent invariable and objective variables. The policy 
analysts’ notion of policies as static independent variables facilitates the anticipation of 
complex policy implications, for it implies that there are always losers and winners of a 
distinct policy. However, in the SD concept, this notion prevents policy analysts to 
account for policies as ‘moving targets’463 that continuously develop and change in the 
time of their being. It disables them to grasp policies and political contents as 
interpretable entities that have an infinite number of facets. This notion closes the view 
of policy analysts for the alternative interpretations of policies, which represents a 
supreme instrument of power because alternatives enable the choice of conflicts, and the 
choice of conflicts allocates power.464 As a result, mainstream policy analysts largely 
fail to outline the scope and the range of conflict about the policies in a way that would 
make the acceptance and integration of the SD concept into policies probable. In 
consequence, they fail to promote the capacity of policymakers to grasp policies as 
processes of political debate and to perceive the scope of policy conflict that makes the 
adoption and integration of concept of SD probable.  
 
Assumption that policies represent bounded objects, which can be separated from each 
other and studied as independent objects. Mainstream policy analysts tend to conceive 
single policies as bounded objects. As a result, they remain blind for the interactions 
between the policies, i.e., for the ways in which they overlap and reciprocally affect 
each other.465 They fall short of accounting for the sectoral, functional and international 
interweavement of policies. They overlook that policies represent parameters for 
success of other policies. In the SD context, mainstream policy analysts hence fail to 
inform policymakers about the embedding of policies in the ‘policy landscape’,466 i.e., 
about the positive and negative external effects single policies (actions and strategies) 
create for other policies. They will also lack the capacity to help policymakers grasp 
policies as self-generating entities that often create negative overspill-effects thus 
creating a demand for new policies to overcome these effects. In short, they fail to 
promote horizontal policy integration. 
                                                 
463 Héritier, 1993.  
464 Schattschneider, 1967, pp. 68.  
465 Héritier, 1993. 
466 Héritier, 1993. 
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Assumption that policies are following static goals. Mainstream policy analysts tend to 
assume that the policies represent the final solutions to policy goals, which represent 
static and fixed aspirations. This understanding of policies has severe negative impact 
on the capacity of policy analysts to help policymakers account for discursive nature of 
the SD concept as an overarching policy goal of the EU. It results in the belief that the 
SD concept does not need to be continuously questioned, adapted and improved in 
relation to the changing contextual conditions in interaction with the general public. 
Mainstream policy analysts thus fail to consider the ways in which the preferences and 
goals of policymakers are continuously changing. They also fail to help policymakers 
account for the ambivalent and dynamic nature of the SD. 
 
In order to improve their capacity to aid policymakers tackle the discursive nature of the 
SD concept, policy analysts thus need to distance themselves from the positivist models 
of policies as bounded and invariable inputs of policy processes.  
 
4.3. Limited Capacity to Support Mind-Shifts in Political Thinking 
 
Confucius argued: “Tell me and I forget. Show me and I remember. Let me do and I 
understand.”467 Accordingly, the capacity of policy analysts to support policymakers at 
making sustainability shifts in political thinking468 largely depends on the way they 
conceive and understand policy learning as the central purpose of policy analysis. 
However, mainstream policy analysts tend to conceive policy learning in a way that 
severely opposes the Confucius’ approach. This is because their notion of policy 
learning is informed by one of the following two theories of learning deriving from old 
paradigm thinking;469 the behaviourist theory of learning470 from the late 60ties and the 
cognitivist theory of learning471 from the late 80ties. In continuation, it will be shown 
how and why these notions severely restrict the capacity of policy analysts to support 
                                                 
467 Attributed to Confucius, 551 BC - 479 BC. 
468 See chapter 2.4. 
469 See Table 3. 
470 For detailed discussion of the behaviorist theory of knowledge see Baumgartner et al., 2000. 
471 For detailed discussion of the cognitivist theory of knowledge see Baumgartner et al., 2000. 
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policymakers at making mind-shifts in temporal, spatial, fact, dynamic, power and 
ethical dimensions of political thinking in a way that would allow them to observe 
governance through sustainability lens. 
 
4.3.1. Behaviourist Stimulus-Response Notion of Policy Learning  
 
When relying on the behaviourist notion of policy-relevant knowledge, mainstream 
policy analysts typically conceive it as a static good, which can be transmitted from the 
head of the experts to the head of the policymaker (the ‘Nürnberg Trichter’ model). 
Thereby, they consider the brain of policymakers as a ‘black box’,472 which receives an 
expert input and reacts on it in deterministic way.473 They see it as a passive container 
that needs to be filled. 
 
 
   
Figure 5: Behaviourist Model of Learning474 
 
Consequently, policy analysts understand policy learning as a transfer of available 
policy-relevant factual ‘know-that’ knowledge. They see themselves as actors who 
know, what and how the learners should learn and whose primary task is to transmit 
their knowledge to policymakers. They strive to present the appropriate stimulus in 
order to evoke learning and knowledge, i.e., a conditioned reflex of adaptation on the 
external world.  
                                                 
472 Baumgartner, 2001. 
473 See Figure 5. 
474 Figure adapted from Baumgartner, 2001.  
a
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Policy analysts informed by the behaviourist model of leaning are not primarily 
interested in conscious (cognitive) regulation processes, but in behavioural regulation. 
Consequently, they see themselves in focus of attention. For them, policymakers have a 
rather passive role in the learning process. They need to remember and recognise the 
learned. They need to simply give the ‘right’ answers on the questions, the answers to 
which are already known. For mainstream policy analysts, the quality of policy learning 
hence in the first place depends from the choice and preparation of the knowledge in a 
way that enables most efficient knowledge transmission. Due to such one-way linear 
understanding of learning, they see themselves as ‘Philosophenkönige’475 selling and 
transmitting knowledge to their loyal subjects, the policymakers. They have an 
‘elitist’476 self-understanding of their role as policy advisors. 
 
Policy analysts who have such instrumental and simple notion of knowledge as know-
what knowledge are typically interested in assessment of efficiency and effectiveness of 
policy programmes. In the context of SD this means that they are primarily concerned 
with explaining and showing how policymakers can design ‘better’, i.e., more efficient, 
effective or legitimate governance for SD.477 When disseminating policy-relevant 
knowledge, policy analysts who are informed by the behaviourist notion of knowledge 
tend to rely on didactic methods of knowledge transmission such as frontal instruction 
and elaboration of closed expert papers, which they present to policymakers without 
demanding for their explicit feed-back or input. The main outputs of policy analysts 
represent written reports that include policy alternatives, evaluations, designs, theories, 
suggestions, warnings, long range plans, statistics, predictions, tests, analyses or simply 
new ideas, and that are written in a highly self-explanatory way, i.e., without the explicit 
consideration of the interpretative gap between policymakers and policy analysts. 
                                                 
475 Lösch, 2005. 
476 Lösch, 2005.  
477 There are highly differing notions of the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness to be found in policy 
discourse. This thesis relies on the definitions of efficiency and effectiveness as conceived by Bandelow: 
“Die Effektivität bezeichnet den Grad der Wirksamkeit, sagt also aus, wie gut ein Ziel erreicht wird. Die 
Effektivität vergleicht das Ergenis (Outcome) mit dem Ziel. Bei der Optimierung der Effektivität geht es 
darum, ‚die richtigen Dinge zu tun’. Effizient bezeichnet daher die Wirtschaftlichkeit des Mitteleinsatzes, 
gibt also das Verhältnis von Wirkung und Kosten an. Die Effizienz vergleicht die erbrachten Leistungen 
mit den Kosten. Bei der Optimierung der Effizienz geht es somit darum, ‚die Dinge richtig zu tun’“ 
(Bandelow, 2003, pp. 305). 
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By seeing policymakers as passive stimulus-receivers, policy analysts disregard the 
problems and challenges of overcoming the interpretative gap between policymakers 
and their own knowledge. The behaviourist stimulus-response understanding of policy 
learning is thus clearly inappropriate to serve as a reference frame for generating and 
disseminating policy-relevant advice that would support policymakers at making mind-
shifts in their political thinking.  
 
4.3.2. Cognitivist Notion of Policy Problems as Objectively Given  
 
When relying on the cognitivist notion of policy learning,478 policy analysts consider the 
inner processes of the human brain as being relevant. Thereby, they assume that the 
brain of policymakers is capable of processing and transforming information.479 As a 
result, policy analysts conceive policy learning as a dialogue between policymakers and 
policy analysts. They see themselves as tutors, who advise, help and demonstrate to 
policymakers how to choose the adequate methods and procedures to solve 
predetermined policy problems. Consequently, they primarily aim to inform 
policymakers about the ‘right’ procedures and methods to solve policy problems. 
However, they do not strive to change the basic beliefs and goals of policymakers. 
Rather, they strive to help policymakers learn the methods and procedures and methods, 
i.e., the ‘know-how’. Policymakers are expected to produce one or several answers by 
applying these methods and procedures. This expectation of policy analysts opposes the 
behaviourist expectation that policymakers can produce only one right answer on 
certain stimuli. 
 
There are numberless examples of policy analytical advice that is based on cognitivist 
understanding of policy learning. Highly popular didactic methods of policy analysts 
who are informed by cognitivist notion of learning for example represent workshops in 
                                                 
478 According to Baumgartner (2001), the cognitivist notion of policy learning (see Table 3) cannot be 
clearly epistemologically positioned. Cognitivist notion, however, can be ascribed to critical rationalism 
as it assumes that the mental representations have a rather illustrative character. It is also highly 
compatible with scepticisms, as it sees the mental representations are primarily as products of the brain. 
The cognitivist notion of learning emerged in order to reduce the restrictions of the behaviourist 
perspective on policy learning.  
479 See Figure 6. 
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which policymakers are expected to interactively discuss the fixed lists of individual 
policy problems and challenges. Policy analysts present and treat policy problems as 
given and as context independent. They (or policymakers) formulate them before the 
start of workshops, which then focus on finding and applying methods to solve them. 
Policy analysts do not urge policymakers to critically reflect and question these 
predefined problems and possible interconnections between them prior, during on after 
the workshops. In practice, policy analysts with the cognitivist notion of policy learning, 
therefore, largely fail to help policymakers account for formability and relative 
randomness in definition of policy problems and for the ways how they are defined 
through diverging perspectives on their sources, implications and meanings in the social 
context, because they conceive policy problems as objectively given problems that are 
waiting to get solved.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Cognitivist Model of Learning480 
 
The cognitivist notion of policy learning is a highly popular among policy analysts 
because it saves time and is didactically simple. However, policy analysis based on such 
notion is highly restricted and even obsolete when it comes to promoting sustainability 
shifts in political thinking of policymakers. This is becase the sustainability shift in 
political thinking starts with a shift in constructing and framing policy problems. So as 
to solve policy problems in terms of translating the SD concept into policymaking, these 
problems first need to be perceived, i.e., constructed and critically reflected. 
 
                                                 
480 Figure adapted from Baumgartner, 2001.  
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4.4. Limited Capacity to Grasp Global Change 
 
According to research evidence, the reliance of policymakers on theories of IR that 
derive from old paradigm thinking481 severely limits their capacity to aid policymakers 
observe the temporal, spatial, fact, dynamic, power and ethical perspectives of global 
change in the SD perspective. These positivist theories of IR, among others, include the 
realist, liberalist, pluralist and globalist theories of IR.482 In particular, the following 
assumptions about the patterns of IR severely restrict the capacity of policy analysts to 
help policymakers account for the impact of global change in the SD perspective: (1) 
the short-term and temporally static notion of IR, (2) the two-level notion of IR, (3) the 
issue-centred and causalist notion of IR, (4) the notion of linear dynamics of IR, (5) the 
notion of absoluteness of sovereignty and primacy of state, (6) the notion of individuals 
as peripheral and rational actors in the worlds politics. 
 
4.4.1. Short-Term and Temporally Static Notion of International Relations  
 
Mainstream policy analysts drawing on the positivist theories of IR exhibit highly 
limited capacity to help policymakers sensitise their political thinking on global change 
for the long-term perspectives. They largely fail to help policymakers account for its 
temporal features such as the acceleration pace of politics at all levels of community due 
to confounded spatial and temporal dimensions of global governance and for the fluid 
and dynamic nature of features of global governance such as sovereignty of states.483 In 
particular, the following assumptions about the temporal nature of the changing patterns 
of global cooperation severely restrict the capacity of policy analysts to help 
policymakers account for the implications of global change in the SD perspective:  
 
Assumption that global governance represents a static order or structure. Policy 
analysts tend to map the patterns of global affairs as a static order, the existence of 
which is independent from temporal dimensions. This assumption derives from the 
liberalist and the realist perspective on IR. Liberalism conceptualises the patterns of 
                                                 
481 See Table 3. 
482 See chapter 3.2.4. 
483 See Table 4 and chapter 3.3.1.  
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global governance as issue-oriented cooperative structures and interactions. Realism 
frames global governance as cooperative arrangements among states and governments 
that are driven by ‘superpower rivalry’484 or balance of power. Due to such notion of 
global governance, policy analysts neglect the temporal dimension of patterns of global 
governance and fail to explore how they might change in the long-term.  
 
Assumption that the patterns of global affairs are changing according to a certain 
pattern or that they are not changing at all. Implicit to mainstream policy analysis are 
the realist and liberalist assumptions that the patterns of global affairs are not changing 
or that they are changing according to a certain pattern. In general, mainstream policy 
analysts tend to rely on static deterministic models of global governance patterns, which 
define the future as continuation of the past. They assume that the patterns of global 
affairs may be controlled and managed. Such notion of global change directs the view 
of policy analysts toward the past and toward present when they examine possible, 
desirable, and probable futures of patterns in global affairs. With other words, the 
assumption results in an inherent present- and past-orientation of policy analysis. As a 
result, policy analysts fail to explicitly address the complex nature of future global 
change and the challenge of exploring the ontologically nonexistent future. 
 
Assumption that the world of global affairs is state-centred. Mainstream policy analysts 
tend to make the primacy of states in patterns of global affairs to a paradogma. They 
assume that actors other than states have only a secondary status in the world politics. 
This deterministic assumption, largely informed by the state-centred realist or liberalist 
theories, makes an account for change in patterns of global affairs over long periods of 
time obsolete, for it produces a false certainty about the future structural conditions of 
global affairs. It implies the possibility of causal explanations of policymaking on 
global level. It suggests that the patterns of solving the global problems are not 
changing. In this case, policy analysts can help policymakers find short-term policy 
solutions to short-term policy problems that the world faces today. However, they fail to 
                                                 
484 Rosenau, 1999. 
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aid policymakers sensitise their political thinking on global change for the mid- or 
longer-term futures perspectives.485 
 
This is merely an exemplary list of the assumptions that commonly inform the 
mainstream policy analysts’ observation of the temporal nature of global change. 
However, it shows that they largely tend to rely on a short-term and static notion of 
global governance patterns that are informed by theories of IR such as liberalist or 
realism that derive from old paradigm thinking. Policy analysts hence need to distance 
themselves from using these theories as reference frames in order to improve their 
capacity to help policymakers account for the long-term future horizon of global change 
that are considered relevant in the SD context. 
 
4.4.2. Two-Level Spatial Notion of International Relations  
 
When grounding their inquiry on the positivist theories of IR, mainstream policy 
analysts exhibit restricted ability to help policymakers sensitise their thinking on global 
change for the global perspectives. i.e., for the non-territoriality and for the non-linearity 
of politics due to allocations of value in spheres of authority within and across bounded 
territories, as well as for the fragmegrative dynamics causing the simultaneous shifts of 
authority to transnational and sub-national level and for the changing global order as an 
encompassing organic whole.486 In particular, the assumption of policy analysts that 
there is a clear division between domestic (local or national) and foreign affairs 
restricts their ability to help policymakers account for the spatial underpinnings of 
global change that are considered relevant in the SD perspective. 
 
When policy analysts frame the patterns of global governance as a static order or a 
structure, where the nation states play the primary role, they remain imprisoned by the 
idea that the line dividing the domestic and foreign affairs serves as the cutting edge of 
analysis and that the nature of the world politics is inter-national. Global governance is 
thus conceived as “doing internationally what governments do at home.”487 The two-
                                                 
485 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999; Glenn / Gordon, 2005. 
486 See Table 4 and chapter 3.3.1.  
487 Finkelstein, 1995, pp. 369. 
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level model of IR characterised by a clear division between the domestic (national and 
local) and foreign affairs that results in the limited ability of policy analysts to recast the 
territoriality of global governance patterns. The state-centric notion of global 
governance results in a general inability of mainstream policy analysts to grasp the truly 
transnational scope of global governance that is seen as relevant in the SD perspective. 
 
The following example of policy advice on the ways to politically solve the cross-
cultural policy problem of the geological change illustrates well the limitations of policy 
advice based on the static, two-level framing of changing patterns of global affairs in 
the SD context. At the end of 1990ties, the energy drilling in Louisiana, USA, removed 
vast quantities of subsurface liquid, which increased the rate at which the land was 
sinking. As a consequence, Louisiana is loosing approximately 25 square miles of 
wetlands every year.488 In face of this challenge, governmental policy experts advised 
the Louisiana state to lobby for federal money to help to replace the upstream sediments 
that are the delta’s lifeblood. However, such local projects will not do much good in the 
very long run, because the success largely depends on the course of changes elsewhere 
on the planet. The lack of policy experts’ concern with maximising joint utility 
functions made the advice of policy experts highly insufficient in the environmental 
terms.  
 
The two-level spatial model of global affairs that policy analysts tend to rely on as to 
make sense of the spatial nature of the changing patterns of global cooperation derives 
from theories of IR that are informed by old paradigm thinking.489 As a reference frame, 
it severely restricts the of policy analysts’ capacity to support policymakers at tackling 
the spatial horizons of change in patterns of global cooperation when reforming 
governance for more SD.  
 
4.4.3. Issue-Centred and Causalist Notion of International Relations  
 
Policy analysts relying on the positivist theories of IR lack the capacity to aid 
policymakers adopt a multi-issue, multi-perspective horizon on global change, i.e., to 
                                                 
488 Glick, 2004, pp. 27.  
489 See Table 3. 
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account for the reciprocal interdependence between market and state, to explore 
international regimes as ‘patchwork patterns’ that are centred on multiple issues or to 
tackle the multi-dimensional nature of globalisation, including the informational, civil 
and social in addition to the economic dimension of globalisation.490 In particular, the 
following assumptions about the fact dimension of IR restrict their ability to help 
policymakers account for global change in the SD perspective:  
 
Assumption that patterns of global governance evolve around narrow issues. Policy 
analysts tend to frame the patterns of global cooperation from the liberalist perspective 
as cooperative arrangements that focus on narrow single issue areas. They assume that 
there is a single public-sector policymaker who faces a single problem in the context of 
a single polity. Moreover, policy analysts tend to rely on the narrow issue-orientation 
that is characteristic for the semi-derivate of liberalist theory, i.e., for the regime theory. 
By referring to the totality of formal rules and norms in international law and to the 
informal norms and rules of behaviour as ‘regimes’, they emphasize and study 
governance only for single issue areas. International governance systems are seen as 
regimes which include “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
issue area.”491 They study regimes as “deliberatively constructed, partial international 
orders on either regional or global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue 
areas of international politics from the sphere of self-help behaviour.”492 Such 
reductionist framing of global governance closes the view of policy analysts for global 
cooperation arrangements as networks that address multiple issues. Their focus on 
narrow issue areas has thus been a definite hindrance to study of change in the multi-
issue and macro nature of global governance.493  
 
Assumption that the global issues are independent. Policy analysts tend to assume that 
the issues addressed by the governance arrangements are largely independent. They fail 
to help policymakers account for the macro-issue organisational structure of global 
                                                 
490 See Table 4 and chapter 3.3.3.  
491 Krasner, 1982, pp.1, in: Karns/Mingst, 2000, pp. 42. 
492 Hasenclever, 2000, pp. 3.  
493 Hewson / Sinclair, 1999. 
 131
governance arrangements due to their single-issue orientation when studying 
policymaking. In this way, policy analysts disregard the necessity of policy integration 
among different issue-areas in frame of global cooperation. They hence lack the 
capacity to provide relevant input on chances and limits of adapting governance in a 
way which would enable equal and simultaneous consideration of multiple issues.  
 
Assumption that economic globalisation represents a world-wide tilt from the state to 
the market. The assumption of mainstream policy analysts about the nature of 
contemporary economic globalisation is informed by economic liberalism, a distinct 
strand of liberalist theory. It represents a very restricted perspective on economic 
globalisation, which frames the relationship between the economic globalisation and the 
state as a static one-way causal dependency of the state on the market. In this view, 
policy analysts largely fail to assist policymakers at accounting for other - especially 
environmental and social - dimensions of globalisation which are considered relevant in 
the SD perspective. The assumption prevents them to systematically consider the multi-
issue and multi-sectoral perspectives of global governance, because the environmental 
and social dimensions do not fit into such a model of change and will thus be widely 
neglected.  
 
The issue-centred notion of global change, deriving from the positivist theories of IR, 
severely restrict the ability of policy analysts to assist policymakers at taking account of 
the multi-issue nature of the changing patterns of global cooperation. This proves that 
the positivist theories of IR represent inadequate theoretical frames for policy analysis 
for governance for SD. 
 
4.4.4. Notion of Linear Dynamics of International Relations 
 
The reliance of mainstream policy analysts on the positivist theories of IR restricts their 
capacity to aid policymakers sensitise their political thinking on global change for its 
dialectic nature, i.e., for its dynamic features such as the dialectic nature of economic 
globalisation, for its contradictory effects on the human well being, and for the global 
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political order as all-encompassing and organic whole.494 Their ability to help 
policymakers tackle global change in the SD perspective is limited in particular due to 
the following assumptions about the dynamics of IR: 
 
Assumption that the change in patterns of global governance is a trivial process based 
on the ‘one-to-one’ relationship between its input (stimulus, cause) and its output. 
Policy analysts often exhibit a deterministic understanding of change in patterns of 
global governance, perceiving global change as a trivial process based on the one-to-one 
relationship between its ‘input’ (stimulus, cause) and its ‘output’ (response, effect).495 
They observe global change as being composed of one overarching trend. In 
consequence, policy analysts typically focus on observing the change within global 
structures and systems, while assuming that the internal operations of a governance 
system remain in one internal state. As a result, in the SD context, policy analysts fail to 
help policymakers account for the non-linear, complex nature of global change, due to 
which “the output once observed for a given input will most likely be not the same for 
the same input given later.”496 They fail to help them observe the shifts of the societal 
phenomena from one internal state to another so as to understand how they change. In 
other words, they fail to help them account for the meta-change, i.e., the restructuration 
of the patterns of global governance. 
 
Assumption that economic growth is linear and without social and environmental 
boundaries. This assumption is based on the realist and the (neo)liberalist models of 
growth that disregard the negative impact of growth and, in particular, its impacts on 
social and environmental aspects of societal transition. The (neo)liberalist economic 
globalisation perspective on global change assumes an unlimited continuation of 
predictable societal growth. It applies econometric models, comprising several 
variables, parameters and equitation in order to account for the growth patterns. This 
belief represents a ‘growth myth’ that ignores the social, material and conceptual limits 
of economic growth. As such, it excludes the possibility of non-linear and altering 
change and it fails to account for the economic, environmental and social limits to 
                                                 
494 See Table 4 and chapter 3.3.4.  
495 For more on trivial notion of societal processes see Von Foerster, 1979a. 
496 Von Foerster, 1979a, pp. 6. 
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growth. In the SD context, such framing of growth clearly limits the capacity of policy 
analysts to aid policymakers acknowledge the limits to societal resources and to societal 
growth when reforming governance for more SD. For example, policy analysts who use 
these growth models as their reference frames to observe global change disregard the 
possibility of shocks such as the natural catastrophes, which may result in very large 
individual losses. 
 
The discussion of the assumptions that mainstream policy analysts commonly adopt in 
order to make sense of the nature of dynamics of global change shows that a 
deterministic notion of growth dynamics as one-way and linear process severely limits 
the ability of policy analysts to support policymakers at tackling the complex and 
dialectic nature of global change. Policymakers drawing on positivist approach to policy 
analysis and in particular on theories of IR deriving from old paradigm thinking,497 
therefore, largely fail to inform governance for SD.  
 
4.4.5. Notion of Absoluteness of Sovereignty and Primacy of State  
 
By drawing on the positivist theories of IR, mainstream policy analysts lack the 
capacity to help policymakers extend the power horizon in their political thinking on 
global change so as to observe it in the SD perspective. In particular, the following 
assumptions about the power distribution in the IR limit the ability of policy analysts to 
assist policymakers at grasping global change in the multi-actor perspective i.e., to 
account for the emergence of the multiple spheres of authority with relational nature, the 
contested nature of sovereignty, the delocalisation of the authority of territorial states 
into multiple directions, the increasingly distributed manner of global interactions set by 
governments, private, public sector managers and citizens, the shifts of authority to 
subnational, transnational and non-governmental level as normal features of global 
change, the central role of global civil society, the rising power of hyper-capitalist elites 
and the rise of their epistemic authority of global informational elites:498  
 
                                                 
497 See Table 3. 
498 See Table 4 and chapter 3.3.5.  
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Assumption that the sovereignty represents an absolute, static and uniform societal 
phenomenon. When relying on the static concept of state sovereignty that derives from 
the realist theory of IR, policy analysts interpret the cooperative governance 
arrangements of global scope as a sign of eroding sovereignty. In the SD context, this 
view on global change disables them to support policymakers in accounting for change 
in quality and nature of sovereignty of states against the background of enhanced 
democratic space. 
 
Assumption that states and governments are the essential underpinnings of the world’s 
organisation and that other actors have no or peripheral impacts on it. Mainstream 
policy analysts widely share the assumption that states and governments are the 
essential underpinnings of the world’s organisation and that other actors have no or 
peripheral impacts on it. However, there is some alteration in relation to the assumed 
extent of power of states in global governance. Whereas some policy analysts rely on 
the realist notion of states as the only unitary central rational actors in global 
governance arrangements, policy analysts that rely on the pluralist and the neoliberal 
theories of economic interdependence frame states as pluralistic actors, meaning that 
decisions are taken by individuals or collective arrangements within structures of 
governments acting with the authority of states. They acknowledge the importance of 
actors outside the framework of states as increasingly important in collaborative 
decision-making of global scope. However, either framed as unitary or as pluralist 
actors that are joined by additional non-state actors in cooperative interactions of global 
scope, states and governments continue to represent the centre of analysis of global 
governance processes. As a result, mainstream policy analysts deterministically weight 
the potential impact of other actors on policymaking as non-existent or as secondary in 
relation to the primary impact of governments and states. This framing limits their 
capacity to help policymakers consider the increasing role and impact of actors other 
than states in forming international regimes and clusters for SD. 
 
Assumption that the cooperative and collaborative arrangements are formed by 
national interests. Due to their state-centric perspective, mainstream policy analysts 
tend to frame global governance as primarily serving the interests of single nation-
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states. On one side, policy analysts who are informed by realism assume that the 
concern about the security and the survival in anarchic world represents the only 
motivation behind the governance. On the other side, policy analysts informed by 
liberalism assume that collaborations emerge in order to support learning and tackling 
of mutual (as opposed to differing) interests. In the SD context, both notions are very 
simplified notions of governance that limit the capacity of policy analysts to support 
policymakers at accounting for the possibility of multidimensional and often opposing 
interests behind the numerous emerging global governance arrangements, in which 
multiple actors do not necessarily follow the often egoist national interests.  
 
Policy analysts assuming the absoluteness or sovereignty of states and the primacy of 
state in contexts in the global politics largely fail to support policymakers at tackling the 
multi-actor horizon in their political thinking on global change. Consequently, they lack 
the capacity to inform governance for SD.  
 
4.4.6. Notion of Individuals as Peripheral and Rational Actors in the Worlds 
Politics 
 
Mainstream policy analysts grounding their research in the positivist theories of IR 
typically lack the ability to help policymakers account for the micro-ethical perspective 
of global change, i.e., for the ethical features of global change such as the new personal 
responsibility of individuals in face of global change, for the intensive nature of 
globalisation, for the rising skills and capacities of individuals, and for the alteration of 
individual ethical horizons of identification due to patterns of global life.499 In 
particular, the following assumptions about the ethical dimension of the changing IR 
limit the capacity of policy analyst to help policymakers tackle the implications of 
global change in the SD perspective: 
 
Assumption that individuals generally act in an economically rational way. Policy 
analysts taking realist and idealist perspective on the IR tend to assume that individuals 
react on the basis of economic interest, i.e., they primarily aim at maximising their own 
                                                 
499 Rosenau, 1995. See Table 4 and chapter 3.3.6. 
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profit. This assumption de-privatises individuals from their social and environmental 
responsibility for both, the well-being of the others as well as for the sustainment of the 
nature. In the SD context, it restricts the capacity of policy analysts to assist 
policymakers at accounting for the relevance and the changing nature of personal 
responsibility of each human being in the world politics. Due to such framing, policy 
analysts for example overlook the possibility of environmental and social stewardship, 
i.e., of the possibility that individuals may not accept any trade-off for large ecosystems 
and social systems losses.  
 
Assumption that individuals play only a secondary and peripheral role in global 
governance arrangements. Drawing on the realist theory of IR, mainstream policy 
analysts tend to assume that the individual human beings take part in the global 
governance processes only by acting through the authority of states and governments or 
through authority of non-state organisations. In consequence, policy analysts disregard 
the potential of individual responsibility and power to mobilise and create 
communicative political spaces or to contribute to welfare. In the SD context, policy 
analysts hence largely fail to provide any input to policymakers striving to account for 
the micro-ethical dimensions of changing patterns of global affairs.  
 
To conclude, mainstream policy analysts who frame the individuals as peripheral and 
primarily rationally motivated actors in the world politics lack the capacity to inform 
policymakers about the chances of the new responsibility ethics, i.e., of the holistic 
value-oriented self-awareness for adjusting governance for more SD.  
 
4.5. Epistemological Needs for Sustainability Turn in Policy Analysis  
 
The above systematic analysis shows that mainstream policy analysts following 
positivist approach to policy analysis encounter severe epistemological shortcomings. 
Due to their inquiry of policymaking as phase- and rationalist-oriented processes 
resulting in bounded and invariable policies, they lack the capacity to support 
policymakers at accounting for the pluralist and the discursive nature of concept of SD 
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because of their.500 Moreover, they have a limited ability to aid policymakers make 
sustainability turn in their political thinking due to behaviourist or cognitivist notions of 
policy learning that makes them largely insensitive to the complex nature of knowledge 
and for the mind-sets of policymakers.501 Nevertheless, the reliance of mainstream 
policy analysts on the positivist theories of IR limits their ability to help policymakers 
tackle the implications of global change through sustainability lens.502 They study the 
patterns of global affairs as short-term temporally static and state-centric phenomena, as 
processes evolving around narrow single issue areas, as processes following a mono-
causalist linear dynamics, and as processes that are primarily determined by states and 
allowing only for a peripheral role of the rationally-oriented individuals and actors.503 
 
Indeed, not all mainstream policy analysts make all these assumptions about the nature 
of policy process and policies, about the nature of knowledge and about global change, 
when conducting policy analysis. Even when they do, they are usually aware of 
limitations imposed by these assumptions and take steps to address them. At least, they 
discuss the implications of assumptions for the research results obtained. However, the 
epistemological shortcomings of these theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
policy process and policies, about the nature of knowledge and about global change 
appear to be greater in the context of SD than they are in other domains of policy 
analysis.504  
 
The above epistemological shortcomings of the mainstream theoretical approaches to 
policy analysis point towards a wide range of complex epistemological needs that 
policy analysts should address so as to increase their capacity to assist policymakers at 
adapting governance for more SD.505 Due to high complexity of these epistemological 
needs that policy analysts need to address in order to increase their capacity to inform 
governance for SD, the thesis in continuation focuses on the following three central 
ones: (1) the need to account for discursive nature of policymaking, (2) the need to 
                                                 
500 See chapter 4.2. 
501 See chapter 4.3. 
502 See Table 3. 
503 See chapter 4.4.  
504 Morgan et al., 1999.  
505 See Table 5. 
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account for social construction of policy problems, and (3) the need to account for the 
deep uncertainty of global change.506 These epistemological needs are considered as 
being decisive for sustainability shift in policy analysis. They should serve policy 
analysts as orientation points in enhancing not only their theoretical frames, but also 
their research methodological and methodical approaches to policy analysis for 
governance for SD. 
 
Table 5: Epistemological Needs for Sustainability Turn in Policy Analysis 
 
 
 
4.5.1. Account for Discursive Nature of Policymaking  
 
So as to increase their capacity to support policymakers at accounting for discursive, 
i.e., pluralist and value-dependent nature of the SD concept, mainstream policy analysts 
need to depart from their mechanistic and fragmented notions of policy processes as 
rationality projects, in which ideas, values, arguments and beliefs serve as mere 
legitimation of interests. Moreover, they should distance themselves from exploring 
policymaking solely in terms of power and interests as well as from treating ideas as 
                                                 
506 See Table 5. 
Aims of Policy 
Analysis 
Epistemological Shortcomings  
 
Epistemological 
Needs  
Help Policymakers 
to Account for 
Discursive Nature 
of the SD Concept  
- Phase-focused and rational notion of policy process.  
- Notion of policies as bounded and invariable outputs. 
Account for the 
discursive nature 
of policymaking.  
Support 
Sustainability 
Mind-Shift in 
Political Thinking 
of Policymakers  
- Behaviourist stimulus-response notion of policy learning. 
- Cognitivist notion of policy learning as improving problem 
solving. 
Account for the 
processes by 
which 
policymakers 
acquire 
knowledge.  
Help Policymakers 
to Frame Global 
Change in the SD 
Perspective  
- Short-term temporally static notion of IR.  
- Two-level spatial notion of IR.  
- Issue-centred and causalist notion of IR. 
- Linear Dynamics of IR  
- Absolute notion of sovereignty and primacy of state 
- Notion of individuals as peripheral and rational actors in IR.  
Account for 
deeply uncertain 
nature of the 
long-term global 
change.  
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properties possessed by policymakers. They also need to cease inquiring global change 
exclusively as change in economic conditions, as institutional change or as change due 
to new technologies.507 Moreover, they need to depart from studying policies as 
invariable, objectively given and deductively explainable social entities.  
 
To increase the epistemological value of mainstream policy analysis in terms of 
informing governance for SD, policy analysts instead should focus on exploring the 
discursive, fluid, complex nature of policies as ‘moving targets’ that are continuously 
changing and developing in the course of their duration and that represent outcomes of 
continuous struggle over ideas, i.e., outcomes of the interpretation-lead interaction 
process between social actors. In addition, they should study policies as discursive 
constructs that turn on multiple interpretations, which are submitted to discursive or 
communicative power that according to Fischer “can determine the very fields of 
actions, including the tracks along which political action travel.”508 
 
In order to do so in empirical practice, policy analysts not only need to enhance and 
adapt their positivist theoretical reference frames, but also methodological and 
methodical approaches in a way that will allow them to study policymaking as a 
continuous struggle over ideas that causes dilemmas, contradictions, plurality and 
paradoxes, which need to be taken into account when adapting governance for more SD 
in the empirical practice. In short, they should rely on the theoretical, methodological 
and methodical approaches that enable them to re- and de-construct the processes of 
interpretations that emerge in the policy interactions.  
 
4.5.2. Notion of Policy Learning as Reflexive Learning  
 
In order to enhance their capacity to help policymakers frame political affairs through 
sustainability lens, policy analysts need to distance themselves from the behaviourist 
notion of learning as transmission of the static good knowledge from one head to 
another. They also need to distance themselves from the cognitivist theory of policy 
learning that conceives policy problems as objectively given. This is because both 
                                                 
507 See chapter 2.3. 
508 Fischer, 2003, pp. viii. 
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notions largely disable them to account for the cognitive processes and maps of 
policymakers and to promote sustainability mind-shift in their political thinking.  
 
Instead of trying to transmit knowledge for solving policy problems or to find ready-
made solutions to the predetermined problems, policy analysts should explicitly 
acknowledge that policymakers in everyday policymaking are confronted with complex, 
unique and unpredictable situations, and that policy problems are often not self-evident, 
but subjectively constructed in response to the situation. In order to promote 
sustainability shift in political thinking of policymakers, policy analysts in particularly 
need to support two types of policy learning. On one hand, they should promote the 
‘complex or change learning’509 of policymakers. They need to support policymakers at 
emancipating themselves from old paradigm thinking510 and at questioning their 
perceptional matrixes in the SD perspective. On the other hand, they need to facilitate 
the ‘reflexive or deutero learning’,511 i.e., they should encourage policymakers to learn 
to learn in order that they can react quicker and in a more flexible way on the new 
information, when translating the concept of SD into policymaking. They need to 
promote their capacity to reflect-in-action, i.e., their ability and willingness to reflect 
inward toward oneself as the observer. They need to help them acknowledge and take 
into account the many ways in which they themselves influence the research findings 
and what comes to be excepted knowledge.512 
 
Both types of learning represent derivates of constructivist theory of policy learning that 
conceives policy learning as an active process by which policymakers in complex real 
situations construct their knowledge in relationship with the past experience. In 
constructivist perspective, learning is framed as a “social process of constructing and 
appropriating a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of one’s experience as a 
guide to action.”513 Meaningful policy learning thus “occurs through self-examination 
of assumptions, patterns of interactions, and the operating premises of action.”514 The 
                                                 
509 Bandelow, 2003. 
510 See Table 3. 
511 Bandelow, 2003. See chapter 4.1.3. 
512 Sandelowski / Barroso, 2002. 
513 Mezinow, 1994. pp. 223. 
514 Merickel 1998. 
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critical reflection can but must not “lead to transformational learning exhibited through 
reflective action.”515  
 
In the constructivist perspective, the brain of policymakers as the addressees of policy 
analysis is conceived as an autopoetic system, which is informationally closed and 
which has no informational input and output. Knowledge takes place only when 
policymakers succeed to integrate the past experiences with present information in order 
to set new actions (e.g., in forms of wanting, thinking, language, movement). In this 
perspective, policymakers are assumed to have a synergy relationship with the 
environment. However, they create by themselves information and knowledge that they 
elaborate in the process of their own cognition.516 
 
 
Figure 7: Constructivist Model of Learning517 
 
In constructivist perspective, policy analysts cannot transmit knowledge and 
information to their heads. Instead, information is seen as a process by which 
policymakers may or may not gain insight and knowledge. The books and the images of 
and about future thus do not represent information yet. They are merely the carriers of 
information. Moreover, in constructivist perspective, policy situations and problems do 
not present themselves as given, but are constructed from events that are purling, 
troubling and uncertain.518 Consequently, policymakers are expected to learn the social 
                                                 
515 Merickel, 1998 
516 See Figure 7. 
517 Adapted from Baumgartner, 2001.  
518 Schön, 1983; 1987. 
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practices, i.e., the ‘knowing-in-action’519 (‘Handlungswissen’), which would enable 
them to act in reflected and exploratory way. The task of policy analysts is not to 
uncover and transmit the abstract (objective) truths or the right methods to policymakers 
as substances or goods. Rather, they should take the function of a coach who cooperates 
closely with policymakers and mentors them at tackling policy problems. They need to 
help policymakers recognise the optimum feasibility and viability of policies and 
support them at developing the life and survival competencies under the continuously 
changing conditions of reality.  
 
So as to promote complex and reflexive policy learning as advocated by the 
constructivist theory perspective, policy analysts need to critically and explicitly 
question their own logic behind their practice of policy analysis. In particular, they 
should continuously reflect their theoretical, research methodological and methodical 
approaches to policy analysis for governance for SD in terms of their capacity to 
promote complex and reflexive policy learning of policymakers. Moreover, they need to 
reflect the competences and the boundaries of policy-relevant knowledge generated in 
the frame of policy analysis in light of the cognitive barriers of policymakers to 
adapting governance for SD. They also should explicitly address the questions of the 
representation, dissemination and communication of the policy knowledge in light of 
highly differing cognitive observation systems of policymakers. 
 
4.5.3. Account for Deep Uncertainty of Global Change  
 
In order to improve their ability to help policymakers frame global change in the SD 
perspective, mainstream policy analysts need to emancipate themselves from relying on 
the positivist theories of IR and from the related ‘predict and act approach’520 that is 
based on the assumption that “the future can be predicted well enough to develop a 
static policy that will produce acceptable outcomes in most plausible future worlds.”521 
Such a ‘predict and act’ approach to studying the global governance limits their ability 
to help policymakers account for global change in the SD perspective, because in 
                                                 
519 Baumgartner, 2001.  
520 Marchau et al., 2010. 
521 Marchau et al., 2010, pp. 940. 
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sustainability perspective, global change represents a non-linear, opened process.522 
This means that the long-terms trends, its impacts on governance for SD, and the related 
policy implications are inherently unpredictable. Even the degree of its uncertainty 
cannot be estimated.523 This means that when observing global change, policy analysts 
cannot know or the parties to a decision cannot agree upon (1) the appropriate models to 
describe interactions between actors involved in global governance, (2) the probability 
distributions to represent uncertainty about key parameters in the models of global 
governance, and/or (3) how to value the desirability of alternative outcomes of global 
governance. In short, policy analysts do not know that they do not know. This causes a 
large gap between the available knowledge and the knowledge policymakers would 
need so as to make quality policy choices in terms of adjusting governance for more 
SD.  
 
The ‘deep uncertainty’524 of global change cannot be reduced by gathering more 
information.525 Under the conditions of deep uncertainty about the future global change, 
policy analysts cannot foresee how it will evolve. Instead, they should adopt certain 
modesty and open the future up, i.e., they should make a virtue out of uncertainty of 
global change. Instead of ‘defuturizing the future’,526 i.e., reducing the feeling of 
uncertainty of policymakers by increasing the security about it and by giving them a 
false comfort of certainty, policy analysts need to conceive the future as an opened 
horizon that can be creatively explored. So as to support policymakers to adapt 
governance for more SD, they should aid them to take the deep uncertainty into account 
and learn to cope with it. They should help them to respond to qualitative change over 
time, to detect the emerging issues and to find the necessary adaptive governance 
                                                 
522 See chapters 2.3.4. and 3.1. 
523 Drawing on Walker et al., in a broad sense, uncertainty is defined as missing knowledge, e.g., the 
absence of information (Walker et al., 2010, pp. 917). For a typology of different levels of uncertainty in 
policymaking see Walker et al., 2003. 
524 Marchau et al., 2010. 
525 Walker et al., 2010. 
526 According to Polak ‘defuturising’ means “a retreat from constructive thinking about the future in order 
to dig oneself into the trenches of the present. It is a ruthless elimination of future-centered idealism by 
today-centered realism. We have lost the ability to see any further than the end of our collective noses. . 
.We are no longer willing or able to peer around the corner of the next century, or even to peer into the 
next decade, except when there is a question of dealing with millions of years and vast distances in space. 
The very size of such time dimensions renders them harmless and non-threatening to the present (1973, 
pp. 195).”  
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responses. In short, they have support them at building flexible governance for SD that 
is resilient to deep uncertainty of global change.  
 
In order to help policymakers account for the non-linear, uncertain, complex and often 
chaotic nature of global change that causes continuous unpredicted emergence of new 
aspects and forms of global cooperation, mainstream policy analysts should depart from 
exploring it in conventional disciplinary patterns of reasoning and open themselves to 
new, integrative, multiple-scale, north-south sensitive, human and natural systems 
perspectives on global change. Only in this way, they will be able to help policymakers 
account for what Taleb527 calls ‘Black Swans’, i.e., events that lie outside the realm of 
the regular expectations (i.e., nothing in the past can convincingly point to its 
possibility), that carry an extreme impact, and that are explainable only after the fact 
(i.e., through retrospective, not prospective, predictability).528 In consequence, 
mainstream policy analysts need to continuously critically reflect the borders of their 
organisation of knowledge and search for solutions to their research dilemmas outside 
their disciplinary borders.  
 
Furthermore, they need to emancipate themselves from their focus on the short-term 
future with some immediate policy in mind and from ‘minutiae futures thinking’,529 i.e., 
from their overriding concern for the present-focused decision-making. Instead, they 
should embrace the futures thinking on a grand, imaginative scale. Nevertheless, 
mainstream policy analysts need to stop searching for solutions to the present and the 
future policy problems in the past. In order to account for deeply uncertain nature of 
global change, they have to emancipate themselves from the attitude to solve policy 
problems by extrapolating common ways of problem solutions from the past and the 
present into the future. However, this is not to say that they cannot learn from 
evaluations of the past, but that they need to explicitly reflect and take into account the 
limited epistemological value of these lessons learned for tackling the deep uncertainty 
of global change. 
 
                                                 
527 Taleb, 2007.  
528 Walker, 2010, pp. 918. 
529 Slaughter, 2001.  
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5. Research Methodological Requirements of Policy 
Analysis for Governance for Sustainable Development 
 
The method is only as good as the one using it. 
(Lamnek, 1995) 
 
Mainstream policy analysts lack the capacity to support policymakers at framing 
governance in the SD perspective because they struggle to encounter three central 
epistemological needs.530 First, they lack the ability to account for the discursive and 
pluralist nature of policies. Secondly, they exhibit limited capacity to account for the 
processes by which policymakers acquire knowledge. Nevertheless, they tend to 
disregard the deeply uncertain nature of global change. These epistemological needs 
represent blind spots in mainstream policy analysts’ observations. They largely result 
from their reliance on the positivist theoretical approaches to policy analysis. However, 
how can policy analysts tackle these epistemological needs in the empirical research 
practice?  
 
In order to answer this question, the chapter focuses on studying the research 
methodological dimension of policy analysis. Thereby, it analyses the applicative 
potential of the Foresight approach and of FRM for tackling the epistemological needs 
of policy analysis for governance for SD. On one hand, it explores how the existing 
research methodological approaches to policy analysis influence the ability of policy 
analysts to choose and use FRM in a way that allows them to tackle the above 
epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD? On the other hand, the 
chapter examines how can policy analysts profit from the current EU Foresight 
discourse in order to improve their capacity to use the FRM in a way that is responsive 
to epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD? 
 
Part 1 of the chapter highlights the interpretivist531 conception of ‘research 
methodology’ and of ‘research method’ that determines the inquiry in this chapter. Part 
2 critically reflects why the mainstream positivist methodological approach limits the 
                                                 
530 See Table 5. 
531 The terms ‘interpretivist’ and ‘intepretative’ are used as synonyms in the thesis.  
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capacity of policy analysts to use the FRM in a way that is sensitive to epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for governance for SD and why the current discourse on 
interpretative turn in policy analysis represents a promising reference to overcome these 
methodological dilemmas. Part 3 systematically analyses how policy analysts can 
benefit from the contemporary EU Foresight discourse in order to tackle the research 
methodological requirements of policy analysis for governance for SD.  
 
5.1. Relevance of Methodological Frame and Methods for Policy 
Analysis 
 
The current policy analytical discourse is informed by different and often opposing 
understandings of methodological frame and research method, in particular in terms of 
their relevance for the applied policy research. This thesis relies on the interpretative 
notion of methodology and methods that importantly determine the focus of exploration 
of the uses of FRM for policy analysis for governance for SD.  
 
5.1.1. Methodological Frame as Research Logic  
 
Drawing on the interpretative conception of methodological frame, the thesis 
understands it as a coherent bundle of methodological assumptions, i.e., as consistent 
assumptions about the relevant conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to gain 
scientific insight in a certain area of interest.532 Methodological assumptions are thus 
conceived as ‘methodological principles’ that deal with the question of choice and use 
of methods for applied policy research, and that represent distinct methodological 
solutions to the epistemological needs of researchers.533 
 
                                                 
532 Lamnek, 1995; Schubert / Bandelow, 2003.  
533 The thesis uses the term ‘methodological principle’, because it is commonly used by acknowledged 
scholars within the policy analytical discourse such as Hajer (2003) and Fischer (2003). However, within 
the German-speaking discourse on the qualitative and interpretative research, acknowledged scholars 
such as Bohnsack (2003) and Lamnek (1995a, 1995b) prefer to use the term ‘methodical principles’ 
(‘methodisches Prinzip’). 
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When referring to ‘methodological frame’ for policy analysis for SD, this thesis hence 
means the applied understanding (‘Anwendungsverständnis’534) of a distinct paradigm 
that informs policy analysts. Methodology stands for the research logic which 
corresponds with and derives from the implicit paradigm thinking of policy analysts and 
serves them as a reference frame for simplifying the complexity of social reality. It 
determines their research interest, their notion of the research object and their research 
direction and purpose. In short, methodology determines the central research habits of 
policy analysts and their notion of applicative potential of research methods for policy 
analysis.  
 
The contemporary empirical policy analytical practice is informed by numerous 
different types of methodological frames, i.e., types of research logic. Thereby, scholars 
tend to distinguish two main types of research logic that in some variation inform policy 
analysts. First type of research logic is commonly referred to as ‘quantitative research 
logic’, as ‘empiricist research logic’, as ‘positivist research logic’ or as ‘rationalist 
research logic’. In order to avoid the heterogeneity of terms used for this type of 
research logic, the thesis applies exclusively the terms ‘quantitative’ or ‘positivist’ 
research logic.  
 
The other type of research logic is largely referred to as ‘qualitative research logic’, as 
‘interpretative approach’, as ‘interpretative methodology’ or as ‘postempiricist 
approach’. Again, for the reasons of analytical clarity, this thesis uses only the terms 
‘qualitative’ or ‘interpretative’ research logic when referring to the second type of 
research logic.535 The research methodological principles common to these two research 
logics differ as presented in Table 6. This is not an exhaustive ideal-typical list of 
differences between the methodological conditions and factors that are considered to be 
decisive for gaining scientific insight by the two types of research logics. However, the 
list makes clear that while the quantitative research logic represents an applied 
                                                 
534 Schubert / Bandelow, 2003.  
535 The analysis of the research discourse shows that acknowledged scholars tend to use the both term-
pairs as synonyms that mean the same. The labels ‘quantitative’ and ‘empiricist’ research logic are often 
used as synonyms in contemporary methodological literature by acknowledged authors. Scholars also 
tend to use the labels ‘qualitative’ and ‘interpretative’ research logic interchangeably.  
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understanding of old paradigm thinking,536 the qualitative research logic represents the 
applied derivate of new paradigm thinking.537  
 
Table 6: Comparative Typology of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Logics538 
 
 
 
Depending on the tendency of constructivism representing the epistemological basis of 
the qualitative research logic, the qualitative research logic can be distinguished into the 
‘re-constructivist’ and the ‘de-constructivist’ research logic.539 While both versions of 
qualitative research logic focus on reading the text, they differ in the distinct 
methodological solutions and innovations that they offer in order to overcome the 
methodological dilemma of perspectivity of knowledge and to come in grips with the 
world as framed from the perspective of new paradigm thinking.540 On one hand, the re-
constructivist methodology is informed by the assumption that although the reality is 
socially constructed, some objective reality exists that can be reinterpreted, i.e., 
reconstructed if it has been clouded by the pervasive regime of truth. The derivates of 
                                                 
536 See Table 3.  
537 See Table 3.  
538 Adapted from Lamnek, 1995. 
539 See Figure 8. 
540 See Table 3. 
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the reconstructivist methodology, among others, comprise the ‘interpretative’, 
‘hermeneutic’, ‘phenomenological’ and ‘cultural’ methodological approaches to policy 
analysis. On the other hand, the de-constructivist methodology is informed by the 
radical constructivist notion of inevitability of the socially constructed world. The 
deconstructivist approach to policy research, therefore, commonly focuses on 
deconstructing the observations, i.e., on uncovering the ‘regimes of truth’541 that define 
the ways people see and speak (create) the world, and on providing new epistemological 
spaces for questioning and constructing alternative views on the reality. It includes 
derivates such as the ‘argumentative’, ‘discursive’, ‘critical’, ‘poststructuralist’, or 
‘postmodernist’ approaches to policy analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Heterogeneity of Interpretative Methodology 
 
The interpretative understanding of methodological frame adopted in this thesis hence 
implies that policy analysts always – implicitly or explicitly – rely on a distinct 
methodological frame when conducting applied policy research. Methodological frame 
determines their notion of the relevant conditions for scientific insight about policies 
and thus informs their preference for and their way to use research methods and 
techniques for data collection and assessment, when conducting empirical policy 
research. Moreover, the interpretative understanding of methodological frame points 
                                                 
541 Inayatullah, 1999. 
Interpretative Methodology 
(Focus on Meaning)  
Reconstructivist Approach 
(Reconstructing the Truth) 
Reconstructivism  
Deconstructivist Approach  
(Deconstructing Knowledge) 
Deconstructivism  
Constructivist Theory of 
Knowledge 
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toward the necessity for the reflected approach to choice and use of methods, i.e., for 
the approach that is responsive to the epistemological needs and ontological 
deliberations of researchers.542 This means that the research inquiry as an interpretation 
process needs to be continuously critically reflected and methodically controlled in 
terms of its responsiveness to the philosophical, i.e., epistemological and ontological 
deliberations and needs of the researchers.  
 
As such, the interpretative notion of methodological frame is critical toward the 
reflective approach to choice and use of research methods that is common to the 
positivist methodology. It, namely, rejects the research habit of policy analysts to solve 
the methodological dilemmas exclusively by reconstructing and refining methods that 
are being used within one methodological frame (‘Verlauf’) without questioning the 
adequateness of the methodological frame itself. The most recent example of such 
positivist approach represents the research design of the five-year LIAISE project of the 
EC that was launched in December 2009.543 So as to better link the Impact Assessment 
instruments to sustainability expertise, the project aims at elaborating a shared Impact 
Assessment toolbox, i.e., durable and flexible infrastructure providing improved tools 
for Impact Assessment that are accessible to policymakers and researchers on a 
dedicated web-platform. The focus of the project is hence put exclusively on improving 
the tools for Impact Assessment in order to bridge the existing gap between the research 
and the policy community in the field of Impact Assessment. The interpretative 
understanding of methodology challenges this belief that rigorous methods and 
methodical tool-boxes represent the best and only way to tackle governance for SD.  
 
The interpretivist understanding of methodology has several implications for the 
exploration of the research methodological requirements of policy analysis for 
governance for SD in this thesis. First, it implies that when discussing the benefits of 
FRM for policy analysis for governance for SD, it is more about the application 
(‘Handhabung’) of the existing methodical instruments as it is about the maturity of the 
                                                 
542 Drawing on Coghlan and Brannick (2005), this thesis distinguishes between reflective approach and 
reflected/reflexive approach to policy analysis that points towards the reflexivity of policy analysts, i.e., 
their “ability and willingness to acknowledge and take account of the many ways they themselves 
influence research findings and thus what comes to be accepted as knowledge (2005, pp. 6).  
543 www.liaise-noe-eu/about.html. 
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single techniques for data collection and assessment. The focus shifts toward the 
individual capacities of policy analyst: “Er muss sich im Feld als feinfühlig, 
reaktionsschnell und der Situation gewachsen erweisen, und es liegt überwiegend in 
seiner Hand, ob sich die von ihm verwendete Methode als fruchtbar erweist. Diese 
Kompetenz lässt sich nicht einfach technizistisch erlernen. Es gibt also in der 
qualitativen Methodologie keine Verselbständigung des technischen Instrumentariums. 
Dessen fruchtbare Verwendung ist primär von der persönlichen Kompetenz des 
Forschers abhängig.”544  
 
Secondly, policy analysts aiming to inform governance for SD need to continuously 
critically reflect the adequateness of their personal research approaches to choice and 
use of FRM for tackling the three epistemological needs encountered when conducting 
policy analysis for governance for SD:545 (1) the need to observe the discursive nature 
of policymaking in order to help policymakers account for the discursive nature of SD; 
(2) the need to account for the processes by which policymakers acquire knowledge in 
order to support them at sustainability mind-shift in the political thinking; (3) and the 
need to tackle the deeply uncertain nature of global change in order to help 
policymakers account for it in the SD perspective. Policy analysts should thereby not 
only question single FRM as this is common in the positivist policy analysis. In 
addition, they need to critically question their ways of choosing and using FRM for 
exercising policy analysis for governance for SD.  
 
Nevertheless, based on their critical self-reflection, policy analysts need to set actions to 
overcome the discrepancy between methodology and their ontological deliberations in 
order to tackle the epistemological needs. Thereby, they not only need to continuously 
adapt and improve single FRM as this is typical for quantitative research, but also 
emancipate themselves from the inadequate research habits and adopt new ones that are 
more responsive to the newly emerged epistemological needs. They need to 
continuously adapt the research methodological frame that serves them as a reference 
point for their choice and use of FRM. 
 
                                                 
544 Lamnek, 1995, pp. 102. 
545 See Table 5. 
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5.1.2. Research Method as Research Path  
 
The thesis conceives research methods as research paths for collection, analysis, 
interpretation and dissemination of empirical data.546 Drawing on the interpretivist 
methodology, the thesis relies on the process-, context- and user-oriented understanding 
of research methods.547 
User-Oriented Notion
The Efficiency of Methods is Determined
by the Competency of their User. 
Process-Oriented Notion
Methods are Conceivable Research 
Paths for Data Collection and Assesment. 
Context-Oriented Notion
Methods Correspond to 
Paradigm Thinking of Their Developers.
 
Figure 9: Interpretative Notion of Research Methods 
 
 
The context-oriented conception of methods frames them as research paths that are 
designed by scholars according to their epistemological and methodological thinking, 
which is influenced by distinct paradigmatic thinking.548 The initial design of FRM thus 
largely corresponds with the distinctive paradigm thinking and the related 
epistemological and methodological deliberations which serve their developers as a 
reference point for simplifying and understanding the complexity of world. In this view, 
quantitative methods represent research paths which are informed by quantitative 
research logic. They are of primary epistemological value for the mainstream positivist 
                                                 
546 Lamnek, 1995; Behrens, 2003. 
547 See Figure 9. 
548 Lamnek, 1995.  
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policy analysis.549 This means that they primarily enable to fulfil the basic requirements 
or conditions for scientific insight that are advanced by the quantitative research logic. 
Since the positivist research logic is epistemologically coherent with the old paradigm 
view of social reality,550 this group of methods allows policy analysts to collect and to 
assess data about the empirical reality as framed in old paradigm thinking 
perspective.551 For example, most of the methods that are referred to as ‘quantitative’ 
are developed on basis of the ‘mechanic view’552 of the world that is insensitive to the 
observer as well as for the values and meanings behind the empirical observations. They 
hence represent research paths for studying the world in terms of the ‘first order 
reality’553 while disregarding the values and meanings informing these observations. 
They also represent means to measure the societal phenomena in terms of simple mono-
causal relationships between distinct parts of social reality while neglecting the holistic 
and integrated view. Bell554 thus argues that quantitative FRM represent research paths 
that emphasise the logical structure of relation statements, use the language of 
mathematics via equations, aim at uncovering causality, emphasise empiricism and 
testability, objectivity and rationality, produce insights characterised by context 
independent applicability and build up of a body of cumulative verified knowledge. He 
conceives them as research paths that aspire to diminish the uncertainty of the future 
and to control it by elaboration of explanations that pinpoint it. 
 
In contrast, qualitative methods represent research paths that are attributable to the 
qualitative research logic.555 They are epistemologically coherent with new paradigm 
thinking.556 They thus have a primary epistemological value for policy analysts who are 
informed by the qualitative research logic. They are well fitted to fulfil the conditions 
for gaining scientific insight as advanced by the qualitative research paradigm. For 
example, inherent to qualitative methods is the notion that a researcher knows more 
about the world by understanding how it is constructed and perceived by policymakers, 
                                                 
549 See Table 6. 
550 See Table 3. 
551 See Table 3.  
552 Foerster, 1993.  
553 Luhmann, 1984.  
554 Bell, 2003a. 
555 See Table 6. 
556 See Table 3. 
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i.e., by understanding and studying the observer instead for the observed. Accordingly, 
qualitative methods primarily enable to study and observe the ‘second order reality’,557 
i.e., the beliefs, opinions, meanings, narrations behind empirical observations. Thereby, 
they can be distinguished into methods for reconstructive and methods for 
deconstructive research that differ in the way that they come to grips with the 
perspectivity of knowledge about the social reality.558 Some qualitative FRM such as 
Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) include the aspects of both – the re- and deconstructive 
research logic.559 
 
The process-oriented notion of research methods implies that methods represent highly 
heterogeneous and context-dependent processes, which cannot be methodologically 
canonised.560 In consequence, the research paths cannot be clearly delineated from each 
other. This thesis uses the term ‘techniques’ when referring to deviations or/and 
specifications of the method and to the sum of different research steps necessary to 
follow a distinct research path. 
 
Nevertheless, a user-oriented understanding of research methods suggests that the 
efficiency of methods is largely determined by the competences and the mind-set of the 
practitioner using them. As a result, the method cannot be discussed as an entity that is 
de-privatised from the person who uses it. As Lamnek states, “the method is only as 
good as the one using it.”561 Therefore, no method has a monopoly on producing good - 
or bad - work. (…) A sharp tool in the hands of inept researchers may produce less 
useful results than a blunt tool in the hands of skilled and sensitive researchers.”562 In 
this sense, research methods represent only ‘Einstiegshilfen’563 into the inquiry process. 
However, they do not guarantee scientifically reliable interpretations. The quality of 
scientific insights can be guarantied only by the competence of policy analysts to use 
research methods.  
                                                 
557 Luhmann, 1984. 
558 See Figure 8. 
559 Inayatullah, 2001a; Inayatullah, 2002a; Inayatullah, 2003. For more on CLA see chapters 6.3.3. and 
6.3.6.  
560 Lamnek, 1995.  
561 Lamnek, 1995, pp. 1. 
562 Bell, 2003a, pp. 241. 
563 Lamnek, 1995. 
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Such context-, process-, and user-oriented understanding of research methods clearly 
opposes the positivist notion of methods as homogenous monolithic entities and as 
neutral instruments, which enable to uncover the absolute truth. It represents a 
counterpart to the positivist understanding of research methods as static, highly codified 
research paths for data collection and assessment that may be applied according to 
fixed, context independent application rules.564 It also differs from positivist belief that 
methods by themselves and not the practitioners using them determine the quality of the 
empirical research, and that an increase of the inherent efficiency of methods 
automatically and always means an increase in the quality of research.  
 
The interpretative understanding of research methods has several implications for the 
discussion of the uses of FRM in policy analysis for governance for SD. First, it 
suggests that the distinct research logic adopted by policy analysts importantly 
influences their preference for a certain FRM over the other, i.e., their choice of FRM 
for policy research. Consequently, the reliance of policy analysts on a particular 
methodological frame, which typically corresponds with their paradigmatic thinking, 
leads to their preference for a particular FRM. This preference is typically determined 
by the level of coherence between FRM and the research methodological logic of policy 
analysts. For example, policy analysts who rely on the quantitative research logic assess 
the applicative potential of research methods for the policy research differently than 
their colleagues who rely on the qualitative research logic.565 Within the qualitative 
methodological frame, quantitative FRM have a rather secondary function for exploring 
social reality, because their epistemological value is largely limited to determination of 
(non-) existence of certain assumed causal correlations. In contrast, qualitative FRM 
have a primary function when used within the qualitative methodological frame, for 
they were developed to (further) explore the quality of correlations between distinct 
social phenomena.  
  
The above process-, context and user-oriented understanding of research methods 
moreover implies that the distinct research logic adopted by policy analysts determines 
                                                 
564 Bohnsack, 2003.  
565 Lamnek, 1995.  
 156
and guides their use of FRM in empirical policy analysis. As a result, all FRM – 
qualitative or quantitative - can be used in different ways, i.e., according to quantitative 
or qualitative research logic. Depending on the type of research logic, FRM will simply 
be used differently. For example, within the qualitative research logic, quantitative 
FRM are used to collect and produce the numerical and quantified data to analyse the 
quality of phenomena. However, they only have a secondary status and low 
epistemological value in interpretative phase of applied research, as they allow only for 
(quantified) statements about existence and intensity of social phenomena explored, and 
offer limited insight about the quality of the existence of phenomena (e.g., about the 
conditions for existence of phenomena). In contrast, qualitative FRM can be used in 
quantitative way as well. This is for example the case when interviews as qualitative 
methods are conducted merely to confirm or falsify the predetermined hypotheses about 
the first order reality.566  
 
Nevertheless, the interpretative understanding of research methods adopted in this thesis 
implies that the applicative potential of FRM in policy analysis for governance for SD 
primarily depends on the capacity of policy analysts to choose and use them in a way 
that will enable them to perceive social reality through their distinct paradigmatic 
glasses. In particular, the quality of choice and use of FRM depends from the level of 
their coherency with the experts’ assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology) and 
the nature of knowledge (epistemology), in addition to their methodological 
assumptions about the appropriate FRM and about the ways to use them in order to 
explore social reality. For example, when policy analysts see the world as a linear 
machine, then the methods of primary importance are the quantitative FRM that allow 
them to reduce the world on linear causalities and grasp it as a linear machine.567 When 
policy analysts see the world as a non-linear machine, then the qualitative FRM aimed 
at tackling and embracing the complexities and uncertainty have the primary importance 
for their research. However, policy analysts may use any type of FRM in any type of 
way in policy analysis for governance for SD as long as they are conscious of their 
limited epistemological value within their distinct methodological frame. 
 
                                                 
566 Luhmann, 1984. 
567 Von Foerster, 1993.  
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5.2. Methodological Approaches in Policy Analysis 
 
The capacity of policy analysts to tackle the epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SD largely depends from their capacity to adopt reflected approach to 
choice and use of FRM. However, mainstream policy analysts often feel overwhelmed 
with this task, as it places unique socio-psychological demands on them. In order to 
adopt a reflected approach to choice and use of FRM, policy analysts first have to 
emancipate from the dominant positivist quantitative research logic informing their 
empirical research, because it prevents them to be aware of and question their own 
research methodological approach to policy analysis, and to adapt it in a way that would 
make their choice and use of FRM sensitive to the newly emerged epistemological 
needs. However, policy analysts can importantly profit from the current EU discourse 
on the need for interpretative turn in policy analysis so as to better tackle the reflected 
approach to choice and use of FRM in policy analysis for governance for SD.  
 
5.2.1. Shortcomings of the Mainstream Positivist Methodology  
 
The existing research habits of mainstream policy analysts are largely informed by the 
positivist methodology that severely restricts their capacity to adopt a reflected 
approach to choice and use of FRM. The content analysis of policy analysis education 
programmes shows that policy analysts are taught to use rigorous methodological 
packages of methods commonly referred to as the ‘toolbox’. These toolboxes are 
informed by the dominating positivist paradigm thinking and are usually presented to 
the students as the right and the best research paths for collecting, analysing and 
interpreting empirical data. Armed mainly with the positivist research designs and 
statistical methods, numberless policy analysis students hence have little or no training 
in understanding the normative and interpretative foundations of research methods that 
they have learned to rely upon, or in studying the social setting to which these 
techniques are to be applied.568 Such monoparadigmatic education in positivist 
methodology for policy research advances the uncritical and unreflected attitude of 
                                                 
568 Fischer, 2003b. 
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policy analysts towards their choice and use of research methods in empirical 
practice.569 
 
Moreover, mainstream policy analysts following the positivist research logics tend to 
assume that methods and methodology mean the same thing. As a result, they largely 
fail to distinguish between the methods as research paths and the methodology as 
research logic that guides their choice and use of methods for empirical research. 
Consequently, they use both terms interchangeably. They talk about methodology, when 
single methods and techniques are meant and vice-versa. This failure of policy analysts 
to distinguish between methods and methodology typically causes general absence of 
scepticism toward their own research logic. It can also result in the lacking ability of 
policy analysts to – at least rhetorically and explicitly - consider the use and choice of 
FRM for policy analysis for governance for SD in a self-reflexive way.  
 
Furthermore, the positivist research logic common to mainstream policy analysts 
suggests that the qualitative research logic is less scientific than the quantitative 
research logic. Therefore, mainstream policy analysts tend to understand the alternative 
qualitative research logic in a very negative and restricted way. Their understanding of 
the qualitative research logic is typically reduced to the following elements: a very 
small number of persons, no real sample studies on the coincidence principle, no metric 
variables and no statistical analyses.570 Such highly restricted understanding of 
qualitative methodology and methods can lead to a negative attitude and deep aversion 
of policy analysts toward the adoption of qualitative research logic and toward the use 
of qualitative FRM in policy analysis. It fuels their determinist and unreflected reliance 
on quantitative research logic and quantitative FRM as the only right approach 
(‘Meßfetischismus’571). 
 
Moreover, mainstream policy analysts informed by the positivist research logic 
typically assume that the choice and use of methods is perspective independent. They 
exhibit the tendency to apply the once learned methods always in the same way when 
                                                 
569 See Table 10.  
570 Lamnek, 1995a. 
571 Lamnek, 1995a. 
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exploring different kind of issues. They believe that they can reduce and even eliminate 
the influence of methods and of their own research logics on the outcomes of their 
inquiries by standardising and fixing the research design. Their methodical apparatus is 
detached from the research object. Policy analysts subvert the reality to be explored to 
research methods learnt. Methods and not the research object being observed determine 
what they observe.  
 
Mainstream policy analysts following positivist approach also tend to disregard that the 
conceptual shifts in thinking social reality severely challenge their research logic. 
Whereas they acknowledge that they continuously undergo conceptual shifts,572 i.e., that 
their framing of social reality and knowledge continuously changes, and that they 
should adapt and enhance their perspectives on relevant parts of social reality in 
interaction with ever-changing society and environment, they at the same time tend to 
pay little attention on how these mind-shifts in thinking social reality challenge their 
research habits and logic, including the way they choose and use FRM. Mainstream 
policy analysts hence fail to revise the standard research logic in relation to accelerating 
number and pace of conceptual and substantive shifts such as the sustainability shift. 
For example, while claiming that interdependencies between the social, economic and 
environmental factors are complex and thus cannot be examined by causality nor 
measured, mainstream policy analysts often continue to use the statistical methods such 
as the environmental sustainability index573 and to communicate the outcomes as facts 
and absolute truths. While acknowledging the complex nature of global change, they 
continue to use costs and benefits analysis with the aim to quantify the relationships.574  
 
To sum up, the positivist methodology is highly insensitive to meanings, beliefs and 
values behind the FRM, the uses and the choice of FRM and behind the empirical data. 
Policy analysts, therefore, often tend to design policy analysis as a technocratic and 
rigorous research practice that eliminates the interpretative nature of knowledge and 
                                                 
572 Hajer, 1993.  
573 Environmental sustainability index was published between 1999 to 2005 by Yale University's Center 
for Environmental Law and Policy in collaboration with Columbia University's Center for International 
Earth Science Information Network and represents s a composite index tracking 21 elements for 
measuring the state of the environmental sustainability of society. For more see Yale University / 
Columbia University, 2005.  
574 Morgan et al., 1991. 
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removes values and languages from the truth of positions. They commonly adopt 
unreflected approach to choice and use of methods for policy analysis that limits their 
capacity to adapt their research habits in response to the epistemological needs. Policy 
analysts thus need to emancipate themselves from the positivist methodology in order to 
meet the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD.  
 
5.2.2. Interpretative Methodology as a Vehicle of Sustainability Turn  
 
The interpretative methodology represents a promising reference frame for policy 
analysts aiming to critically reflect their own research logic and habits behind the choice 
and use of FRM and to overcome the methodological dilemmas due to their positivist 
research logic when conducting policy analysis for governance for SD. The 
interpretative methodology575 acknowledges that all social reality is a product of 
interpretation. It claims that interpretation work in research process is inevitable 
(‘Problem der Unhintergehbarkeit von Interpretationsarbeit im Foschungsprozess’576). 
In consequence, interpretative methodology takes the perspectivity of knowledge 
seriously. It underscores “the extent to which methodological choices, rather than being 
a disembodied repertoire of tools and techniques, are grounded in a particular set of 
epistemological and ontological presuppositions.”577 In this sense, it claims that “a 
certain conception of the way scientific method should proceed, and its grounding in 
beliefs about epistemology, almost inevitably lead to a certain conception of society, 
and understanding of how society should be organized and managed.”578  
 
Although the quantitative research logic widely dominates the conduct of the 
institutionalised mainstream policy analysis, mainstream policy analysts increasingly 
advocate the need for interpretative turn.579 In particular, the conceptual shift from top-
down ‘governing’ concept to a looser ‘governance’ framework revived the discussion 
                                                 
575 For more on understanding of methodology in this thesis see chapters 5.1. and 3.2.2.  
576 Keller, 2001. 
577 Yanow, 2003, pp. 228. 
578 Yanow, 2003, pp. 228. 
579 Hajer / Wagenaar, 2003; Fischer, 2003a. The interpretative turn is also commonly referred to as 
‘argumentative turn’ (e.g., Fischer / Forester, 1993) or as ‘post-positivist revolution’. 
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on the need for qualitative, i.e., interpretative research logic in policy analysis.580 
Numerous acknowledged scholars, including Hajer and Wagenaar,581 Fischer and 
Forester,582 Gottweis,583 Finlayson,584 Yanow and Schwartz-Shea585 argue that this 
conceptual shift to governance framework could mean that the time for interpretative 
methodology may well have arrived.  
 
The interpretative policy analysis is primarily concerned with analysis of meaning and 
symbolism in policy-related interaction. It strives for “enhanced appreciation of the 
variety of meanings within the policy process, the multiple ‘realities’ that people 
brought to the situation, and the ways in which power was systematically facilitating the 
representation of same insights at the cast of others.”586 Wagenaar thereby divides 
interpretative policy analysis into several sub-research fields that differ in the way they 
study policy interactions. They include analysis of ‘frames’ (Schön, Rein, Laws), 
‘stories’ (Thorgmorton, Roe, Wagenaar, Van Eeten), ‘plots’ (Kaplan), ‘discourses’ 
(Gottweis, Hayer, Keller) and of ‘mise en-scene’ of policymaking (Yanow, Homart and 
Hajer).587  
 
Policy analysts aiming to adopt reflected approach to use and choice of FRM for 
exercising policy analysis for governance for SD can profit significantly from the 
interpretative policy analytical discourse. On one hand, the discourse offers an extensive 
body of work containing the methodological critique of the mainstream positivist 
methodological approach to policy analysis, systematically spelling out its 
limitations.588 In particular, the literature addresses questions such as: “Could the 
strength of a policy proposal be judged merely in terms of a quantified assessment of 
costs and benefits? How do such approaches account for the role played by values that 
people adhere to? Aren’t values important for understanding why some parties disagree 
                                                 
580 Finlayson, 2004b.  
581 Hajer / Wagenaar, 2003.  
582 Fischer / Forester, 1993; Fischer, 2003a; 2003b. 
583 Gottweis, 2003a; 2003b. 
584 Finlayson, 2004a; 2004b. 
585 Yanow / Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Yanow, 1993; 2000; 2003; 2006; 2007 
586 Wagenaar, 2003b. 
587 Wagenaar, 2003b. 
588 Dryzek, 1989; 1990; 2006; Stone, 1988; Majone, 1993; Fischer, 1989; 1993; 2003a; 2003b; Fischer / 
Forester, 1993; Héritier, 1993a; 1993b; Windhoff-Héritier, 1987. 
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with others? To what extent were policymakers sometimes unwittingly ‘taken away’ by 
their own myths, mistaking a compelling perspective for widely shared and 
unproblematic truth?”589  
 
On the other hand, the interpretative policy analysis discourse proposes a range of 
innovative methodological solutions in order to tackle the epistemological needs and 
methodological dilemmas due to conceptual and paradigm shifts590 in thinking 
policymaking such as for example the sustainability shift and the shift toward the 
framework of governance. In particular, the discourse on deliberative policy analysis, 
which connects policy analysis to the issue of deliberative democracy,591 has the 
potential to positively influence the receptivity of mainstream policy analysts for 
potential of interpretative methodology to serve as reference frame for reflected choice 
and use of FRM in policy analysis for governance for SD. It proposes several 
methodological solutions for coming into grips with challenges related to the conceptual 
shift toward thinking policymaking in terms of governance, including the challenge to 
account for new spaces of politics, to explore policymaking under conditions of radical 
uncertainty, to account for increased importance of ‘difference’ for our understanding of 
politics, and to tackle the interdependence and the increased dynamics of trust and 
identity in policymaking.592 These solutions, among others, include methodological 
derivates such as discourse analysis, grounded theory, ‘multiple’ methodological 
inquiry and design science.593  
 
The current scientific discourse on the need for interpretative turn in policy analysis has 
a positive effect on the sensitivity of mainstream policy analysts for the relevance of 
reflected approach to choice and use of research methods in policy analysis. However, 
the interpretative research methodology still does not have a secure footing in the 
empirical practice. Furthermore, the current discourse on interpretative turn in policy 
analysis also remains largely insensitive toward the applicative potential of FRM as 
                                                 
589 Wagenaar, 2003b. 
590 According to Kuhn (1962) a paradigm shift takes place, when a scientist's world is qualitatively 
transformed and quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory. See chapter 
3.2.2. 
591Hajer / Wagenaar, 2003. For an exhaustive discussion on ‘deliberative democracy’ see Lösch, 2005.  
592 Hajer / Waagenaar, 2003.  
593 Héritier, 1993.  
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methodical solutions for policy research, because the reflections of interpretative 
approach to conduct of policy analysis largely focus on the classical social sciences 
methods and their applicative potentials for policy analysis. 
 
5.2.3. Uses of the Foresight Approach and Futures Research Methods in Policy 
Analysis  
 
The current increased interest of policy analysts into using FRM is not new. It in a way 
represents a return to the roots of the policy sciences, the Harold Lasswell’s plead in the 
late 50ties for a “new futures orientation in political science.”594 Bell is one of few 
scholars who explicitly discuss in historical perspective the link between futures field595 
and policy analysis that today represent two separate research fields. He points out that 
at the very beginning of policy analytical research in late 30ties, Lasswell as one of the 
co-founders of policy analysis highlights that the “decision making was inevitably 
future-oriented. Deciding how to act for example inventing and choosing among policy 
alternatives, involves a process of constructing images of alternative futures and 
selecting among them.”596 In Lasswell’s view, “making decisions intelligently means 
having expectations about the future consequences of present developments and of 
taking or not taking certain actions.”597  
 
Whilst being aware of the uncertainty of the future, Lasswell598 argues that deliberate 
decision making is inconceivable without having beliefs about at least some of various 
alternative present possibilities for the future. In his view, knowledge and prediction as 
means for construction of alternative images of the future are not enough to design and 
implement intelligent human action. Laswell highlights that decision making and 
policymaking involves having goals and making value judgements, which need to be 
accounted for when thinking about futures. He assumes that “people would act, 
according to their cognitive maps of reality, also as to achieve their goals and fulfil their 
                                                 
594 Lasswell, 1951, pp. 5.  
595 Slaughter, 2001a. 
596 Bell, 2003a, pp. 51. 
597 Bell, 2003a, pp. 52.  
598 Lasswell, 1951. 
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values, avoiding their feared futures as much as possible given the constraining 
conditions.”599 
 
Bell600 argues that Lasswell since the late 1930ties struggled to create and establish 
what is now known as futures field. Lasswell developed several methods and 
methodologies for futures thinking in policy analysis such as for example the 
developmental analysis. He also included ‘anticipations of the future’ as an aspect of 
one of the two generally perceived purposes of policy sciences: the effort to contribute 
to decision process by creating relevant information and interpretations to specific 
policy issues. According to Bell, he later on merged his work on futures thinking with 
his efforts to invent policy sciences while neglecting his visions for a separate futures 
field because his endeavours remained widely unnoticed by his colleagues.601 
 
Building on the legacy of Lasswell’s endeavours, numerous scholars continued to 
discuss and recognise the relevance and uses of FRM and of explicit systematic futures 
thinking for policy analysis. In fact, this debate represents a core of an ongoing dispute 
on the status of the futures field as a distinct discipline as opposed to being a part of 
political or policy sciences. Bell points out that until 1970, scholars recognised a 
considerable overlap between the policy sciences and the research based on FRM.602 In 
the late 70ties, the leading futurists Kahn and Wiener for example argued that policy 
research has not only to do with anticipating future events and making them as desirable 
as possible, but also with preparing policymakers to deal with whatever future actually 
arises, by considering a range of alternative futures.603 At the appearance of the initial 
issue of the journal ‘Policy Science’ in the 1970ties, six of twenty-one people listed as 
editors or advisers were prominent futurists.604  
 
However, by the 1990, the futures field comprising areas of futures activity such as 
Foresight, Futuring, Futures Studies, Futures Research and the policy analysis have 
                                                 
599 Bell, 2003a, pp. 51 
600 Bell, 2003a. 
601 Bell, 2003a. 
602 Bell, 2003a. 
603 Bell, 2003a. 
604 Bell, 2003a.  
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grown apart. Policy analysis in the EU today represents a full-fledged heterogeneous 
professional activity that is practiced across many domains, ranging from social 
sciences such as economics and political science.605 In the EU futures field, Foresight, 
i.e., systematic, participatory, future intelligence gathering and medium-to-long term 
vision-building process aimed at present-day decisions and mobilising joined 
actions,”606 gradually evolved to a dominating area of futures activity that is dispersed 
across a wide range of scientific disciplines and domains. 607 
 
In the past decade, the interest into blending both research fields increased. On one 
hand, policy analysts increasingly consider the ability to integrate Foresight approach 
and FRM into policy analysis and the capacity to develop a new future-oriented culture 
as one of the key challenges for policy analysts in the future because policymaking in 
any sector is future-oriented and most of the public intervention relates to the future 
perspective.608 On the other hand, the EU Foresight discourse aims to establish political 
science and in particular policy analysis as the disciplinary background of Foresight. 
The launching of the “International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy” in 2004 
represents one of many symptoms of this trend. The Journal attempts to put special 
emphasis on the use (actual or potential) of FRM for policy analysis: “The exiplicit 
disciplinary background for the discussion of the use of FRM in the Journal represent 
the domains of policy and management sciences and research following the utilisation 
of knowledge in decision-making processes including recent insights in the domain of 
knowledge management.”609 
 
Thereby, the Foresight practitioners rely on what often appears as a jungle of diverse 
and conflicting FRM. When asked to define FRM, scholars at the conferences and in 
publications usually point out a range of FRM. For example, one of the largest 
worldwide handbooks of FRM provides the following list of FRM commonly used in 
the futures field: “Agent Modeling, Causal Layered Analysis, Cross-Impact Analysis, 
Decision Modeling, Delphi Techniques, Econometrics and Statistical Modeling, 
                                                 
605 See chapter 4.1. 
606 Malta Council for Science and Technology, 2001.  
607 Interview with Loikkanen, 2007; Interview with De Fonseca, 2007; Interview with Da Costa, 2004.  
608 Interview with Havas, 2007; Interview with Loikkanen, 2007; Interview with Mannermaa, 2004. 
609 Interview with Havas, 2007.  
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Environmental Scanning, Field Anomaly Relaxation, Futures Wheel, Genius 
Forecasting, Vision, and Intuition, Interactive Scenarios, Multiple Perspective, 
Participatory Methods, Relevance Trees and Morphological Analysis, Road Mapping, 
Robust Decision Making, Scenarios, Simulation-Gaming, State of the Future Index, 
Structural Analysis, Systems Modeling, Technological Sequence Analysis, Text 
Mining, Trend Impact Analysis.”610 However, these lists of FRM exhibit severe 
incoherencies in terms of classifying methods as FRM. For only few methods in these 
lists can be discussed as ‘primarily FRM’611, i.e., as methods that have the legitimate 
claim to being FRM.612 A large part of these lists represent standard methods that were 
developed in other disciplines, but that could also be used within the futures research 
field. 
 
In face of the increased interest of policy analysts into Foresight, this chapter in 
continuation systematically explores how policy analysts can profit from the 
contemporary EU Foresight discourse when aiming to adopt a Foresight approach and 
use FRM so as to tackle the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for 
SD.613 So as to prevent further confusion, the chapter also examines, what are the 
commonly perceived central features of the highly heterogeneous and diverse FRM and 
how are they distinguished from other standard methods used in the policy research.  
 
5.3.  European Foresight Discourse on Futures Research Methods 
 
The EU Foresight discourse is dispersed across a wide range of domains, sectors and 
scientific disciplines. Foresight thus appears as a jungle of diverse and conflicting 
modes of research, full of inconsistent terminologies, diverse intellectual styles and 
sometimes incommensurable paradigms. In order to outline how the EU Foresight 
discourse can inform the systematic and up-to-date discussion of the ways to 
reintroduce FRM to policy analysis for governance for SD, this chapter analyses it 
along three tracks: (1) the ‘know-what’ discourse evolving around purposes and issues 
                                                 
610 Gordon / Glen, 2003.  
611 Bell, 2003a. 
612 Bell, 2003a. 
613 See Table 5. 
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of Foresight, (2) the ‘know-how’ discourse on research methods and tool-boxes for 
exercising Foresight, and (3) the ‘knowing-in-action’ discourse on Foresight as a social 
practice that is conducted by practitioners with highly different backgrounds and 
experience.614  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Tracks of the European Foresight Discourse 
 
5.3.1. Foresight as a Core Area of Activity in the Futures Field  
 
The ‘know-what’ discourse on Foresight points towards numberless understandings and 
definitions of what Foresight is. Common to most of the definitions of Foresight in the 
EU is the claim that Foresight activities produce knowledge in relation to a future time. 
Foresight is thus understood as “the ability to create and maintain a high-quality, 
coherent, and functional forward view.”615 Moreover, the definitions typically point 
toward the following three central analytical features of Foresight: its opened, 
participatory and decision-oriented nature.616 Foresight commonly speaks from the 
epistemological position that “the coexistence of different expectations about the futures 
states and paths points up the contingency of transformation processes and prevents 
                                                 
614 See Figure 10. 
615 http://costa22.org/mou.php 
616 See Figure 11. 
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actors from getting locked in strategies which are based on deterministic assumptions 
about development trends that are taken for granted.”617  
 
 
Figure 11: Basic Concept of Foresight618 in the European Union 
 
However, the boundaries between Foresight and numerous other areas of activity in the 
futures field are fuzzy, not only at the rhetoric, but also at the epistemological and 
methodological level. For example, Foresight is at times conceived as a form of Futures 
Studies.619 Foresight is also often used as a synonym or as a generic or umbrella term 
for the futures research. Moreover, in the actual practice, Foresight exercises frequently 
include elements of Forecasting or prediction, thereby ignoring the general consensus 
about the rather interpretivist or constructivist epistemological position of Foresight.620 
At times the term Foresight is also misused as a label for any type of policy research 
that relies on FRM. Furthermore, the understanding of Foresight in the EU differs 
highly from the understanding in the US. While the US-based scholars tend to 
understand Foresight as one of the basic skills and human capacities that “protect us 
                                                 
617 Voss et al., 2004, pp. 13.  
618 Da Costa et al., 2006. 
619 http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/A1_key-terms/futures-study.htm 
620 For more on social construcivist perspective in and on Foresight see Fuller and deSmedt (2008); Fuller 
and Loigma (2007) and Joergersen and Grosu (2008). 
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from making certain kinds of errors and suffering the consequences”621, in the EU, 
Foresight represents a label for a central activity area in the futures field.  
 
For reasons of analytical clarity, this thesis draws on the EU definition of Foresight. 
Therefore, it clearly distinguishes Foresight from other areas of activity in the EU 
futures field. In the EU, Foresight is typically clearly distinguished from ‘Forecasting’, 
a policy research activity that is informed by the second generation ‘predict-and-act’ 
futures thinking. Miles et al.622 for example argue that Foresight is about shaping future 
and not predicting it. Voß et al. add that it “differs from forecasting by recognising the 
impossibility to predict the dynamics of complex systems.”623 As a result, Foresight 
practitioners acknowledge the openness of the future as “a constitutive element which 
substantiates its malleability and aptness towards strategy.”624 Borup, therefore, argues 
that “Foresight is not a process of forecasting the future but rather an attempt to explore 
the space for human actions and interventions to shape the future. Foresight is aimed at 
producing orientations rather than predictions.”625  
 
In the EU discourse, Foresight is also commonly distinguished from ‘Futuring’,626 a 
policy research field that attempts to predict the future by applying the rules of the past. 
The futurists aim at developing “’future scenarios’ in which qualities remain the same, 
only the quantities change: more cars, wider highways, faster planes, bigger bombs, 
etc.”627 Nevertheless, Foresight is commonly distinguished from the ‘prospective 
studies’ that were introduced by the French scholar De Jovenel and that are commonly 
practiced in France and Francophone Africa.628 While Foresight exercises share a 
general interest in all types of futures, the prospective studies represent studies “of the 
future to develop a strategic attitude of the mind with a long-range view of creating a 
desirable future.”629  
 
                                                 
621 Slaughter, 2001a. 
622 Miles et al., 2002, pp. 2. 
623 Voss et al., 2004, pp. 12. 
624 Voss et al., 2004, pp. 12.  
625 Borup, 2003, pp. 3, cit. in: Voss, 2004 pp. 12. 
626 Cornish, 2004.  
627 Von Foerster, 1979a, pp. 5.  
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629 Glenn, 2003a, pp. 6. 
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However, Foresight is typically positioned near to the Futures Research630 field, an 
empirical approach to policy research relying on FRM that is typically followed by the 
US-based policy researchers. Futures Research is defined as “the use of [futures 
research] methods to identify systematically the consequences of policy options and to 
identify alternative futures with policy implications for policymakers.”631 Futures 
Research as a decision-oriented approach seeks to “identify and describe current forces 
that should be understood in order to make more intelligent decisions.”632 According to 
Slaughter, here the emphasis is on “forecasting, planning and exploring futures using 
analytic and quantitative methods.”633 
 
Foresight also tends to be discussed as an applied form of the ‘Futures Studies’, a 
largely US-based strand of research in which FRM are used for more general academic 
research.634 Both, Foresight and Futures Studies are informed by the third generation 
futures thinking.635 They are understood as opened approaches to research in terms of 
envisioning alternative futures, “not predicting a pre-determined future but exploring 
how the future might evolve in different ways depending on the actions of various 
players and decisions taken.”636 However, Futures Studies are commonly conceived as 
“any exploration of what might happen and what we might want to become.”637 They 
are seen as more broadly and rigorously processed, following the goal to understand the 
issues as completely as possible.638 According to Slaughter, “they are concerned with 
understanding the futures field as a whole, developing overviews of its work and 
communicating these to, and with, other constituencies and groups.”639 In contrast, 
Foresight is typically defined as an action-oriented type of research that not only 
analyses or contemplates futures development, but also supports actions in actively 
                                                 
630 See Slaughter, 1993. 
631 Glenn, 2003a, pp. 6. 
632 Glenn, 2003a, pp. 8. 
633 Slaughter, 2001a, pp.5. 
634 For exhaustive discussion of the Futures Studies field see Masini, 1989; 1993; Slaughter, 1993.  
635 See chapters 5.5.2. and 6.1.3. 
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shaping the future.640 Its goal is to develop policymakers’ capabilities to relate current 
decisions to long-term prospects.  
 
5.3.2. Issues and Applications of Foresight  
 
The ‘know-what’ discourse on Foresight identifies a wide range of applications and 
issues of Foresight exercises. Foresight is, among others, considered to be a promising 
approach to detect adverse conditions, guide policy, shape and develop a strategy, 
explore new markets, products and services, raise the general public’ awareness of 
developments that are likely to influence societies future, as well as to identify 
opportunities and areas of vulnerability in complex strategic issues. Foresight is also 
increasingly used to inform the policy processes aimed at bringing the society on the 
tracks of SD and to inform the governance within complex systems.641  
 
For example, according to the 2005 EFMN Issues Analysis Report,642 the issue 
‘Sustainability and Protection of Environment’ features as the fifth most prominent 
issue in the Foresight exercises conducted between 2004 and 2005.643 The report also 
ranks this issue among the ten most important issues to be addressed by the Foresight 
exercises in order to support the EU science and technology policies in the future.644  
 
 
                                                 
640 Da Costa et al., 2006.  
641 Da Costa et al., 2007. 
642 EFMN, 2005.  
643 See Figure 12. 
644 See Figure 13. 
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Figure 12: 2005 Ranking of Issues ‘Sustainability / Protection of the Environment’ and 
‘Changes in Governance’ in the European Foresight Exercises645 
 
 
The 2005 EFMN Issues Analysis Report646 moreover ranks the issue ‘Changes in 
Governance /Services’ on the place eighteen on the list of most frequently addressed 
issues by the Foresight exercises in 2004 and 2005.647 However, the ranking of the most 
important emerging issues of Foresight studies lists the issue ‘Changes in 
Governance/Services’ as the fourth most important issue to be addressed by the future 
Foresight research in order to support the EU science and technology policies.648  
 
                                                 
645 Adapted from EFMN, 2005.  
646 EFMN, 2005.  
647 See Figure 12. 
648 See Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: 2005 Ranking of Issues ‚Sustainability / Protection of the Environment’ and 
‘Changes in Governance’ as Emerging Issues in the EU Foresight Exercises 649 
 
In particular, Foresight is seen as an important policy instrument for improving 
governance of policymaking and participatory democracy and for re-configuration of 
policy-making bodies around new conceptualisations of topics.650 Miles et al. thereby 
distinguish two common types of Foresight: top-down and bottom-up Foresight. They 
differ in that they are oriented at different points along a spectrum from technocratic to 
democratic decision making.651 
 
                                                 
649 Adaptd from EFMN, 2005.  
650 Da Costa et al., 2007; Interview with Da Costa, 2004; 2007; Interview with Keenan, 2004; Interview 
with Aaltonenm, 2007. 
651 See Table 7. 
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Table 7: Governance Foresight Approaches 
 
  Type 1  
Governance Foresight  
Type 2 
Governance Foresight 
Governance Notion  Technocratic Decision Making  Democratic Decision Making 
Outputs of Research  Formal Products Processes 
Research Approach  Top-Down Bottom-Up 
Research Goal  Policy Benefits Procedural Benefits  
 
When conceiving governance as technocratic decision-making, Foresight practitioners 
aim at providing knowledge that policymakers might not otherwise have access to due 
to wide dispersion of knowledge resources and expertise in the knowledge society. This 
type of Foresight is characterised by a top-down approach to choice and use of FRM 
that places little stress on interaction. As a result, even when it draws on a wide range of 
sources, these are analysed and interpreted by a small group of experts. Such Foresight 
activities also emphasise formal products such as for example priority lists and written 
reports. The goal of this type of Foresight is to create anticipatory intelligence that is 
depicting the dynamics of change (e.g., scenarios, roadmaps), future opportunities and 
threats, strengths and weaknesses of the current system for addressing future challenges, 
visions of change etc. Da Costa et al.652 thus refer to this type of Foresight as ‘Foresight 
product’. 
 
In contrast, Foresight practitioners who perceive governance as democratic decision-
making primarily strive to bring more stakeholders and points of view into the decision-
making process.653 In this perspective, Foresight represents “a part of the armoury of 
methods for deliberative democracy, a way of enhancing social dialogue and informing 
more people about the key issues at stake – not just about the decisions that have been 
taken for them.”654 This type of Foresight is conceptualised as a bottom-up exercise that 
places stress on communication, gathering opinions and information from a wide range 
of sources, and that secures more legitimacy for the ‘ownership’ networks established 
                                                 
652 Da Costa et al., 2007. 
653 Miles et al., 2002. 
654 Miles et al., 2002, pp. 39.  
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around the Foresight activity.655 Furthermore, it attempts to produce procedural benefits 
in terms of facilitating policy implementation. It wants to assist policymakers at creating 
common grounds such as joint visions, learning platforms and linkages, at developing 
soft coordination (e.g., by increasing their feeling of ownership of the policy 
objectives), and at creating distributed intelligence (e.g., by promoting the creation of 
shared information as an input to policymakers and other stakeholders).656 Therefore, it 
is also referred to as ‘Foresight process’657 with the focus on network building, on 
developing Foresight capabilities, and on ‘embedding’ Foresight into organisations and 
into wide constituencies of stakeholders. With the ultimate objective of increasing 
social preparedness to anticipate and to respond to change, policymakers and 
stakeholders taking part in Foresight exercise are encouraged to exchange opinion, 
knowledge and strategic thinking. Furthermore, the Foresight process wants to provide 
policymakers with ‘policy benefits’ by enhancing the receptivity of their organisation 
and by increasing their capability to react to future challenges and to evolve in phase 
with policy.658  
 
5.3.3. Meta-Physical Foundations of Futures Research Methods  
 
Scholars typically distinguish FRM from other standard methods of social and natural 
sciences by pointing out the shared metaphysical assumptions that they are based on, 
including the ontological, epistemological, teleological and ethical assumptions. The 
literature, among others, points out that the primarily FRM differ from other standard 
methods in that they are informed by shared ontological assumptions about the 
relevance and the nature of time.659 Typically, they are based on the shared belief in the 
directionality and irreversibility of time.660 Accordingly, FRM are based on the linear 
and fragmented notion of time as iterative, one-way process consisting of distinct 
phases: the past, the present and the future. They are grounded in the belief that the past 
                                                 
655 See Table 7.  
656 Da Costa et al., 2007. 
657 Da Costa et al., 2007. 
658 Da Costa et al., 2007. 
659 According to Luhmann’s theory of meaning (1984, 1995), the time dimension represents a central 
meaning dimension of political thinking. For more see chapter 2.4. 
660 Bell, 2003a. 
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and the possibilities of the future are different from the present and that some futures are 
better than others.  
 
Moreover, scholars highlight several shared epistemological assumptions behind FRM. 
Mannermaa for example observes that FRM differ from the standard methods in that 
they represent research paths to “study the present from the point of view of a special 
interest in comprehending the future.”661 In his view, what distinguishes FRM from 
other standard research paths is their interest in comprehending the future and the 
dynamics of societal change. In contrast, standard research methods typically share an 
exclusive interest into the actual dimension of social reality,662 which deals with the 
questions what was and what is. Glenn and Gordon claim that FRM share the belief that 
society cannot control the future, but it can influence the course of history. They point 
out that FRM are informed by the assumption that while it is not possible to know the 
future, it is feasible to influence the elements of it. As society includes expectation and 
decision, the explicit futures thinking is necessary for action because it can increase the 
effectiveness of human action.663 However, while the primarily FRM are conceived as 
sharing an explicit interest into understanding the future, Mannermaa664 points out that 
they represent research paths to explore the present, not the future, as some might think. 
In other words, FRM aim at “making observations at some specific point of time which 
concerns the existing world at the same moment, not some moment before or after 
it.”665  
 
Scholars also point out shared teleological foundations of FRM. They are typically 
conceived as decision- and action-oriented methods that were conceptualised to make a 
difference for decisionmaking processes. They are perceived as research paths to 
promote the knowledge-based shaping of future social action and to integrate 
knowledge and values in designing future social action..666 Nevertheless, it is a point of 
general agreement that FRM are based on the shared ethical assumptions. They are 
                                                 
661 Mannermaa, 1988, pp. 281.  
662 Wright, 1964, pp.20.  
663 Glenn, 2003a, pp. 3. 
664 Mannermaa, 1988. 
665 Mannermaa, 1988, pp. 280. 
666 Bell, 2003a; Interview with Glenn, 2005.  
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perceived as research paths for integrating knowledge and values to inform future social 
action and for achieving ethical imperatives such as “making the world a better place 
where all human being will have an equal and hood chance of living long and satisfying 
lives, a commitment to the well-being of future generations”667 and “enhancing the life-
sustaining capacities of the Earth.”668  
 
Not all these meta-physical assumptions inform all FRM. However, they do represent 
the commonly perceived philosophical ground of most primarily FRM that makes them 
different from the other standard methods used in traditional social and natural sciences.  
 
5.3.4. Futures Research Methods as Tools for Comprehending Futures  
 
In the EU, FRM are commonly discussed as research paths with a declared special 
interest in comprehending the future.669 The literature thereby typically distinguishes 
three basic intellectual perspectives in order to explore and understand future: the 
possible, the probable and the desirable futures perspectives.670  
 
FRM are commonly understood as means for understanding the desirable futures. In this 
perspective, they are conceived as research paths to study goals and values judgements 
of people in order to construct an ethical basis for the long-term notions of good society. 
Consequently, they are used by policy analysts to deal with questions referring to 
desirable social reality and to systematically examine what ought to be. They are also 
referred to as ‘methods of ethical or normative reflection’.671  
 
FRM are also typically conceived as means to understand the probable futures. They are 
seen as research paths that enable policy analysts to conceptualise societal problems as 
dynamic entities, and to study them in relation to the likely developments within a 
period of time and under specified conditions. In this perspective, their primary function 
is to allow policy analysts to address questions referring to probable social reality, i.e., 
                                                 
667 Bell, 2003a, pp. 186.  
668 Bell, 2003a, pp. 186.  
669 Mannermaa, 1988. 
670 See Figure 14. 
671 Wright, 1964, pp.20.  
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questions about what will be. Therefore, they are also commonly referred to as ‘methods 
of prediction’.672  
 
Long-term notions
of the good society
Unrealized but realisitic
possibilities of problem
solutions
Likely temporal 
development
of societal problems
Possible futures
Desirable futures
Probable futures
 
Figure 14: Basic Intellectual Perspectives on the Futures 
 
Nevertheless, FRM tend to be discussed as tools for comprehending the possible 
futures. They are seen as research paths to uncover the unrealized but realistic 
possibilities of problem solutions that lie dormant in the world and are rooted in 
unconventional thinking. The commonly perceived primary function of FRM is to help 
policy analysts to deal with questions referring to possible social reality, i.e., with 
questions about what can be. In this perspective, they are typically referred to as the 
‘methods of theoretical speculation’.673 
 
The above three perspectives are commonly conceived as useful categories for thinking 
about the various meanings of reality and discourse about it and for classifying FRM. 
Thereby, it is argued that the common standard methods developed within other 
disciplines tend to deal with actual social reality, whilst leaving the possible, probable 
                                                 
672 Wright, 1964, pp. 20.  
673 Wright, 1964, pp. 20.  
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and desirable dimensions of social reality largely out of sight. In contrary, FRM are 
conceived as means that aim at providing input on these three intellectual perspectives 
that are disregarded by the traditional research methods of perception. In consequence, 
FRM are seen as tools for filling the gap in the rich reservoir of methods within the 
scientific research.  
 
However, according to Inayatullah, it is not possible to separate and objectively 
distinguish these probable/possible/preferred orientations of FRM, for they represent 
categories that exist within a particular model of the self, namely that of modernism and 
liberalism, and within a particular regime of truth, “which is exactly that; a regime (not 
a model which has no political connotations: while regime wreaks of politics and 
power, for truth is nothing more than power) which has come about at the expense of 
other configurations of truth, other knowledge paradigms, other discourses.”674 He 
claims that in poststructuralist perspective, it is not possible to separate and objectively 
distinguish these orientations of FRM as this is often implied in the mainstream largely 
positivist discourse on FRM.  
 
5.3.5. Systematisations of Futures Research Methods in Foresight  
 
EU discourse on Foresight focuses intensively on reflecting and improving research 
methods and tools, processes and practices that it is characterised by. The Foresight 
practitioners rely on what often appears as a jungle of diverse and conflicting research 
paths. Hence there have been various attempts to survey the research field in order to 
determine what, if anything, might lend some coherency to the apparent chaos of 
FRM.675 Numerous systematisations of FRM have been developed in order to help 
practitioners of Foresight to make sense of the heterogeneity of FRM and help them use 
and combine FRM in the empirical research.  
 
However, an in-depth content analysis of the acknowledged systematisations of FRM 
shows that they are largely informed by the positivist research methodological paradigm 
                                                 
674 Inayatullah, 1999.  
675 For one of the largest collection of internationally peer-reviewed handbook on methods and tools to 
explore future possibilities see Gordon / Glenn, 2003; Glenn / Gordon, 2009. 
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that in several ways promotes the unreflected attitude toward the choice and use of 
FRM. First, systematisations of FRM typically conceive FRM as homogenous, 
monolithic, neutral, i.e., context-independent research paths for exploring the social 
reality that can be clearly delineated from each other and methodologically 
canonised.676 They fail to outline the philosophical and historical foundations of FRM. 
They disregard that the applicative potential of FRM needs to be reflected in relation to 
the contemporary and continuously changing modes of thoughts and the resulting 
epistemological needs.  
 
For example, the Handbook of Knowledge Society Foresight677 distinguishes three 
classes of FRM, including: (1) Forecasting methods based on expert judgement (e.g., 
genius forecasting, relevance trees, morphological analysis, Delphi method, La 
Prospective), (2) Forecasting methods based on statistical or mathematical analysis 
(e.g., trend extrapolation, simulation modelling), and (3) classical participatory social 
research methods and management and planning methods (e.g., expert panels, SWOT 
analysis, Benchmarking, Issue Surveys, Mind mapping, Argument Analysis).  
 
Another commonly cited systematisation of FRM in the EU represents the one 
elaborated in the frame of the COST 22 project of the EC.678 FRM are divided into: (1) 
scenario analysis methods for the development of descriptions of possible future 
situations in order to anticipate and prepare for upcoming events, (2) participatory 
methods such as Delphi studies and focus groups where respectively expert and non-
expert opinion on a specific issue is collected and analysed, (3) computer simulations 
methods for representation of possible future situations through computer modelling so 
as to investigate how present developments might turn out in the future and (4) 
technology assessment methods for the analysis of technological innovation, its 
application, and its impacts for use in policy-making contexts.  
 
Secondly, systematisations of FRM tend to neglect the methodological aspects of the 
uses of FRM for Foresight. When discussing the characteristics of single methods, they 
                                                 
676 Lamnek, 1995.  
677 Miles et al, 2002, pp. 5ff.  
678 http://costa22.org/mou.php 
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often leave the users of FRM, i.e., the practitioners of Foresight largely out of sight. The 
outlined features of FRM are largely deprived from the research context, e.g., the 
paradigmatic and epistemological deliberations of the researchers using them. Instead, 
the uses of FRM for decision making are discussed in the frame of single case studies. 
However, the systematisations largely fail to outline how the applicative potential of 
FRM in the research practice depends from skills of the practitioner and from other 
external contextual conditions such as the cultural, paradigmatic, financial context.  
 
Third, the systematisations of FRM largely account for the potential of FRM for policy 
research only in terms of quantitative research. Whilst outlining what is the applicative 
value of single qualitative and quantitative FRM for measuring, describing, explaining 
and forecasting different futures, they largely fail to provide any input on how to use 
FRM for exploring, critically reflecting and shaping the futures. While outlining the 
applicative potential of FRM for positivist Foresight, they disregard their potential for 
the interpretative or critical Foresight. Thereby, they imply that the quantitative research 
logic is the only right logic for inquiry of any kind of aspects of reality from any kind of 
perspective.  
 
One such example represents Glenn’s distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
FRM that refers to the degree to which a method relies on explicit measurements and 
numbers.679 The quantitative FRM are considered as being based on mathematics, i.e., 
using equations and precise measuring instruments. In contrast, qualitative FRM are 
largely seen as methods that do not use numerical measurements to any great degree and 
rarely rely on statistical analyses. This distinction is problematic as it is informed by a 
rather narrow understanding of qualitative methodology and methods, which implies 
that qualitative methods do not allow for quantification. This understanding clearly 
opposes the interpretative conception of methods adopted in this thesis.680 In 
interpretative methodological perspective, quantification is considered to be an inherent 
feature of both, quantitative and qualitative methods. Bell, therefore, argues that “the 
                                                 
679 Glenn, 2003a. See Table 8. 
680 See chapter 5.1.2. 
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quantitative-qualitative distinction is better conceived as a continuum than a dichotomy, 
most methods allowing for some degree of quantification, however, limited.”681 
 
Table 8: Taxonomy of the Future Research Methodology682 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, systematisations of FRM often focus exclusively on the methods 
developed within a (often not explicitly defined) cultural space. They hence exhibit 
lacking sensitiveness toward methodological developments and practices in other 
cultural areas. As a result, the practitioners of Foresight often reinvent methods by 
giving them another names and presenting single case studies of the use of these 
methods, although methods have been invented, used and studied in numerous ways for 
years in other cultures and regions. When using systematisations of FRM as orientation 
                                                 
681 Bell, 2003a, pp. 243. 
682 Adapted from Glenn, 2003a. 
Method Quantitative Qualitative 
Environmental Scanning  X 
Delphi  X 
Futures Wheel  X 
Trend Impact Analysis X  
Cross-Impact Analysis X  
Structural Analysis X X 
Systems Perspectives X  
Decision Modelling X  
Statistical Modelling X  
Technology Sequence Analysis  X 
Relevance Trees and Morphological Analysis  X 
Scenarios X X 
Interactive Scenarios  X 
Participatory Methods  X 
Simulation and Games  X 
Genius Forecasting, Vision, Intuition  X 
S&T Roadmapping  X 
Field Anomaly Relaxation  X 
Text Mining  X 
Agent Modelling  X 
SOFI Index X X 
Multiple Perspective Concept  X 
Causal Layered Analysis  X 
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frames, Foresight practitioners will fail to account for and profit from the methodical 
and methodological developments elsewhere in the world. Due to the resulting lack of 
knowledge and exchange on diversity of FRM around the world, Foresight practitioners 
struggle with the problem of reinventing the wheel. Moreover, the cultural 
insensitiveness of systematisations of FRM also leads to scepticism and ignorance 
toward other approaches to choice and use of FRM outside their national or regional 
borders. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Systematisation of Futures Research Methods by Aaltonen / Barth683 
 
Seldomly, the classifications of FRM direct the attention toward the epistemological 
value and limitations of FRM within distinct epistemological and research 
methodological frames of the researchers. If they do, they are often so engrossed with 
details and nuances in the varieties of FRM that policy analysts end up with a map 
which is almost as tangled and confusing as the jungle itself. For example, Aaltonen and 
Barth684 outline a classification, in which FRM are classified in terms of their 
epistemological value for studying the nature of the system (i.e., stand outside the 
                                                 
683 Aaltonen / Barth, 2005, pp. 4. 
684 Aaltonen / Barth, 2005, pp. 4. See Figure 15. 
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system, through interactions of agents). Moreover, they are distinguished in their ability 
to serve as means for controlling or to directing system (i.e., remove ambiguity, allow 
ambiguity). In addition, Aaltonen and Barth classify them in terms of their potential to 
enable policy analysts to study complexity (mathematical complexity, social 
complexity, engineering approaches, systems thinking). However, this systematisation 
fails to serve policy analysts as a reference frame for tackling the epistemological needs 
of policy analysis for governance for SD.685 
 
To sum up, in order to recognise the applicative value of FRM for policy analysis for 
governance for SD, policy analysts need to explicitly reflect the epistemological value 
of FRM for tackling the epistemological needs of the policy analysis for governance for 
SD. This epistemological value arises from distinct paradigmatic nature of FRM. As the 
SD concept is grounded in new paradigm thinking, FRM that derive from new paradigm 
thinking have a higher epistemological value as the ones deriving from old paradigm 
thinking. However, the contemporary positivist classifications and systematisations of 
FRM inside the EU Foresight discourse are, therefore, of limited analytical value for 
policy analysts aiming to inform governance for SD. They fail to serve them as 
reference frames to critically reflect the epistemological value of FRM for tackling the 
epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. In particular, they fail 
to direct the attention of policy analysts towards the level of coherence between the 
epistemological value of FRM and the epistemological needs of policy analysts. As 
such, they represent a central barrier to reflected choice and use of FRM in policy 
analysis for governance for SD.  
 
Policy analysts using these systematisations as their methodological orientation will 
largely fail to develop a consciousness for the paradigmatic nature of FRM that is 
essential for reflecting the applicative potential of FRM for policy analysis for 
governance for SD.686 For example, they will fail to reflect that numerous FRM such as 
road maps and scenarios have been developed some thirty years ago by scientists and 
experts who followed purposes, needs, problems and canons which were severely 
different from the contemporary modes of thought. They will also overlook that most of 
                                                 
685 See Figure 15. 
686 See chapter 6.1. 
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FRM were developed in the positivist paradigm based on reductionist and fragmented 
understanding of reality and that they are thus highly incompatible with the new modes 
of thought about social reality (e.g., the holistic and the integrated thinking) which 
inform the SD concept.  
 
While policy analysts relying on FRM in order to inform governance for SD can profit 
from the know-what discourse on Foresight in terms of reflecting the applications of 
Foresight in policy analysis, the discourse thus offers little inputs on the epistemological 
value of FRM and different research methodological approach to using them in policy 
analysis for governance for SD. 
 
5.3.6. Research Methodology for Foresight  
 
Although much of future research methodology and ideas have been institutionalised, 
there is relatively little documentation, evaluation and agreement about the quality of 
the use of FRM in Foresight.687 The EU ‘knowing-in-action’ Foresight discourse is still 
at its beginning. There is limited and fragmented reflection of the research styles and on 
the research methodological approaches to using FRM in Foresight exercises. 
Consequently, scholars largely agree that currently “there is an imbalance between the 
high level of operational use of Foresight and the relatively low level of research and 
development of its methodology.”688  
However, methodological issues in Foresight do not represent a blind spot in the current 
EU Foresight discourse. It is now common notion in the EU Foresight discourse that the 
question of methodology is important for Foresight as it is especially critical to be clear 
about methodology when attempting to create an understanding of the future.689 
Foresight experts point towards the need to focus on methodological considerations, as 
this would be useful in order to better understand the applicative potential of FRM for 
Foresight and the nature of the knowledge that is generated by Foresight. The For Learn 
Online Foresight Guide of the JRC of the EC for example argues that “it is critical to be 
                                                 
687 Glenn, 2003a.  
688 http://costa22.org/mou.php 
689 http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/4_methodology/framework.htm  
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clear about methodology when attempting to create an understanding of the future. For 
instance some methodological considerations might give guidance on why participation 
is needed to state anything relevant about the future or what it means to be an ‘expert’ 
etc.”690  
In the past decade, there have been several efforts taken to fuel the methodological 
discussions within the Foresight discourse in the EU and to provide a coherent 
framework for communication and co-operation among the Foresight researchers at the 
EU level. For example, in 2003, the EC launched a 4-year concerted research action on 
‘Foresight Methodologies - Exploring New Ways to Explore the Future” in the context 
of sustainability that was designated as European Cooperation in the Field of Scientific 
and Technical Research (COST) A22.691 The main objective of the COST A22 was to 
“develop certain aspects of foresight methodology so as to ensure systematic use and 
optimum benefit specifically in areas of identifying seeds of change, integrating 
narratives and numbers, and interaction between researchers, policymakers, and the 
public.”692  
 
Moreover, the International Seville Seminars on Future-Oriented Technology 
Analysis,693 which represent the central series of events on Foresight in the EU, 
typically focus on reflecting the uses of FRM for policy research. The coming 
International Seville Seminar on the Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA)694 in 
2011, organised by the IPTS again aims to explicitly address the methodology issues in 
Foresight. IPTS argues that the FTA as a distinct form of Foresight “should follow 
certain principles to ensure quality in both processes and outputs and be supported by 
appropriate combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods, which are fit for 
purpose and context, and which enable the building of trust through inclusiveness and 
transparency in processes.”695 Against this background, the 2011 FTA Conference seeks 
                                                 
690 http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/4_methodology/framework.htm  
691 http://Costa22.org; Fuller / de Smedt, 2008; COST A22, 2007.  
692 The project took place within the framework of a European Network for Foresight Methodology that 
facilitated the communication and co-operation among researchers and practitioners. The project, among 
others, included several conferences and workshops on Advancing Foresight Methodologies. For more 
see: http://costa22.org/mou.php. 
693 http://foresight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta.html 
694 In the EU, FTA is commonly understood as a distinct form of Foresight.  
695 http://foresight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta_2011/intro.html 
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contributions that address premises and practices in combining quantitative and 
qualitative FTA methods. In 2009, the Yeditepe International Research Conference on 
the Methodological Issues in Foresight Studies was organised in Istanbul.696 
 
The Action FORERA represents another ongoing action carried out in support of the 
European Research Area Unit of JRC-IPTS that wants to provide “forward looking 
intelligence to support decision making and improves the use of Foresight as an 
instrument for policymaking within the European Research Area.”697 One of the main 
foci of FORERA thereby represents monitoring and systematising knowledge on the 
uses of FRM for policy research. This includes provision and ongoing updating of an 
Online Foresight Guide and organising of workshops addressing issues such as why to 
embark on Foresight, how should one design a Foresight exercise, how should one run a 
Foresight exercise, how the results of the Foresight exercise be used, and how can one 
assess the effectiveness of an exercise. However, the Foresight guide does not explicitly 
address the methodology issues as it is considered that this would go beyond its scope.  
There is also a series of initiatives of the IPTS that are intended to provide a Foresight 
Knowledge Sharing Platform for Foresight practitioners and policymakers in the EU. 
They, among others, include the FOR-LEARN project,698 the Mutual Learning 
Platform,699 and the ForSociety.700 In addition, the EFMN aims at providing Foresight 
briefs on the examples of Foresight activities on a ‘country by country’ basis, the maps 
of Foresight initiatives in the world and Management and Mapping and Issues Analysis 
Reports on Foresight.701 Moreover, there is a range of Practical Guides to Foresight 
provided by the EC such as the Knowledge Society Foresight.702  
 
However, all these initiatives and contributions on Foresight practices fail to establish to 
establish a clear link to the EU recent discourse on the requirements of adapting 
governance for more SD. Moreover, they also fail to connect the issue of Foresight with 
                                                 
696 http://marc.yeditepe.edu.tr/yircof09.htm 
697 http://forera.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
698 http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.htm 
699 http://www.innovating-
regions.org/network/whoswho/projects_extended.cfm?sub_id=27&project_id=9 
700 http://www.eranet-forsociety.net 
701 http://www.efmn.info 
702 E.g., Miles et al., 2002; http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/0_home/index.htm 
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the current EU discourse on the theoretical, methodological and methodical issues of 
policy analysis. 
 
An important reference for policy analysts striving to tackle the reflected approach to 
choice and use of FRM, however, represent the works of the new/third generation 
futurists active in the broader futures field,703 who explicitly address the applicative 
potential of FRM from the interpretative perspective. Inayatullah704 represents one of 
the most visible new generation futurists providing contributions to the contemporary 
methodological and methodical discussion on reflected choice and use of FRM for the 
futures research. In general, he posits the Critical Futures that are based on the works of 
post-structuralists, including Michel Foucault, Michael Shapiro and Richard Ashley: 
“While they speak from an epistemological position that argues that the real is a social 
construction and thus they seek to relativise culture, they anchor their approach in a 
commitment to the deconstruction, the analysis, of power.”705 Inayatullah,706 therefore, 
argues for the Critical Futures Studies that are based on the deconstructivist version of 
the interpretative paradigm. In order to integrate the deconstructivist interpretative 
research logics into the practice of the choice and use of FRM in policy research, he 
proposes the CLA methodology.707 Furthermore, Inayatullah’s handbook ‘Welcome to 
Futures Studies: Methods, Emerging Issues and Civilisational Visions’708 includes 
several sections on methodological issues of the choice and use of FRM for policy 
research which are informed by the interpretative notion of methodology and methods. 
 
Slaughter709 represents another new generation futurist, who importantly contributes to 
contemporary methodological and methodical discussion on applicative potential of 
FRM from the perspective of interpretative research logic. In contrast to Inayatullah, he 
argues for Critical Futurism that draws on the reconstructive, cultural and hermeneutic 
                                                 
703 Slaughter, 2001. See chapter 6.1.3. 
704 Inayatullah, 1992; Inayatullah, 1999; Inayatullah / Wildman, 1999; Inayatullah, 2001; Inayatullah, 
2002a; Inayatullah, 2002b; Inayatullah, 2003.  
705 Inayatullah, 1999.  
706 Inayatullah, 2003.  
707 Inayatullah, 2001a; 2002a; 2003. For more on CLA see chapters 6.3.3. and 6.3.6. 
708 Inayatullah / Wildman, 1999.  
709 Slaughter, 1984; Slaughter, 1995; Slaughter, 1997; Slaughter, 1999; Slaughter 2001; Slaughter 2001a; 
Slaughter / Inayatullah, 2003. 
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traditions of interpretative school of thought.710 In Slaughter’s view, the main goal of 
futures field should be to “recover meanings that are lost in the predictive statistical 
approach. (…) It is the recovery of alternative futures that have been silenced by various 
oppressive structures, by a false consciousness.”711 He authored several publications 
which observe the paradigmatic nature of the uses of FRM in the futures field and the 
dependence of their applicative value from the philosophical deliberations and 
epistemological needs.  
 
Also Mannermaa712 studies the paradigmatic nature of the futures research and the 
philosophical foundations of FRM. Thereby, he highlights the necessity to choose and 
use FRM in a way that enables to account for the normative nature of futures thinking 
and makes them sensitive to values, beliefs and narrations behind empirical data. He 
also critically discusses how the emergence of complexity theory and systems thinking 
challenged the existing Future Research Methodology.713  
 
Hence at this point, the EU Foresight discourse on the research methodological aspects 
of the uses of FRM in policy research is still in its infancy in the empirical practice. 
Currently, it fails provide categorisations or typologies of different research 
methodological approaches to using FRM for policy research that would allow policy 
analysts to systematically reflect their applicative value for tackling the epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. 
 
                                                 
710 Slaughter, 1984; Slaughter, 1997.  
711 Inayatullah, 1999.  
712 Mannermaa, 1988; 2000.  
713 Mannermaa, 1988.  
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6. Towards a Meta-Epistemological and Meta-
Methodological Frame for Sustainability Governance 
Foresight 
 
Policy analysts aiming to inform governance for SD can profit from adopting the 
Foresight approach to policy analysis for governance for SD, i.e., from exercising 
systematic, participatory, action-oriented, opened vision-building that relies on FRM.714 
However, in order to conduct quality SGF, policy analysts need to choose and use FRM 
in a way that is sensitive to the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance 
for SD.715 Consequently, they need to emancipate themselves from the unreflected 
approach to use and choice of FRM that is fuelled by the quantitative research logics 
that commonly informs the research practices of mainstream policy analysts.716 Instead, 
they need to continuously (1) systematically examine the epistemological value of FRM 
for meeting the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD, (2) 
critically reflect the epistemological frame behind their practice of SGF and the related 
research interest and research goals of SGF, (3) examine their own research 
methodological logic and approaches to using FRM in relation to the epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for governance for SD, (4) and adapt them in a way that 
enables them to better tackle these epistemological needs.  
 
The goal of the chapter is thus to propose a meta-epistemological and meta-
methodological frame for exercising SGF that would allow policy analysts to better 
meet the epistemological needs of policy analysis of governance for SD,717 including 
the need to observe the discursive nature of policymaking, the need to account for the 
processes by which policymakers acquire knowledge, and the need to tackle the deeply 
uncertain nature of global change. The frame comprises three elements. Part 1 
introduces a paradigmatic classification of FRM that aims to help policy analysts 
critically examine the epistemological value of FRM for SGF. Part 2 proposes a 
                                                 
714 See chapter 5.3. 
715 See Table 5.  
716 See chapter 5.2.1. 
717 See Table 5. 
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typology of epistemologies of SGF that should enable policy analysts to critically 
reflect how different epistemological frames determine the research interest, the goals 
and the outcomes of SGF and how they influence the ability of policy analysts to meet 
the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. Part 3 sets out a 
research methodological heuristic for SGF that should serve policy analysts to 
emancipate themselves from the unreflected choice and use of FRM and to critically 
reflect and adapt their research methodological approaches to using FRM for SGF in 
way that is responsive to the epistemological needs. 
 
6.1. Paradigmatic Typology of Futures Research Methods  
 
In order to exercise quality SGF, policy analysts need explicitly reflect the 
epistemological value of FRM for meeting the epistemological needs of policy analysis 
for governance for SD.718 While policy analysts can use any type of FRM for exercising 
SGF, they need to use them in a way that is sensitive to their epistemological 
limitations. The epistemological value of FRM for exercising SGF is thereby 
determined by the level of coherency between the paradigm of the future that informs 
FRM and the epistemological and research methodological frame informing the policy 
analysts. In order to help policy analysts critically reflect the epistemological value of 
FRM for SGF, this chapter thus proposes a paradigmatic typology of FRM that brings 
their paradigmatic foundations to surface for conscious examination.  
 
The typology of FRM is organised according to Mannermaa’s719 conception of futures 
thinking that encompasses four different paradigms of futures thinking. The paradigms 
differ in their approach regarding time and relationships between the present and the 
past. He calls these paradigms ‘four chronological stages or ‘generations’ of futures 
thinking’. They include: “total passivity toward the future, desire to forecast the future, 
scenario thinking and making the future.”720 As the total passivity toward the future is 
irrelevant for futures thinking, the typology of FRM distinguishes the following three 
                                                 
718 See Table 5. 
719 Mannermaa, 1988. 
720 Mannermaa, 1988, pp. 294. 
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generations of FRM, each representing a derivate of a distinct paradigm of the future: 
(1) Forecasting methods, (2) scenario methods, and (3) critical FRM. 721 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Paradigmatic Typology of Futures Research Methods 
 
 
6.1.1. First Generation: Forecasting Methods 
 
The first generation FRM are informed by futures thinking that is characterised by 
desire to forecast the future and “to make plans and perform activities fitted to the 
‘forecasted’ futures as perfectly possible.”722 They have primary epistemological value 
within the positivist research methodological approach to SGF. They are conceptualised 
to explore the future societal change as framed in the old paradigm perspective, i.e., as a 
linear process. They are primarily aimed at diminishing the uncertainty of the future and 
at controlling it by uncovering the simple mono-causal relationships between distinct 
parts of social reality, by studying the first order reality, and by emphasising 
empiricism, testability, objectivity and rationality.  
 
                                                 
721 See Figure 16. 
722 Mannermaa, 1988, pp. 294. 
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The first generation of futures thinking became the dominating way of futures thinking 
in the 1950ties and the 1960ties.723 It informs a distinct type of core activity in the 
futures field that is commonly known as ’Forecasting’.724 Thus the first generation 
methods are commonly referred to as the ‘Forecasting FRM’.725 They for example 
include different trend-extrapolation techniques, which build on the mechanic projection 
of the past trends into the future. Another popular technique are the ‘social indicators’726 
for monitoring the state of society in order to produce some quantitative picture of 
society as “a way of knowing where it had been, where it was going, and how to make 
sound decisions about social policy.”727 The ‘State of the Future Index’728 developed by 
Gordon and Glenn represents one such example of a set of social indicators to track and 
forecast expectations about the ten-year future outlook.  
 
6.1.2. Second Generation: Scenario Methods 
 
The second generation FRM are informed by the notion of the future “as consisting of a 
range of possible alternatives, more or less probable, more or less desirable.”729 This 
second generation of futures thinking emerged in the 1970ties and 1980ties.730 It 
acknowledges and embraces the uncertainty of the future instead of trying to control it. 
It informs a distinct type of core activity in the futures filed that is commonly known as 
‘Futures Studies’.731  
 
The second generation FRM tend to “connect together various driving forces, trends, 
and conditioning factors so as to envisage alternative futures.”732 They are primarily 
aimed at exploring how the future might or should evolve in different ways. The second 
generation FRM, among others, include different scenario techniques that attempt to 
prepare policymakers for threats and desirable alternatives in the future. They have been 
                                                 
723 Miles et al., 2002. 
724 See chapter 5.3.1. 
725 Miles et al., 2002. 
726 Bell, 2003a. 
727 According to Bell (2003a), the ‘social indicators movement’ emerged in the 60ties on the basis of the 
initial Ogbourn’s idea of the need to monitor the state of the society by using variety of social indicators.  
728 Gordon / Glenn, 2006.  
729 Gordon, 2003. See also Glenn/Gordon 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; Glenn et al, 2009, 2010.  
730 Miles et al., 2002.  
731 See chapter 5.3.1. 
732 Miles et al., 2002, pp.33. 
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strongly influenced by the rise of the issues such as environmental problems and the 
emergence of the innovative information and communications technologies. They have 
found first proponents in large corporations and military, which have interests in 
strategic analysis across a wide spectrum of problems.733  
 
The second generation FRM have primary epistemological value for both, the 
quantitative and qualitative research approach to SGF, and in particular for the 
reconstructivist research methodological approach to SGF. Policy analysts informed by 
old paradigm thinking conceive the uncertain and ambiguous nature of the future as a 
consequence of the ontological assumption that the world represents a complex system 
that is subject to accelerating complex change.734 They can use scenario techniques in 
order to elaborate simple range of deviations from the norm as strategic alternatives that 
have as their assumption a culturally defined present. For example, the scenario 
techniques allow them to construct alternative scenarios as narrations on high and low 
figures that constitute deviations from the norm.735 The second generation FRM can 
hence be applied in order to point toward alternatives on the basis of culturally defined 
present, while disregarding different ways in which other cultures frame the world. A 
prominent example of the use of the second generation FRM within the positivist 
methodological framework represents the Report on ‘The Limits to Growth’ that is 
based on the system-dynamics modelling and computer simulations.736  
 
In contrast, policy analysts who are informed by new paradigm thinking aim to address 
the uncertainty of the futures as a consequence of the epistemological assumption that 
the world is socially constructed.737 They thus use the second generation FRM in order 
to focus on meaning and to subjectivise as well as relativise the future at expense of 
                                                 
733 Policy research drawing on the second generation FRM in particular emerged in decision-making 
contexts following the Second World War in the fields such as United States military strategic planning 
with the RAND Corporation, and in French spatial planning with DATAR, the National Institute for 
Spatial Planning (http://costa22.org/mou.php; Bell, 2003). The General Electric and Roway Dutch/Shell 
used the second generation FRM in their corporate planning procedures in the 1960s. The NGOs worked 
with the scenarios of socio-economic and environmental futures to introduce the first global models that 
attempted to address these issues in an integrated fashion. For more see Miles et al., 2002; Bell, 2003. 
734 See Figure 17.  
735 Inayatullah, 1999.  
736 Meadows, 1972. For an overview of the methodological critique on the Report ‘Limits to Growth’ see 
Bell, 2003a,40ff. 
737 See Figure 17. 
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politics. So as to create alternative futures, they for example use scenario techniques to 
discern how different cultures create the future and what the future will be like. Hence 
the scenario techniques also have primary epistemological value for reconstructive 
research, i.e., for creating new, culturally self-aware alternative interpretations of the 
future, shared discourses and authentic conversation of the futures.738 They can be used 
as means for exploring the world as framed in the reconstructivist perspective deriving 
from new paradigm thinking.  
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Figure 17: Second Generation Futures Research Methods 
 
 
6.1.3. Third Generation: Critical Methods  
 
The third generation FRM are informed by the idea of ‘making the future’.739 This type 
of FRM began to emerge in the late 90ties as a result of the transition from ordinary 
scenario thinking to futures thinking that realises its own normative and paradigmatic 
                                                 
738 Mannermaa, 2002.  
739 Mannermaa, 1988.  
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nature.740 Such futures thinking gave rise to what became commonly known as ‘Critical 
Futures’741, ‘Critical Futures Studies’,742 or ‘Critical Futurism’.743 
 
The critical FRM are informed by the radical constructivism and by the works of post-
structuralists such as Michel Foucault. Instead of ‘relativising culture’ as this is the case 
with the second generation FRM, the critical FRM are committed to deconstruction, i.e., 
to analysis of power.744 They are developed on the basis of the assumption that 
personalities are always present in all scenarios and in understanding of present reality. 
Thus there is always an element of ‘making the future’ in all statements about the 
future.745 Moreover, they are informed by the belief that the real is a social construction. 
Hence they focus on the meaning. They represent research paths for historicising and 
deconstructing the future in order to challenge the categories of thinking for 
constructing alternative futures. In other words, they represents means for reinventing 
the futures for example in sustainability perspective. As such, they have primary 
epistemological value for critical research approach to SGF informed by new paradigm 
thinking.  
 
An example of the third generation FRM represents the CLA746 that applies 
poststructuralism as a method. Being concerned with opening the present and the past to 
create alternative futures, it “focuses less on the horizontal spatiality of futures – in 
contrast to techniques such as emerging issues analysis, scenarios and backcasting – and 
more on the vertical dimension of futures studies, of layers of analysis.”747 Slaughter 
hence “considers it a paradigmatic method that reveals deep worldview commitments 
behind surface phenomena.”748 It aims at creating new epistemological or 
transformative spaces for questioning of the future and creating alternative futures by 
offering means for analysis of policy issues from numerous levels, including “common 
                                                 
740 Menermaa, 1988. 
741 Slaughter, 1999; Inayatullah, 1999.  
742 Inayatullah, 1999. 
743 Slaughter, 1984. For more see chapter 5.3.3. 
744 Inayatullah, 1999.  
745 Mannermaa, 1988. 
746 Inayatullah, 2001a; 2002a; 2003. See chapters 6.3.3 and 6.3.6. 
747 Inayatullah, 2001a. 
748 Inayatullah, 2001a. 
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rationality; the social and policy sciences; the discursive (as constituted by different 
worldviews) and the metaphorical or mythical.”749  
 
To conclude, the typology of FRM classifies FRM in the futures field in three distinct 
generations of FRM that are informed by distinct paradigms of the future.750 All three 
types of methods can be viewed, to an extent, as phases in development of the futures 
field: from positivism, to its critique, to present post-positivist efforts. This typology not 
only allows policy analysts to critically reflect the epistemological value of FRM, i.e., 
the benefits and limitations of their uses within different epistemological and research 
methodological frames. It also enables them to systematically explore the possible 
synergies between different generations of FRM. For example, it shows that the third 
generation methods such as the CLA open up space for articulation of constitutive 
discourses, which can then be shaped as scenarios that are elaborated by the second 
generation scenario techniques.  
 
6.2. Epistemologies in Sustainability Governance Foresight  
 
The distinct epistemological position of policy analysts not only determines the research 
interest and goals of SGF, but also their preference for and their use of FRM in SGF. In 
order to practice quality SGF, policy analysts thus need to explicitly reflect what types 
of SGF emerge from different epistemological positions, and how different 
epistemological frames influence their ability to meet the epistemological needs of 
policy analysis for governance for SD.751 This chapter proposes a three-dimensional 
model of epistemologies in SGF in order to help policy analysts critically reflect, what 
epistemological frame is of high applicative value for exercising SGF in a specific 
research context. Drawing on Inayatullah,752 the model links the EU Foresight practices 
to three alternative epistemological positions: the positivist, the interpretative and the 
                                                 
749 Inayatullah, 1999. For more on the CLA see chapters 6.3.3. and 6.3.6.  
750 See Figure 16. Although the above classification of FRM helps bringing the distinct paradigmatic 
nature of FRM to surface for conscious examination, it is important to keep in mind that each generation 
of FRM represents somewhat ideal typology and that not every FRM can be fitted into (just) one of these 
three categories. 
751 See Table 5. 
752 Inayatullah, 1999; 2001. 
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critical. Accordingly, the model of epistemologies in SGF argues that SGF can be based 
on three different epistemes, i.e., larger historical boundaries of knowledge that order 
the real and our knowing of it. None of the three epistemologies - positivist, 
interpretative and critical - represents a concrete regime of truth. Rather, they represent 
languages, ways of seeing, discourses, and negotiable assets that can be used by policy 
analysts to better understand and inform governance for SD. 
 
Different types of SGF and policy advice on ways to adapt governance for more SD 
emerge from the three epistemological positions of policy analysts when exercising 
SGF.753 Positivist SGF produces single-value deterministic images of the future that 
simply reinscribe the present even while they ‘predict‘ the future. Interpretative SGF, 
while significant in expanding the discourse of the future across cultures, relativises the 
future at the expense of politics. By historicising and deconstructing the future, critical 
SGF creates new epistemological spaces that enable the formation of alternative 
futures.754 The typology thus shows that policy analysts can follow a wide range of 
research interests and goals when exercising SGF, which can be categorised in relation 
to three epistemological positions: the positivist, the interpretative and the critical. 
Mainstream policy analysts thereby typically rely on the positivist epistemology that is 
captured by the predictive orientation.  
 
Table 9: Epistemologies in Sustainability Governance Foresight 
 
SGF Approach Interest Outputs 
Positivist SGF Controlling the future by forecasting 
what will happen. 
Single-value visions in a given 
plan or episteme, i.e., 
quantitative deviations from the 
norm (‘litany type visions’). 
Interpretative SGF Decolonising and subjectivising the 
future by reconstructing the images of 
the futures in various contexts, cultures 
and organisations. 
Culturally self-aware 
interpretations of the future 
(‘systemic type visions’). 
Critical SGF Reinventing the futures by 
deconstructing how different regimes of 
truth define the ways to frame and 
language the future. 
Alternative worldview visions in 
order to bring into being new 
schemes of politicization 
(‘worldview type visions’). 
                                                 
753 See Table 9. 
754 Inayatullah, 1999; 2001. 
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6.2.1. Positivist Sustainability Governance Foresight 
 
Positivist Foresight represents an opened, participatory and decision-oriented approach 
to vision-building that aims at controlling the future by forecasting what will happen.755 
Typical outputs of positivist Foresight are alterative visions in a given paradigm or 
episteme. They represent single-value deterministic images of the future that ignore the 
uncertainty arising from unprecedented events, noise, chance, systemic changes, 
experimental and observational errors as well as from the underlying values and 
assumptions.756 These visions represent a simple range of quantitative deviations from 
the norm, expressed by high and low figures on present projections of a policy issue. 
They are referred to as ‘litany type of visions’.757 
 
Positivist Foresight is captured by the predictive orientation. It attempts to find 
invariance and identifies trends and events on the basis of the regularity principle.758 It 
typically relies on the quantitative FRM such as the econometric methods that are used 
in order to construct future events and trends based on regularities within a distinct 
frame of time. The linear Forecasting or Backcasting are the techniques used most in 
this type of Foresight. While most physical and social systems are nonlinear759, they 
make linear approximations because “linear equitations are simpler to handle 
mathematically and over vast regions of operation the linear models provide a good 
match with reality.”760 Thereby, practitioners of positivist Foresight often seem to 
confuse quantity with quantity. End products are future scenarios in which the qualities 
remain the same, while the quantities change: more people, more cars, wider highways, 
faster planes, bigger bombs etc.761 Policy analysts tend to disguise these deviations from 
the norm as alternative futures thinking. However, as Von Foerster argues, future 
scenarios applying the rules of the past so as to construct alternative future visions are 
meaningless in a changing world.762 
                                                 
755 See Table 9.  
756 Gordon / Glenn / Jakil, 2005. 
757 Inayatullah, 2001; 2001a; 2003.  
758 Von Foerster, 1979a. 
759 See chapter 2.3.4. 
760 Gordon / Glenn /Jakil, 2005, pp. 1066. 
761 Von Foerster, 1979, pp. 5.  
762 Von Foerster, 1979a. 
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In the epistemological perspective, positivist Foresight strives to capture the real by 
leaving the episteme unexamined. The future events that it constructs hence exist only 
within a certain episteme. Consequently, positivist Foresight implicitly positions the 
present as a realised good society for it fails to question and capture the structural 
change of society. This creates the problem of probabilistic values that are assigned to 
occurrence of future events. Also left naturalised are the theoretical assumptions as to 
what is foreseeable, the data assumptions as to what is observable, and the values 
assumptions as to what is preferred and even more importantly the categories of theory, 
data, values and their ordering.763 By disregarding the perspectivity of observations and 
empirical data, positivist Foresight remains widely insensitive to meaning and 
symbolism. In positivist Foresight, it is also assumed that the language is neutral, i.e., it 
is not seen as actively constituting the real. The language is conceived as merely 
describing reality and serving as an invisible link between theory and data.764 One of the 
reasons is that policymakers often create obscure languages because that language 
serves particular interests. Hence they prefer to leave the language unexamined in order 
that it continues to determine what images of the future are possible, and which are 
likely to achieve a given reality.  
 
Positivist Foresight represents the dominating approach in the EU Foresight exercises. It 
is not only favoured by policy analysts but also by experts such as planners, futurists or 
economists. Consequently, the strategic discourse is most prevalent in this 
epistemological framework. This raises the question, what is the applicative value of 
positivist approach to SGF? How does it promote the capacity of policy analysts to meet 
the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD?765 And how does it 
increase their ability to help policymakers tackle the cognitive barriers of perceiving 
policymaking in the SD perspective?766 
 
                                                 
763 Inayatullah, 2001; 2001a; 2003.  
764 Innaytullah, 2001. 
765 See chapter 4.5. 
766 See chapters 2 and 3.  
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On one hand, positivist SGF enables policy analysts to support policymakers at creating 
visions that allow them to explore different solutions to the problems within their own 
episteme. It for example permits them to create targeted strategies and actions to 
minimise the envisioned negative trends and to empower the positive trends as 
elaborated from the culturally defined present. According to Inayatullah, “it gives ready 
made futures forgetting the institutional practice and values that go into making 
them.”767 Hence the information that it produces is valued by policymakers as it 
“provides lead time and a range of responses to deal with the ‘enemy’, whether it be a 
competing nation or corporation.”768  
 
However, due to the way in which positivist SGF constructs future events, it falls short 
in promoting the capacity of policy analysts to tackle the epistemological needs of 
policy analysis for governance for SD. By leaving the language and the perspectivity of 
policy-relevant knowledge unexamined, it limits their capacity to account for discursive 
and pluralist nature of policies. Thus the language employed by policymakers so as to 
seek and maintain power continues to determine the images of the future. Policymakers 
drawing on positivist SGF stay focused in the present and continue to serve the current 
structure. This type of SGF enables them to gain new political alliances, achieve 
‘modernity’ and acquire funding and prestige. However, it does not challenge them to 
make sustainability shift in their political thinking about the future. When adopting 
positivist approach to SGF, policy analysts also lack the capacity to account for deep 
uncertainty of global change, for they remain blind for the qualitative change, i.e., the 
change in subject-object and subject-subject relationships.769 Consequently, 
policymakers relying on positivist SGF will fail to build flexible governance that is 
resilient to deep qualitative societal change and that is sensitive to black swans or wild 
cards, i.e., events that lie outside the realm of the regular expectations (i.e., nothing in 
the past can convincingly point to its possibility).770 Without grounding it in critical 
analysis, positivist SGF can hence transmit a false filling of certainty about the future. It 
can also be misused by policymakers to signal that alternatives have been considered, 
                                                 
767 Inayatullah, 2003, pp. 22. 
768 Inayatullah, 2001.  
769 Von Foerster, 1979, pp. 5.  
770 Walker, 2010, pp. 918. 
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i.e., to make “symbolic gestures to show funding agencies and critics that possibilities 
of what can happen have been planned for.”771 
 
6.2.2. Interpretative Sustainability Governance Foresight  
 
Interpretative Foresight stands for opened, participatory, decision-oriented vision-
building that strives to decolonise and subjectivise the future by reconstructing the 
images of the futures in different contexts, cultures and organisations.772 Interpretative 
Foresight aims to account for the existence of alternative values systems and life styles 
in order to encourage free, symmetrical dialogue among them in spite of all differences. 
Typical outputs of interpretative SGF thus represent culturally self-aware interpretations 
of the future that discern how other cultures frame the future, and what they think the 
future will be like. Interpretative futures visions are hence commonly referred to as 
‘systemic type visions’.773  
 
Interpretative Foresight is rooted in the reconstructivist paradigm. One of the main tasks 
of interpretative Foresight is to recover the futures thinking of policymakers that has 
been colonised by the Western tradition of modernity. In order to do so, it is concerned 
with reconstructing how a particular future (e.g., the capitalist future) has emerged as 
universal future, what new futures might follow these historical patterns, and how 
alternative futures such as SD might dramatically transform this historical pattern. 
Interpretative Foresight is also an effort to identify cultures and perspectives that have 
been suppressed in the mainstream discourse in order to help policymakers in 
articulating and realising new visions. Typical questions that are addressed in 
interpretative Foresight for example include: How do different state actors (e.g., 
ministries) and stakeholders frame policy problems such as climate change? What are 
the differences between their images of future climate change? What are the 
implications of different images of the future climate change for governance? And, how 
can governance be made more resilient for differences in perceiving climate change? 
 
                                                 
771 Inayatullah, 1999.  
772 See Table 9. 
773 Inayatullah, 2001; 2001a; 2003.  
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Interpretative Foresight creates a possibility of a world in which the elites are not at the 
top - politically, economically, culturally and more importantly epistemologically. 
Aiming to decolonise the future, interpretative Foresight creates a possibility that the 
present (e.g., the liberalism and the capitalism) will not continue to be the future for 
many centuries to come. It opens the possibility that alternative visions such as the SD 
vision adjust the dominant capitalist vision of continued growth and thereby creates the 
possibility for rearranging governance structures, processes and tools in a way that will 
enable to put the society on the tracks of SD. Interpretative Foresight thus allows policy 
analysts to help policymakers see that their futures thinking is peculiar instead of 
insisting that it is universal. It enables them to sensitise policymakers for the fact that 
their notion of the category future as well as their comments of the future are “bound by 
and are intelligible in various cultural contexts.”774 By relativising future, interpretative 
Foresight enables policymakers to see the different ways in which time, history and 
progress can be constituted through and across culture. It allows for the comparison of 
many images of the future: dominant and recessive ones.  
 
Instead of less policy choices to be made, interpretative Foresight, therefore, creates 
more policy choices. As a result, the future, instead of becoming more certain, as most 
policymakers would like it gets even more uncertain. The future suddenly becomes 
negotiable for policymakers. The type of policymaking that emerges from this 
perspective is one of multiple understandings. Consequently, Inayatullah775 warns that it 
should be of no surprise if public administrators and politicians resist the alternative 
visions deriving from interpretative Foresight, except when they are constructed as 
minor deviations from the present. In contrast, groups that are less consolidated in 
various power structures such as social movements or people’s associations might 
exhibit greater openness to such type of Foresight. Hence some scholars still find it 
difficult to assert that alternative futures, which are different from the modern paradigm, 
could be taken seriously.  
 
                                                 
774 Inayatullah, 1999. 
775 Inayatullah, 1999.  
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The interpretative approach to SGF has the potential to increase the capacity of policy 
analysts to meet the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD.776 
By subjectivising the future, interpretative SGF allows policy analysts to help 
policymakers see the limits of their own futures thinking. By outlining how different 
groups of actors see the real, it enables policymakers to learn from their efforts and to 
see themselves anew. Moreover, interpretative SGF forces policymakers who tend to 
constitute themselves in a problem solving mode not to dismiss alternative futures 
deriving from other contexts, cultures and organisations (e.g., different 
operationalisations of the SD concept or difference development paradigm). In this way, 
interpretative SGF can increase the capacity of policy analysts to support policymakers 
at creating governance for SD that addresses different alternative social causes. 
Interpretative SGF can, therefore, enhance the capacity of policy analysts to support 
policymakers at designing inclusive governance for SD that is resilient to deep societal 
change. Moreover, it enables them to make the deep uncertainty of societal change 
explicit. 
 
However, there are several limitations to the applicative value of interpretative SGF for 
policymakers aiming to adapt governance for more SD. First, interpretative SGF might 
lead to situation where any future is as good as any other future. As a result, 
policymakers are left anchorless in the sea of cultural futures visions. Interpretative SGF 
can thus be somewhat uncomfortable for policymakers in that instead of certainty about 
how to adapt governance in order to better promote SD, what emerges is a relativisation 
of the governance futures. Furthermore, interpretative SGF disregards the differences 
between the cultures as it conceives cultures as essentially unified (‘we are all one’) or 
as fundamentally distinct (‘this is our way’). In this way, interpretative SGF is thrown 
out with culture moving to a site outside of criticism.777 Nevertheless, interpretative 
SGF fails to account for evolutionary and dynamic nature of culture that might entirely 
change in the course of time. It results in alternative visions that freeze time horizontally 
(across culture). Due to this de-politicization of power and time, policy analysts fail to 
inform policymakers about the ways how power circulates in the futures images and 
visions. Without grounding interpretative SGF in critical, i.e., deconstructivist analysis, 
                                                 
776 See Table 5. 
777 Inayatullah, 1999.  
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what can emerge are futures visions of the good that enslave possible, and alternative 
cultures which merely repeat the history of the past. 778 
 
6.2.3. Critical Sustainability Governance Foresight 
 
Critical Foresight represents an opened, participatory and decision-oriented approach to 
vision-building that aims at relativising the future by deconstructing how different 
regimes of truth define the ways to frame and language future.779 The end product of 
critical Foresight represent alternative ‘worldview type visions’780 that seek to uncover 
the regimes of truth which define the way we see, speak and ‘language’ the future in 
enable policymakers to explore how their self has become a subject of various 
discourses and structure, and how it is shaped by them.781 Instead of defining yet 
another political position in a form of an alternative future vision or plan, critical 
Foresight aims to imagine and bring into being new ‘schemes of politicisation’782 of an 
issue that policymakers strive to solve. It wants to uncover not yet widely shared 
alternative discourses with immense potential for framing disputed issues in a way that 
allows for joint action. In this way, it allows policymakers to reinvent the futures.  
 
Like interpretative approach, critical approach to Foresight speaks from the 
epistemological position that the real is socially constructed. In consequence, critical 
Foresight aims to relativise culture. However, in contrast to interpretative Foresight, it is 
committed to deconstruction, i.e., to analysis of power. Being rooted in the 
poststructuralist or deconstructivist paradigm,783 it attempts to make ‘the real’ political, 
i.e., to historicise it and make it peculiar. It strives to depict, how alternative worldviews 
constitute futures, i.e. how they are complicit to framing futures and how they legitimise 
the deeper social, linguistic and cultural structures. Critical Foresight puts into question 
that which is planned. It makes the way we speak contentious. It expounds the problems 
of current language and categories which continue to reinscribe the power-politics of the 
                                                 
778 Inayatullah, 1999.  
779 See Table 9. 
780 Inayatullah, 2001; 2001a; 2003.  
781 Inayatullah, 1999. 
782 Shapito, 1991. 
783 See chapter 5.1.1. 
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present and the alternative possibilities of the future. It examines how alternative 
possibilities of the future became the sole ways of describing something by evoking 
alternative futures in which rationality, mind and order are differently constructed. 
Moreover, it contests the ground of issues by inquiring how a particular policy problem 
has come to be framed.784 
 
In contrast to positivist Foresight, critical Foresight does not offer replications 
(‘blueprints’) of visions in order to endorse and empower political movements on behalf 
of policymakers or stakeholders. The practitioners of critical Foresight do not simply 
explore how trends affect the pace of issues to be addressed by policymakers, but how 
the issues emerged as categories of thought. Instead of taking for granted the issues in 
various regression forecasts, they take issue to it. The critical Foresight thus has the 
ability to reposition issues from a neutral apolitical site to a political one, wherein it 
examines them as a part of larger way of constructing the world. It critically reflects 
present categories of thought, which in turn do no longer represent frozen mentalities 
and a-historical concepts.785  
 
Critical Foresight aims at questioning existing forms of power in creating authoritative 
discourses and the existing categories of thinking. It allows policy analysts to 
demonstrate how the cultural ways to create future have emerged, how a certain way to 
create future has become the dominating way and how do decisions based on distinct 
types of futures thinking affect the circulation of power. It thus enables policy analysts 
to help policymakers explore alternative ways how, through practice, issues and 
strategies planed are constructed and empowered as a subject of history, what effects 
these practices of constructing and empowering issues might have for governance, and 
what governance options do these practices engender and open up? Critical Foresight 
for example addresses questions such as: How do alternative discourses or worldviews 
constitute the problem and the solution? How are they are complicit to framing an issue 
and solution? How do they legitimise the deeper social, linguistic and cultural 
structures? Critical Foresight, therefore, not only strives to create the obvious radical 
neoliberal vision of growth (“go forth and externalise environmental costs”) and 
                                                 
784 Cf. Inayatullah, 1999; 2001. 
785 Cf. Inayatullah, 1999; 2001. 
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confront it with the strong sustainable vision of growth (“take care of the environment 
first”) as this is the case with interpretative Foresight. It also searches for alternative 
ways of politicization of growth that lie in between such as for example the weak 
sustainable vision of growth (“balance the world”).  
 
Critical approach to SGF can be highly beneficial to policy analysts aiming to inform 
governance for SD as it can increase their capacity to tackle the epistemological needs 
of policy analysis for governance for SD.786 Among others, it allows policy analysts to 
promote complex policy learning, i.e., to help policymakers see themselves as products 
of various ways of constituting the world, which are opened to negotiation and debate 
by anyone. Moreover, critical SGF enables policy analysts to tackle the pluralist nature 
of policymaking. It allows them to help policymakers understand how discourses 
influence their framing of policy issues such as climate change as well as of governance 
measures to solve them. For instance, if the poverty is understood predominantly in 
terms of economic indicators, only economic measures are going to be suggested. In 
addition, critical SGF allows policy analysts to support policymakers at recognising that 
future(s) that they nominate as eligible stems from the type of their epistemological 
approach. Critical SGF also enables policy analysts to help policymakers explore why 
and how their own understanding of issues and the corresponding decisions differ from 
those of the other relevant actors. In this way, it facilitates the review of policymakers’ 
own notion of problems and promotes their capacity to question their own way of 
finding governance solutions and searching for additional and new perspectives that 
might bring more comprehensive results. In this way, it can increase the capacity of 
policy analysts to help policymakers to reform governance for more SD that addresses 
multiple-issue nature of policy problems and that works against the oppressive social 
structures that are complicit in preventing the realisation of SD. Nevertheless, critical 
SGF allows policy analysts to develop future visions that enable policymakers to 
inquire their epistemological construction of the future. In this way, they provide spaces 
in which unconventional action planning can come forth. 
 
                                                 
786 See Table 5.  
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However, similarly as interpretative SGF, critical SGF limits the ability of policy 
analysts to outline procedures for making final decisions. This is because its reflexivity 
prevents it from evading to pragmatic simplifications and limits its capacity to support 
policymakers to reach decisions necessary for actions.787 Both, interpretative and critical 
SGF hence seem to be complementary to positivist SGF that aims at empowering 
policymakers via problem-solving visions building that help them to articulate values, 
to develop strategic plans and to implement them.  
 
6.3. Research Methodological Heuristic for Sustainability 
Governance Foresight 
 
Policy analysts can profit from all three types of SGF that derive from the following 
epistemological positions: the positivist, the interpretative and the critical. The 
epistemological frame that policy analysts choose to rely on thereby importantly 
determines the research interest, the research goals and the outcomes of their SGF 
exercise.788 In order to fulfil these research interests, goals and purposes, policy analysts 
can rely on a wide range of FRM.789 Thereby, they should choose, use and combine 
FRM in a way that is sensitive to the epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SGF, including (1) the need to observe the discursive nature of 
policymaking in order to help policymakers account for discursive nature of the SD 
concept; (2) the need to account for the processes by which policymakers acquire 
knowledge in order to support them at sustainability mind-shift in the political thinking; 
(3) and the need to tackle the deeply uncertain nature of global change in order to help 
policymakers account for it in the SD perspective.790 Policy analysts should thus adopt a 
reflected approach to choice and use of FRM.791 According to empirical evidence, 
mainstream policy analysts largely struggle to do so as they are commonly informed by 
the positivist research logic that fuels an unreflected attitude towards choosing and 
using FRM.792  
                                                 
787 Inayatullah, 1999; 2001. 
788 See chapter 6.2. 
789 See chapter 6.1. 
790 See Table 5. 
791 See chapter 5.2. 
792 See chapter 5.2.1. 
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This chapter proposes a research methodological heuristic for SGF that should aid 
policy analysts to continuously critically reflect and adapt their own research 
methodological approaches to choosing and using FRM in a way that is sensitive to the 
epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. In other words, the 
heuristic should serve policy analysts to find innovative methodological solutions for 
choosing and using FRM in a way that is coherent with the epistemological needs of 
policy analysis for governance for SD.  
 
Heuristic represents a widely acknowledged approach for directing one's attention into 
learning, discovery, or problem-solving. In this thesis, it is conceived as “die Lehre von 
den Verfahren, Probleme zu lösen, also für Sacheverhalte empirischer und nicht-
empirischer Wissenschaften Beweise und Wiederlegungen zu finden.“793 It refers to 
systematic process to generate scientific knowledge, i.e., to the art and science of 
discovery and insight. The heuristic for SGF aims at opening new spaces of thinking 
instead of closing them through normative guidelines. In contrast to algorithm that 
always assures a clear solution, it remains unsure in terms of the results, while 
promising new inventions or discoveries.  
 
The design of the research methodological heuristic for SGF is informed by the 
constructivist learning theory.794 The heuristic primarily wants to promote complex and 
change learning of policy analysts about the methodological requirements of SGF. 
Policy analysts are expected to gain ‘knowledge in action’795 that enables them to act in 
methodologically reflected way when exercising SGF, i.e., to choose and use FRM in a 
way that is sensitive to the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for 
SD.  
 
The design of heuristic for SGF thus not only opposes the authoritarian behaviourist 
type of heuristic that typically focuses on providing the ways and instruments that 
enable policy analysts to learn the right or wrong methodological habits, and on 
                                                 
793 Lorenz, 1984, cit. in: Hunecke, 2006, pp. 15.  
794 See Figure 7. See also Baumgartner, 1993a; 1997b; 2001; 2002; 2003; Baumgartner et al., 2000; 2002.  
795 See also Baumgartner, 1993a; 1997b; 2001; 2002; 2003. 
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presenting didactic strategies to persuade policy analysts that it is in their own interest 
to squeeze themselves in the corset of the preconceived methodological and methodical 
solutions.796 Furthermore, the heuristic for SGF differs from the cognitivist type of 
heuristic that is primarily aimed at identifying the methodological tasks for policy 
analysts in empirical praxis to solve the predetermined and didactically adjusted, 
simplified methodological problems.797 
 
In order to promote the methodological self-reflexivity of policy analysts when using 
and choosing FRM in SGF, the heuristic for SGF identifies six methodological 
strategies or methodological principles.798 They include: (1) explorative approach, (2) 
hermeneutic approach, (3) communications approach, (4) deliberative approach, (5) 
emancipatory approach and (6) transdisciplinary approach.799 These heuristic 
principles800 should serve policy analysts as cognitive help for reflected choice and use 
of FRM. They represent departing points of methodological self-reflection on the basis 
of which policy analysts should be able to choose and use FRM in a way that is widely 
coherent and responsive to the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance 
for SD. The research methodological principles not only determine the conditions for 
quality scientific insight, but also illuminate the aspects of research process that need to 
be critically accounted for by policy analysts. They should enable policy analysts to 
identify and solve complex methodological problems that cannot be solved with success 
by using simple algorithms.  
 
The methodological principles for self-reflected use of FRM in SGF are not set in a 
normative way, i.e., out of a certain philosophical discussion and tradition. They are 
developed on the basis of insights about the knowledge gap between governance for SD 
and policy analysis from the previous chapters. In particular, they draw on the typology 
of cognitive barriers and challenges of policymakers in terms of perceiving governance 
                                                 
796 See Figure 5. See also Baumgartner, 2001.  
797 See Figure 6. 
798 Hayer / Wagenaar, 2003.  
799 The names of the principles are descriptive, i.e., they point toward the praxeology of SGF, instead of 
pointing towards a specific philosophical theory tradition (e.g. deconstructivist or poststructuralist 
approach).  
800 Hunecke, 2006. 
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in the SD perspective,801 on the typology of shortcomings of the mainstream theoretical 
approaches to policy analysis for governance for SD and the resulting epistemological 
needs to be tackled by policy analysts.802 Nevertheless, the heuristic for SGF draws on 
the analysis of research methodological requirements of policy analysis for governance 
for SD.803 It is informed by the insights on the central research methodological 
dilemmas of mainstream policy analysts following the positivist research logic when 
applying FRM.804 Moreover, it draws on the analysis of how policy analysts can profit 
from the EU policy analysis discourse on the interpretative turn and from the EU 
Foresight discourse in order to overcome the research methodological dilemmas.805  
 
Consequently, the proposed methodological principles for SGF largely stem from the 
interpretivist discourse that proved to be a promising reference frame for policy analysts 
aiming to critically reflect their own research logic and habits behind the choice and use 
of FRM and to overcome the methodological dilemmas due to their positivist research 
logic.806 The heuristic for SGF shows how the shift from quantitative to qualitative 
methodological approach to choice and use of FRM in SGF can improve the ability of 
policy analysts to tackle the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for 
SD. Moreover, it sets out how the methodological principles and perspectives from 
interpretivist methodological discourse demonstrate analytical fertility and practical 
usefulness for tackling the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for 
SD.  
 
The heuristic attaches great importance to ‘Leitfragen’807 as central instruments for 
cognitive integration of knowledge from different perspectives in the Foresight 
practice.808 Each research methodological principle is operationalised into central 
methodological ‘Leitfragen’ that need to be considered by policy analysts when aiming 
                                                 
801 See chapters 2 and 3.  
802 See chapter 4. 
803 See chapter 5.  
804 See chapter 5.2. 
805 See chapter 5.3. 
806 See chapter 5.2.2. 
807 Balsinger provides the following definition of ‚Leitfragen’: „Als Leitfragen lassen sich solche Fragen 
bezeichnen, die zwar bezüglich des Forschungsgfeldes interessieren, die aber den genuinen 
Erkenntnisinteressen der Einzelprojekte übergeoprdnet sind und dadurch die Arbeiten der Teilprojekte 
anleiten.“ (Balsinger, 2005, cit. in: Hunecke, 2006, pp. 175). 
808 Hunecke, 2006. pp. 175. 
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to implement methodological principles in a SGF exercise. Moreover, the research 
methodological principles are illustrated with a series of empirical examples of the uses 
of FRM in the Foresight practice. The examples of applications of FRM in Foresight are 
not only used to demonstrate how the mainstream positivist approaches to applying 
FRM limit the capacity of policy analysts to meet the epistemological needs of policy 
analysis for governance for SD in empirical practice. They are also used to show how 
these dilemmas can be solved by grounding SGF exercise in the research 
methodological principles outlined in the heuristic for SGF.  
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Table 10: Research Methodological Heuristic for Sustainability Governance Foresight 
 
 
Critical Explorer 
 
 
 
• Heuristic Principle: explorative approach to SGF 
• Yes-Go: Flexible and opened research design, which is adaptive and recursive. 
• No-Go: Standardised and fixed research design based on ex-ante hypotheses.  
• Leitfrage: How to choose and use FRM in a way that enables contesting the ex-
ante hypotheses in response to new insights during the SGF exercises? 
• References: grounded theory; experimental approach.  
 
 
Discoverer of 
Frame Conflicts 
 
 
 
• Heuristic Principle: hermeneutic approach to SGF 
• Yes-Go: Use of FRM to detect conflicts in framing of policy issues. 
• No-Go: Use of FRM in a way that is ignorant toward interpretative judgements. 
• Leitfrage: How to use FRM for reconstructing frames as normative-prescriptive 
stories which set out policy problems, course of action and basis for persuasion? 
• References: interpretative approach; reconstructive approach. 
 
  
Translator Across 
Discourses 
 
 
 
• Heuristic Principle: communications approach to SGF 
• Yes-Go: Use of FRM to develop refined culturally sensitive frames of policy issues 
• No-Go: Use of FRM in a way that disregards the discursive practices and hidden 
forms of communicative power behind them. 
• Leitfrage: How to use FRM for translating knowledge and narrations into palatable 
messages across different discourses, i.e., for epistemic translation? 
• References: argumentative approach, communications approach, discursive 
approach, policy epistemic approach, dialectical model of policy analysis, critical 
futures research, layered approach.  
 
 
Facilitator of 
Citizen Deliberation 
 
 
 
 
• Heuristic Principle: deliberative approach to SGF 
• Yes-Go: Use of FRM for facilitating citizen deliberation and bringing to fore the grass 
roots knowledge at all stages of policymaking and policy inquiry. 
• No-Go: Use of FRM for collecting judgements of citizenry only to verify policy 
solutions to predetermined policy problems.  
• Leitfrage: How to use FRM in a way that enables meaningful participation of all 
affected actors at all stages of policy inquiry? 
• References: action approach; grass-roots approach; network research; collaborative 
research; collaborative policy learning, participatory approach 
 
 
Honest Broker 
 
 
 
• Heuristic Principle: emancipatory approach to SGF 
• Yes-Go: Use of FRM that enables to sensitise political thinking for conflicts, 
randomness, signs of breaks and destabilisations in societal transition.  
• No-Go: Use of FRM for finding invariance, trends and regularities in societal transition 
in order to create ‘false’ certainty.  
• Leitfrage: How to use FRM to deconstruct and challenge the routinized ways of 
futures thinking, to take a critical gesture toward speech and to create a hypothetical 
space of intelligent breaking of rules? 
• References: critical/poststructuralist approach; deconstructivist approach; Befreiungs-
Wissen. 
 
 
Transdisciplinary 
Knowledge Agent 
 
 
 
• Heuristic Principle: integrated approach to SGF 
• Yes-Go: Use of FRM for integrating specialised knowledge. 
• No-Go: Use of FRM for finding sufficient cause (‘causality principle’).  
• Leitfrage: How to use FRM in a way that allows for integration of knowledge that is 
sensitive to different descriptive levels of disciplinary, sectoral and other social 
discourses? 
• References: transdisciplinary approach; causal layered methodology. 
 
6 
6.3.1. Explorative Approach: Policy Analyst as Critical Explorer  
 
In order to exercise SGF that is responsive to the epistemological needs of policy 
analysis for governance for SD,809 policy analysts need to adopt explorative approach810 
to choice and use of FRM.811 They need to act as critical explorers who explicitly reflect 
how to choose and apply FRM in a way that enables them to adopt an opened attitude 
toward the research object, i.e., to formulate and continuously question, refine and 
modify their working hypotheses about the research object, their research foci and their 
choice and use of FRM in response to new data collected during the course of a SGF 
exercise. Policy analysts should thus continuously adapt their choice and use of FRM to 
the particularities of the research object. Moreover, they should utilize the insights 
gained during the course of the SGF exercise to continuously refine the research steps.  
 
Mainstream policy analysts thus need to emancipate themselves from the commonly 
adopted positivist approach to Foresight that counsels them to choose and use FRM 
exclusively to falsify or verify the hypotheses about the research object, which are 
formulated ex-ante, i.e., in a theoretical way before the start of the research inquiry. 
Consequently, they rely on explorative approach to Foresight to formulate hypotheses 
about the societal phenomena exclusively at the beginning of the scientific inquiry. 
Then the ex-ante generated hypotheses are tested by less impressionistic quantitatively 
proven descriptions of behaviours. Thereby, policy analysts usually rely on a rigorous 
research plan. In empirical practice, mainstream policy analysts for example typically 
formulate narrow questions for the first round questionnaire of a Delphi study812 with 
multiple choice questions. Such approach hinders policy analysts to account for 
discursive nature of policymaking, or to recognise and methodologically account for the 
multi-issue and multidimensional nature of policy problems in empirical reality. 
                                                 
809 See Table 5. 
810 Lamnek, 1995a. 
811 See Table 10.  
812 Delphi study represents a FRM that “has been used very often across a broad spectrum of topics. It is a 
principal method of futures research and has found application in planning, decision making, and policy 
research” (Gordon / Pease, 2006). Delphi study “was developed at the RAND Corporation in the late 
1950’s and 1960’s as an effective means for collecting and synthesizing expert judgements. (…) In 
general, Delphi studies involve feedback of information from one round to the next, including (for 
numerically answered questions) the average or median of responses, and typically, reasons furnished by 
participants for holding extreme positions” (Gordon / Pease, 2006). For a discussion of the Delphi study 
see Linstone/ Turoff, 1975; Gordon, 2003a. 
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In order to tackle these methodological dilemmas, policy analysts need to become 
critical explorers. They should follow three interrelated principles.813 When using FRM, 
they should follow the openness principles, i.e., adopt an opened attitude (‘Offenheit’) 
toward research persons, situations and methods. They should apply FRM in a way that 
allows them to stay opened toward the new developments and dimensions of the 
research object, which they have not accounted for and planed at the beginning of the 
SGF exercise. Secondly, policy analysts exercising SGF should follow the flexibility 
principle, i.e., they should assure high responsiveness of research logics and paths on 
the changed conditions and constellations in empirical praxis. Third, policy analysts 
should follow the circularity principle, i.e., the Foresight research process should follow 
the ‘hermeneutical circle’ as opposed to ‘logical circle’ that is common to positivist 
research logics. They should continuously adapt and revise their research plan and 
methodical apparatus in response to data collected on the research object. They should 
follow a flexible research plan that is adapted during the course of inquiry in response to 
newly gained empirical data. Nevertheless, policy analysts exercising SGF should 
change their expectations about the type of outputs of SGF. They should choose and use 
FRM in a way that enables them to generate (as opposed to verify) hypotheses about the 
nature and quality of the research object. Instead of falsifying and confirming the 
existence of the assumed problems and finding solutions to them, policy analysts need 
to generate new assumptions about policy problems at the end of the SGF exercise.  
 
For example, when using Delphi study to formulate energy scenarios, policy analysts 
should first ask experts opened questions the answers to which are not already known 
and which enable them to make different levels of knowledge and numerous contexts 
visible. Opened questions leave the participants of Delphi study more room for self-
performance and allow policy analysts to uncover influential factors that lie outside the 
mainstream paradigms. The participants of Delphi study can even be asked to write 
short essays in which they imagine what the future might be for energy politics. The 
aim of policy analysts would thereby be to tease out the factors that participants see as 
significant in the energy future. Then, policy analysts could analyse the empirical data 
                                                 
813 Lamnek 1995a; Lamnek 1995b; Bohnsack, 2003.  
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collected in the first wave of the Delphi study to verify their own theoretical 
assumptions in the research field and to adapt and refine the further methodical steps in 
response to the new distinct situational moment. On the basis of this enhanced multi-
perspective understanding and knowledge about a policy issue and about the 
participants images on the energy futures, policy analysts then could construct a 
questionnaire for the second wave of the Delphi study, which includes more narrow 
questions in order to clarify different attitudes. In this way, policy analysts can advance 
their own understanding of policy issues, and position it in a larger context. 
 
In order to adopt explorative approach, policy analysts exercising SGF should explicitly 
reflect the following research methodological questions:  
 
- How to emanate the analytical relationships and the interpretations from the 
empirical life before and during the course of the SGF exercise? 
- How to choose and use FRM in a way that enables to contest the ex-ante hypotheses 
on the basis of new insights gained during the course of the SGF exercise?  
- How to take into account new perspectives and move into directions that were not 
accounted for and planed at the beginning of the SGF exercise? 
- How to continuously adapt the methodic apparatus and research plan in response to 
collected data about the policy issue at stake during the course of the SGF exercise?  
- How to use and choose FRM in a way that enables to generate policy problems and 
theories on the basis of research insights at the end of the SGF exercise? 
 
Policy analysts can draw on a rich body of research methodological literature from the 
social sciences discourse in order to tackle the above methodological questions. 
However, while this literature offers a range of research methodological solutions for 
these questions, it fails to establish an explicit link to Foresight practices. In particular, 
grounded theory offers a valuable reference frame for exercising SGF. It advocates 
simultaneous involvement of researchers in data collection and analysis in order to 
construct “analytic codes and categories from data, not from preconceived logically 
deduced hypotheses, advancing theory development during each step of data collection 
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and analysis.”814 In particular, practical guides on grounded theory written by Charmaz 
and Bryant815 or by Glaser and Strauss816 provide valuable insights into the 
constructivist grounded theory approach that is sensitive to meaning.  
 
Policy analysts striving to act as critical explorers can also draw on the works by 
Lamnek’s817 and Bohnsack’s818 about the qualitative methodology for social research. 
Grünwald’s819 experimental approach to social research represents another promising 
reference for tackling explorative approach in the SGF empirical practice. It strives to 
prevent that policy analysts fall into the trap of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, which is 
characteristic for quantitative research logic commonly informing mainstream policy 
analysts. The experimental approach is thus aimed at exploring the futures as fluid and 
discursive entities and at accounting for the impossibility of their prediction. 
 
However, policy analysts can also learn from several empirical examples of explorative 
approach to choice and use of FRM in the futures field. The Real-time Delphi study 
represents an increasingly popular example of explorative approach to using Delphi 
study. While “in classical Delphi, the judgments collected in one round are fed back to 
the participants in subsequent rounds (…) by contrast, Real Time Delphi is roundless 
and answers generated are fed back to participants in real time.”820 Experts can not only 
judge once or twice, depending on the number of rounds, as it is typical for the 
conventional Delphi study. During a Real-Time Delphi, experts can independently 
reassess their responses as often as they want.”821 However, the applicative value of the 
Real-time Delphi study examples is limited, for they are largely informed by the 
positivist research logic, i.e., by predictive orientation. Thus they are ignorant toward 
the interpretative judgments and toward deep uncertainty of global change, which 
represent the basic epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. 
                                                 
814 Charmaz, 2006, pp. 10. 
815 Charmaz, 2000; 2006; Charmaz / Bryant, 2007. 
816 Glaser / Strauss, 1967; 1998. 
817 Lamnek 1995a; Lamnek 1995b.  
818 Bohnsack, 2003. 
819 Grünwald, 2004.  
820 http://www.realtimedelphi.net/ 
821 Friedewald et al., 2007.  
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6.3.2. Hermeneutic Approach: Policy Analyst as Discoverer of Frame Conflicts 
 
In order to meet the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD 
when exercising SGF,822 policy analysts should adopt hermeneutic approach to choice 
and use of FRM.823 Hermeneutic approach is informed by the constructionist 
assumption that “the definition of a problem and the action taken to solve it largely 
depend on the view which the individuals or groups that discovered the problem have of 
the system to which it refers.”824 Accordingly, policy analysts should become 
discoverers of frame conflicts who choose and use FRM in a way that allows them to 
reconstruct and compare different logics of the situational context and discover conflicts 
between different frames825 that shape understandings of policy problems and actions to 
solve them. 
 
In contrast, mainstream policy analysts tend to use FRM in a way that ignores or 
sidesteps the subjective dimensions and that treats meanings as manifestations of 
objective phenomenon826 in order to establish explanations that can stand independently 
of social meanings. They conceive empirical data as given and objective information, 
which is in large part self-explanatory and can be understood only in one way. Thus the 
commonly adopted positivist approach to choice and use of FRM in Foresight is 
insensitive to the role of social meanings that are inherent to social and political 
interaction. For example, when using Delphi study to create energy scenarios, 
mainstream policy analysts typically involve a worldwide panel of experts from 
different disciplines and sectors. When formulating questionnaires, they typically do not 
explain the distinct meanings of the terms and vocabulary that they use. Also, they fail 
to outline the implicit logic behind the questions. This fuels numerous (hidden) 
misunderstandings among the experts, who – coming from all over the world and 
having different professions – can understand the terms used in questions such as 
                                                 
822 See Table 5. 
823 See Table 10.  
824 Brün, 1971, cit. in Von Foerster, 1979a. 
825 Drawing on Yanow (2003), ‘frame’ means the normative-prescriptive stories that set out policy 
problem, a course of action and a basis for persuasion. For more on ‘frames’ and ‘framing’ see Yanow, 
2003; 2007; 2008. Similarly, Goffman (1974, pp. 10-11) defines frames as tacit, hidden principles of 
organisation which governs the subjective meaning we assign to social events. In accordance, Fischer 
(2003b, pp. 143) defines framings of issues as guideposts for analysing, knowing, arguing and acting.  
826 Fischer, 2003b, pp.151. 
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‘alternative energy‘ or ‘near future‘ in different way than policy analysts do. The 
misunderstandings even increase when the questionnaires are translated into other 
languages. Moreover, the questionaires developed by mainstream policy analysts, 
typically consist of multiple choice questions and questions asking the experts for 
quantitative estimates of the attributes of the future developments, e.g., of their value, 
impacts, probabilities or backfire potential without demanding for further explanation 
and argumentation why. Such narrow questions disable policy analysts to contextualise 
the empirical data and knowledge collected in relation to what is meant when experts 
for example claim that a certain energy sector will rise in the next future. They also fail 
to account for the reasons why experts think that it will. For experts can make the same 
estimate for different reasons. 
 
Drawing on such Foresight, policymakers discuss the future energy politics in the same 
terms, however possibly mean completely different things. Hence policymakers would 
agree and adopt certain energy scenarios as guidance for cooperative efforts to adapt 
governance for more SD, but have very different understandings of what these energy 
scenarios mean. Consequently, energy scenarios appearing relatively straightforward 
would be found to involve different frames (e.g., assumptions and premises) and would 
not lead to desired effects. Such misunderstandings and misperceptions create hidden 
barriers to effective policy development and implementation. They fail to provide 
insight on relevant frame conflicts that occur when different participants focus on 
different elements of a policy issue and value these elements differently. Such Foresight 
disregards the discrepancies underlying the actors’ implicit theories. In this way, policy 
analysts not only fail to provide policymakers with the competence to anticipate 
reactions of the actors involved in governance and to be empathic of these reactions. It 
also gives them a false certainty and feeling to know the future(s), what ever type of 
them it might be.  
 
This above example shows in exemplary way how positivist approach to SGF limits the 
capacity of policy analysts to account for the epistemological needs of policy analysis 
for governance for SD. First, positivist SGF disregards the contentious dimensions of 
policy questions, the intractability of policy debates, the defects of supporting 
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arguments policy narratives and the political implications of contending prescriptions. 
By ignoring the discrepancies underlying the parties’ implicit theories and perspectives 
on one and the same issue it fails to distil the variety of reasons and logics on the basis 
of which policymakers see the future in one way or another. It falls short of outlining 
what are the narratives and arguments that support their framing of issues (e.g., future 
energy politics) and who is informed by these narratives. While such Foresight provides 
policymakers with one or several single-value deterministic images or visions of the 
coming futures (e.g., energy scenarios), it fails to help policymakers recognise the 
frames and interests of diverse parties and the related options for building global 
partnerships. In this way, positivist approach to SGF reduces the ability of policy 
analysts to account for the discursive nature of policymaking.  
 
In order to tackle these methodological dilemmas, the heuristic for SGF counsels policy 
analysts to adopt hermeneutic approach to use of the FRM. For example, when using 
the Delphi study for constructing energy scenarios, policy analysts should apply it to 
illuminate the logics and meanings behind questions in questionnaires, and to 
reconstruct how future energy politics is being framed by different participants of the 
Delphi study and to identify the discrepancies between these framings. Thereby, there 
are numerous possible methodological solutions to do so. Policy analysts can for 
example reformulate the questionnaires for the Delphi study in a way that enables to 
explore the degree “to which interest groups, policy constituencies, scholars working in 
competing disciplines, and the citizens in the various context of everyday life perceive 
and structure the energy politics”827 in the future. Instead of asking “do you think that 
the alternative energies will be important in next 10 years,” policy analysts could ask 
“why and how do you think that the alternative energy sector will evolve in next ten 
years?” In order to uncover the policy frames and situational contexts that attribute 
social meanings to their perceptions of the future of energy politics, questions can be 
substituted with problem-setting stories that participants of the study are asked to tell 
about policy situations and that “link causal accounts of policy problems to particular 
proposals for action and facilitate the normative leap from is to ought.”828 Moreover, 
policy analysts can ask experts participating at a Delphi study to fulfil personal profiles 
                                                 
827 Fischer, 2003b, pp. 143. 
828 Fischer, 1993, pp. 143. 
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in which they provide data on their profession, disciplinary background, location of 
living and working and other information prior to answering questions. In this way, 
policy analysts can better track the differences in vocabulary used by experts and their 
own vocabulary and critically reflect the meaning of and the reasons for the estimates of 
experts. They can better examine and interpret how policy issues are being 
conceptualized or framed by experts; how they are selected, organized, and interpreted 
to make sense of a complex reality; and how does this influence the participants’ 
estimates about the future energy politics. 
 
These examples show that the methodological shift from positivist to hermeneutic 
approach to choice and use of FRM in SGF can importantly increase the competence of 
policy analysts to meet the newly emerged epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SD. Hermeneutic principle advocates the choice and use of FRM in a 
way that makes the assumptions behind the study and the construction of alternative 
futures visible and that allows policy analysts to deconstructs how beliefs and 
expectations, i.e., the way that policymakers see the world, shapes and changes the 
world we live in. Hermeneutic approach to SGF thus allows policy analysts to account 
for discursive, fluid, socially constructed and highly interdependent nature of 
policymaking. It shifts the focus away from the instrumental behaviour that is based on 
values such as costs, benefits, and feelings towards the broader subjective meanings, 
motives or purposes behind the events, actions and other texts. Hence hermeneutic 
approach to SGF enables policy analysts to explicitly account for the role of values, 
interests and language when interpreting different framings of social reality. Such SGF 
promotes the inter-subjective understanding of futures alternatives that is crucial for 
building governance for development and implementation of policies that promote 
SD.829 It promotes better communication and understanding between policymakers and 
makes joint activity possible. It enables policymakers to avoid misunderstandings and 
misperceptions, which are particularly common in governance context that is 
characterised by high heterogeneity of actors.  
 
                                                 
829 Hoffman, 1995. 
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Secondly, hermeneutic approach to SGF allows policy analysts to account for deep 
uncertainty of global change. The exploration of global change is always characterised 
by a lot of interpretation by policy experts, who in face of deep uncertainty of global 
change rather connect the existing empirical data with social theories than provide new 
empirical data per se. Hermeneutic approach to choice and use FRM in SGF enables 
policy analysts to explicitly account for the interpretative, i.e., perspective-dependent 
nature of knowledge and data collected about the futures. It allows them to use FRM in 
a way that is sensitive to implicit assumptions that inform the judgements about the 
possible, probable and preferable futures. Thus hermeneutic approach allows them to 
consciously account for the mind-set of actors relevant to the policy issue and for the 
state of discourse on the future as opposed for the future itself. It enables them to 
understand how the policy issues in question are conceptualized or framed by the parties 
to debate, how they are selected, organized, and interpreted to make sense of a complex 
reality.830 In this way, it increases the ability of policy analysts to promote the 
anticipatory and strategic power of policymakers as it enables them to determine the 
conflicting framings of the world that cause different and opposing courses of action 
concerning what is to be done, by whom, and how even when policymakers may agree 
on the common goals. 
 
Nevertheless, by allowing policy analysts to consciously and critically account for 
social construction of policy problems, hermeneutic approach to SGF enables them to 
promote complex policy learning. When following hermeneutic approach to SGF, 
policy analysts use FRM to reconstruct frames, i.e., normative-prescriptive stories that 
set out policy problem and a course of action to be taken to address the problem.831 
Such SGF allows policymakers to reconstruct differences between frames that provide 
coherence, a direction for action and a basis for persuasion. It allows them to critically 
reflect the frames that they and other policymakers will consider the facts to be and how 
these lead to normative prescriptions for action. It enables policymakers to compare 
different perspectives for dealing with a problem, as well as to recognise how frames 
change the problem, and to critically reflect the way how they employ frames to 
                                                 
830 Cf. Fischer, 2003a. 
831 Yanow, 2003. 
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perceive problems, manage preferences, formulate solutions, settle disputes, and come 
to compromises.  
 
In order to adopt hermeneutic approach and become discoverers of frame conflicts when 
exercising SGF, policy analysts in particular need to explicitly reflect how to choose 
and use FRM in a way that enables them:  
 
- to account for different meanings and understandings of policy issues and tease out 
the logic of the situational context? 
- to grasp the meaning or significance of contemporary problems as they are 
experienced by policymakers and other relevant stakeholders? 
- to develop futures visions that enable to illuminate the different ways that arguments 
about the ways policies and problems move across different disciplines and 
discourses?  
- to explore deeper processes of meaning-making, paradigm formation and the active 
influence of obscured worldview commitments? 
- to reconstruct the alternative ways of thinking and perceiving futures and to 
recognise the existence of alternative world views and images of the future across 
cultural space and time? 
- to account for discrepancies between the tacit hidden frames of policy analysts and 
the frames which govern the subjective meaning that policymakers assign to social 
events? 
- to reconstruct and communicate the relevant frames that serve the actors involved in 
governance for SD as guideposts for analysing, knowing, arguing and acting or as 
normative-prescriptive stories that set out policy problems and the course of action 
to be taken in order to address policy problems?  
- to gain an insight on distinct framings and meaning of the main terms and topics of 
interest across cultural space and tie and to articulate them to policymakers?  
- to outline the frames providing policymakers with the direction for action, the basis 
for persuasion and the framework for the collection and analysis of data? 
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- to illuminate frames that determine what actors involved in governance for SD 
consider as the ‘facts’ and how these facts lead to normative prescriptions and 
futures images for action? 
- to compare different perspectives for dealing with a problem, i.e., to recognise how 
the frames change the problem? 
- to study the ways how different political actors employ frames to perceive problems, 
manage preferences, formulate solutions, settle disputes, and come to compromises? 
 
Hermeneutic approach to choice and use of FRM in SGF demands high creativity of 
policy analysts when searching for the new ways to use FRM that enable them to 
account for the framing and logics behind the policy discourse in order to tackle the 
epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. Finding individual 
methodical solutions in empirical praxis may represent one of the biggest challenges to 
be met by policy analysts who aim to adopt hermeneutic approach to use and choice of 
FRM in SGF. Thereby, policy analysts can draw on extensive literature about 
hermeneutic approach that has received great attention in several discourses.  
 
Within the science theory and methodological discourse, policy analysts can, among 
others, draw on works on reconstructive approach to empirical research by scholars 
such as Bohnsack832 and Grünwald.833 Within the policy analysis discourse, 
hermeneutic approach represents an increasingly popular methodological approach to 
overcome the methodological dilemma of positivist policy analysis research that is 
ignorant approach to the role of values, interests and language. In particular, policy 
analysts can draw on discussions about interpretative policy analysis834 that focuses on 
analysis of meaning and symbolism in policy-related interaction, and that strives for 
“enhanced appreciation of the variety of meanings within the policy process, the 
multiple ‘realities’ that people brought to the situation, and the ways in which power 
was systematically facilitating the representation of same insights at the cast of others.” 
835  
                                                 
832 Bohnsack, 2003. 
833 Grünwald, 2004.  
834 Finlayson, 2004a; 2004b; Bevir / Rhodes, 2004a; 2004b; Dowding, 2004; Hay, 2004; Yanow, 2002; 
2006; 2007. For more see chapter 5.2.2. 
835 Wagenaar, 2003b. 
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Policy analysts can also profit from discussions on the contextualised approach to 
policy analysis proposed Torgerson836 on the basis of the Lasswell work on contextual 
orientation in policy analysis. The approach stands for continuous examination of the 
logics of the situational context that defines and shapes the understandings of policy 
problems.837  
 
Nevertheless, hermeneutic approach to use and choice of FRM for policy advice has 
also been widely perceived as an alternative methodical solution inside the futures field. 
Mannermaa838 for example considers hermeneutic interest of knowledge as one of three 
central interests of knowledge in futures studies that is aimed at “better communication 
and understanding between people in order to make joint activity possible”839 and 
“creating subjective understanding of social reality.”840 Furthermore, also Inayatullah841 
and a camp of colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Hawaii advocate the interpretative school of futures research that focuses on creating 
shared discourses, authentic meaning and conversation. However, the level of empirical 
Foresight research that is based on the interpretative or hermeneutic methodological 
approach remains low.  
 
6.3.3. Communications Approach: Policy Analyst as Translator Across 
Discourses  
 
Mainstream policy analysts need to adopt the communications approach to choice and 
use of FRM in order to create quality SGF.842 So as to tackle the epistemological needs 
of policy analysis for governance for SD,843 they need to become translators across 
discourses who choose and use FRM in a way that allows them to do ‘epistemic 
translation’,844 i.e., to help policymakers translate knowledge and narrations into policy 
                                                 
836 Torgerson, 1985; 1986. 
837 Torgerson, 1985.  
838 Mannermaa, 2000. 
839Mannermaa, 2000, pp. 3. 
840 Mannermaa, 2000, pp. 3. 
841 Inayatullah, 1992; 1999; 2001.  
842 See Table 10.  
843 See Table 5. 
844 Fischer, 2003, pp. 232. 
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arguments and at communicating these as palatable messages across different 
discourses, i.e., for consumption by a variety of groups and interpretative communities. 
They should use FRM to create SGF that allows policymakers to cling into the existing 
and future discourses and communicate their interests across different discourses in 
form of inclusive policy arguments. In order to do so, policy analysts should explicitly 
reflect how to choose and use FRM in a way that allows them to examine how 
arguments and debates constitute and shape the various policy networks or ’policy 
communities’, i.e., who are the participants of these communities, what rhetoric they 
use, how do their members communicate across differences etc. Moreover, they should 
use FRM in a way that promotes consensual reframing of policy issues that can generate 
new capacity-giving consensus for action, which transcends the submission to 
arguments or frames of powerful actors.845  
 
In contrast, mainstream policy analysts following the positivist research logics typically 
use FRM to elaborate narratives and visions about the future (e.g., different scenarios) 
in a way that leaves the worldviews, ideologies, discourses archetypes, myth and 
metaphors unpacked. For example, when generating energy scenarios, mainstream 
policy analysts use FRM in a way that allows them to generate two types of scenarios: 
(1) scenarios at the litany level, i.e. at the level of describing the quantitative trends, 
problems without questioning assumptions beneath them, and (2) scenarios at the 
systematic level that are concerned with social causes and questioning data, however 
without contesting the paradigm in which the issue is framed. The litany and system 
type scenarios disregard how the worldviews and discourses that inform the narrations 
about the future frame an issue. Furthermore, mainstream policy analysts following 
positivist approach to Foresight typically communicate these energy scenarios in the 
form of reports that fail to illuminate, how certain worldviews and myths in themselves 
constitute both the problems and the solutions.846 Worldviews and epistemological 
positions underneath these scenarios remain unreflected and disregarded. Mainstream 
policy analysts present scenarios as if they would spoke for themselves, without 
                                                 
845 Cf. Fischer, 2003. 
846 Cf. Inayatullah, 2001. 
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accounting for the ’epistemological gap’847 between them, the policy experts (e.g., 
policymakers, scientists) and the citizens and without considering the relationship 
between the policy science and political deliberation.  
 
The above example shows that positivist approach to SGF severely limits the ability of 
policy analysts to account for the epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SD. The unreflected epistemological gap between the policy analysts, 
policy experts (policymakers, scientists) and the citizens leads to non-functioning 
communication and lacking cooperation, cooperation and joint action, to different 
interpretations of the collected data, to lacking time-information coordination (e.g., false 
information at the right time, or right information, but too late), to lacking effective 
implementation of information in (knowledge) practices, and to lacking communication, 
including limited transmission of implicit knowledge between the actors involved and 
informed by one and the same SGF exercise. 
 
In order to tackle these shortcomings, policy analysts should adopt communications 
approach to choice and use of FRM when exercising SGF. They should use FRM in a 
way that enables the emergence of a climate, within which adversarial networks can 
reframe a policy issue by “renaming the policy terrain, reconstructing interpretations of 
how things got to be as they are and proposing what can be done about them in a way 
for all groups to sit down at the same table.”848  
 
For example, policy analysts can decide to rely on the CLA849 before formulating 
energy scenarios in order to define and articulate constitutive discourses on the energy 
issue and to identify and create potential areas of consensus that moves beyond the mere 
competing policy-analytical frames or policy arguments. The four-level schema of the 
CLA can be used to situate data and statements uttered by participants of the Delphi 
study. Thereby, policy analysts can analyse the statements of participants in two steps. 
                                                 
847 The term ‘epistemological gap’ stands for the difference between the epistemological frame of the 
policy expert and the rest of society (Fischer, 2003b). It is closely related with the term ‘hermenetic 
difference’ that refers to the difference between the initial and the enhanced understanding of the text 
(Lamnek, 1995a). 
848 Fischer, 2003b, pp. 146. 
849 CLA is a FRM developed by Inayatullah with the aim to capture the multilevel discourse and its power 
for future-oriented policy argumentations. For more see Inayatullah, 2001a; 2002a; 2003; chapter 6.3.6. 
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First, they can search for problem-oriented and solution-oriented statements, i.e., the 
litany and the system type statements, both addressing the first order reality. Then, 
policy analysts can continue with the search for statements, which implicitly or 
explicitly reflect deeper, generally non-negotiable worldviews or myths that confirm or 
challenge the first order assumptions about the policy problems and solutions related to 
global energy politics. Hence they can focus on determining, how different discourses 
and futures visions inform the litany and systems type statements. In this way, policy 
analysts can, on the one hand, identify the interpretative communities, which share the 
same worldview or are informed by the same myths. They can distinguish different 
highly heterogeneous types of epistemic communities and discourse coalitions ranging 
from scientific, policy and public citizenry discourse coalitions. In this way, policy 
analysts can systematically examine how arguments and debates constitute and shape 
the various policy networks or ’policy communities’. They can for example distinguish 
the statements that exhibit neoliberal, keysianist or political economy worldview of 
economy experts and politicians on energy politics. On the other hand, by drawing on 
the CLA, they can explore the interplay between specific statements of participants of 
Delphi study and their background worldviews and myths and illuminate the ways in 
which differences between the interpretative communities become disputes.850  
 
In order to act as translators across discourses when exercising SGF, policy analysts can 
also use the CLA to systematically formulate different worldview scenarios on the basis 
of the litany- or system-type statements from the Delphi study, which are coherent with 
a particular worldview. Besides providing policymakers with the ’first order 
knowledge’,851 policy analysts can instruct them “about how the knowledge in scenarios 
is to be interpreted and where its limits lie.”852 By formulating worldview scenarios, 
policy analysts can critically illuminate the meta-dimensions of scenarios, including the 
(1) normative premises, (2) cognitive propositions, (3) the limits of systems observed, 
(4) relevance judgements made, (5) knowledge of the epistemological limitations of 
knowledge of the first order and (6) knowledge of inherent uncertainties. Furthermore, 
the worldview scenarios can help the policymakers and other stakeholders to critically 
                                                 
850 Inayatullah, 2001a; 2002a; 2003. 
851 Luhmann, 1984.  
852 Grunwald, 2004, pp. 164.  
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reflect their own discursive practices and hidden forms of communicative power behind 
their visions. In other words, they can help them investigate how the discourse they 
used to understand is complicit in their framing of the policy issue. That would enable 
them to examine the internal coherency between their arguments and different 
narrations and their worldviews.853  
 
Policy analysts can profit in several ways from communications approach to choice and 
use of FRM in SGF. First, communications approach to SGF allows policy analysts to 
promote complex learning. The reliance on SGF based on communications approach 
enables policymakers to systematically formulate policy argumentations about energy 
politics, which are highly responsive to different framings of energy policy in the 
governance discourse. Such SGF allows policymakers to create political arguments with 
the greatest possible internal coherence and with the closest fit to an ever-changing 
environment. In this way, policymakers are able to gear their arguments closely to real-
world and ordinary-language.  
 
Secondly, the adoption of communications approach to the choice and use of FRM 
enables policy analysts to account for the increasing pace and complexity of global 
change, when designing policy advice on sustainability governance. As communications 
approach enables policy analysts and policymakers to know their enemies in worldview, 
it promotes their anticipatory competence and capacity for strategic communication and 
helps them formulate dynamic argumentations, which are responsive to contemporary 
global change. In particular, policy analysts following communications approach to 
SGF have the capacity to help policymakers account for global change in the SD 
perspective. Among others, they can help them to tackle the long-term nature of global 
change. By moving from analysing the systemic and litany level of social reality (‘first 
order reality’854) to uncovering the meta-discourses and the mindsets behind these first 
order perceptions of reality, policy analysts also move from exploring short- to 
exploring long-term temporality. This is because the temporal dimension of inquiries, 
including data analysis and interpretation in form of scenarios, expands from immediate 
focus of litany type statements and historical focus of systemic statements to longer-
                                                 
853 Inayatullah, 2001a; 2002a; 2003. 
854 Luhmann, 1984.  
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term focus of paradigm and worldview statements.855 Moreover, policy analysts can 
better help policymakers account for the multi-dimensional nature of global change. The 
worldview scenarios enable and facilitate a more complex framing of policy problems 
than the litany or system type scenarios. Due to increased complexity of policy issues 
also the solutions are more complex and holistic. Policy analysts following 
communications approach to SGF can also better support policymakers in making the 
mind-shift, i.e., the worldview and identity shift in their political thinking and action. 
Communications approach to use of FRM enables to design the ’layered action steps’. 
Hence it enables policy analysts not only to define the litany and systemic types of 
action steps (e.g., energy rationing or management), but also some longer term action 
steps (e.g., changing consumption patterns, rethinking relationship between industry and 
energy) and very long term (e.g., rethinking energy, biology, natural resources).  
 
Third, communications approach to SGF allows policy analysts to account for the 
discursive, pluralist nature of policymaking. Policymakers relying on such SGF can 
better recognise the (potential) frame and worldview conflicts and increase their 
communicative competence. They can improve their policy argumentation, i.e., reframe 
the issue and policy arguments in a way that is sensitive to the rhetoric of other 
interpretative communities relevant to policy issue. Thus such SGF promotes the 
capacity of policymakers to communicate across multiple discourses, to harmonize 
interests and create a common basis for collaborative action on global scale.  
 
In order to act as translators across discourses, policy analysis in particular need to 
reflect how to choose and use FRM in a way that: 
 
-  allows for epistemic translation of results of the studies into palatable messages 
or policy arguments for consumption across the differing interpretative 
communities in a way that open up possibilities for consensus? 
- enables to explicitly account for the epistemological gaps between the actors, 
translate the future policy narratives into the languages of political settings and 
frame them in response to the living worlds of the addressees? 
                                                 
855 Inayatullah, 2001a; 2002a; 2003. 
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- allows to create links between the language of their arguments and the language 
of political setting in order to mobilise collaborative policy action? 
- to consensually reframe the futures so as to generate new capacity-giving 
consensus for action which transcends the submission to arguments or frames of 
powerful actors? 
 
Finding research methodological solutions to these questions when exercising SGF  
represents a major challenge for policy analysts. Thereby, policy analysts can rely on an 
extensive body of literature. First, policy analysts can rely on works about the derivates 
of the interpretative policy analysis that emerged after the ’argumentative turn’.856 
These derivates include several approaches that share the common interest in 
examining, how policy deliberations work and how policy arguments can be compelling 
in ways that can potentially generate new capacity-giving consensus, including the 
argumentative approach, the discursive approach, the policy epistemic approach and 
the dialectical model of policy analysis. All these approaches are inspired in one way or 
another by the theoretical concepts behind the argumentative turn, including by the 
rhetoric and communications theory, the British language analysis, the French 
poststructuralism and by the Frankfurt school of critical social theory.  
 
However, the argumentative turn was also perceived in the futures research field. 
Thereby, policy analysts striving to tackle communications approach to choice and use 
of FRM can in particular draw on body of works on critical futures research857 and on 
the layered approach858 to use of FRM. However, there is still a lack of FRM and 
examples of Foresight, which would be informed by communications approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
856 Cf. Finlayson, 2004a; 2004b; Fischer, 1993; 2003a; 2003b; Fischer / Forester, 1993; Gottweis, 2003a; 
2003b; Héritier, 1993; Yanow, 1993; 2000; 2003; 2006; 2007; Yanow / Schwartz-Shea, 2006. 
857 Slaughter, 1984; Slaughter, 1995; Slaughter, 1997; Slaughter, 1999; Slaughter 2001; Slaughter 2001a; 
Slaughter / Inayatullah, 2003.Inayatullah, 1999.  
858 Inayatullah, 2001a; 2002a; 2003. 
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6.3.4. Deliberative Approach: Policy Analyst as Facilitator of Citizen 
Deliberation 
 
In order to tackle to the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for 
SD,859 policy analysts need to adopt deliberative approach to choice and use of FRM in 
SGF.860 When conducting SGF, policy analysts thus should become facilitators of 
citizen deliberation, in which the citizens get an active cognitive function throughout the 
research process, i.e., they actively contribute to all phases of the research process. Thus 
policy analysts should choose and use FRM in a way that allows them to democratise 
the dialogue between policy experts (e.g., policy analysts, policymakers, other 
scientists) and the everyday citizens. Thus they should apply FRM in SGF to bring to 
fore grass-roots knowledge and promotes the democratic legitimisation of policy 
formulation, decision-making and policy action. They should use them to reinforce the 
capacity building of the everyday citizens and give them opportunity to actively 
participate at framing and solving the policy problems. Policy analysts, therefore, have 
to adopt reflected attitude toward their nearness or distance to research praxis and 
explicitly reflect how to choose and use FRM in a way that enables them to exchange 
their views and observations with the everyday society. 
 
Deliberative approach is informed by the methodological assumption that the scientific 
truth relies on the social consensus and not on correspondence with the objective reality. 
It represents a methodological correlate to the idea of forming transnational intelligence 
of problem solution in frame of the third transformation of democracy,861 in which the 
national governments are in concurrence with other actors inside governance, including 
civil society. Deliberative approach to SGF counsels policy analysts to question the 
traditional hierarchic understanding of relationships between policy experts (e.g., policy 
analysts, policymakers) and the citizenry, and instead establish an egalitarian 
participatory relationship. It stands for an approach to choice and use of FRM in SGF 
that enables policy analysts to radically reduce the social distance between the policy 
experts and the specialised citizens. It demands from policy analysts to use FRM in a 
                                                 
859 See Table 5.  
860 See Table 10.  
861 Fischer,2003a; 2003b. 
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way that promotes the straightforward active participation of the citizenry in all phases 
of SGF - from problem definition to Foresight dissemination - as a standard solution. 
Moreover, it calls for the necessity to use FRM in SGF in a way that informs the 
citizenry about the bases of government policies.862 In order to act as facilitators of 
citizen deliberation, policy analysts should thus choose and use FRM in SGF to 
organise and coordinate collaborative dialogue, which would enable a broad range 
actors involved with a policy issue (e.g., policy experts as well as the citizens) a 
conversation with their policy situation that might eventually lead to their frame 
reflection, to shifts in framing policy issues and to policy change. Hence policy analysts 
should choose and use FRM to promote the policymakers’ willingness to look at future 
policy issues from the citizens’ perspectives and take cognitive risk coupled with their 
openness to the uncertainty associated with frame conflicts.  
  
Deliberative approach to use of FRM in many ways differs from the commonly adopted 
participatory approach to Foresight that is informed by the quantitative research logic. 
When conducting participatory Foresight, mainstream policy analysts typically rely on a 
range of participatory methods to collect the judgements of citizenry. However, when 
they turn to the citizens, they do so only to confirm or falsify the already existing policy 
theses and policy solutions about the predefined policy problems. Hence they involve 
the citizens only to verify data analysis, but not in the phase of problem definition. 
Furthermore, when interpreting data and disseminating Foresight, they typically 
formulate expert advisory reports that are meant only for clearly identifiable elite of 
policymakers, while neglecting the necessity to inform, empower and educate the 
citizenry. Deliberative approach thus severely differs from participatory approach to 
Foresight that is characterised by the use of FRM to promote ‘non-cognitive 
participation’863 of the citizenry (i.e., participation has a ‘Türöffnerfunktion’) or the 
‘informative participation’ (i.e., bodies of knowledge of the citizenry are collected, 
without giving the citizens an active cognitive function throughout the research 
process).  
 
                                                 
862 Cf. Fischer, 1993; Hajer / Wagenaar, 2003.  
863 Hunecke, 2006. 
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This positivist attitude toward the participatory research is based on the techno-
bureaucratic and elitist notion of scientific knowledge and on the hierarchic 
understanding of the relationship between policy experts (e.g. policy analysts, 
policymakers, scientists) and the everyday citizens. Mainstream policy analysts 
involved in Foresight practices thereby tend to see themselves in the role of the 
‘philosophischer König’864. Consequently, they exercise Foresight as a ‘Steuerungsform 
von oben’,865 for they assume that they can posses the absolute, certain and value-free 
scientific knowledge about policy issues. Similarly, policymakers as the contractors and 
the main recipients of Foresight typically expect that policy analysts provide them with 
the absolute knowledge. These beliefs are informed by the methodological assumption 
that the scientific truth is based on the correspondence with an objective reality that only 
needs to be discovered.866 Thus mainstream policy analysts fail to choose and use FRM 
in a way that would enable them to design Foresight process as an interactive process 
between the policy experts and the citizenry. When exercising Foresight, they are 
instead primarily concerned how to choose and use FRM in way that enables them to 
theoretically justify the political decisions of policymakers for political debate and to 
organisationally accomplish these.867  
 
For example, when conducting Delphi study to formulate energy scenarios, policy 
analysts who are informed by the quantitative research logic typically invite exclusively 
those policy experts to participate who are acknowledged inside the mainstream 
scientific community for their scientific expertise. They typically exclude the everyday 
or specialised citizens from the Delphi study, although they will be severely influenced 
by the policy measures. Instead, policy analysts tend to collect the citizens’ comments 
after the scenarios have already been formulated for example in ‘citizen panels’ or ‘lay 
panels’ in the frame of local scenario workshops. Thereby, the citizens are confronted 
with a range of scenarios that policy analysts formulate prior to scenario workshops. 
These scenarios can take a wide range of forms, including for example the possible, the 
feasible, the desired, the worst and the best case scenario etc. After the presentation of 
                                                 
864 Steinert, 1998; Lösch, 2005.  
865Steinert, 1998. 
866 Héritier, 1993a; 1993b. 
867 Fischer, 1993.  
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these scenarios, citizen panels are typically asked to cross-examine the policy analysts 
and then retire in order to deliberate on exchanges and prepare a consensus report, in 
which they are expected to elaborate a common vision of the future energy politics in 
their region or district by referring to the themes of the workshop and by using the 
scenarios as point of reference. In the consensus report, the citizens panels are typically 
asked to consider all of the issues that bear on the topic of future energy politics at the 
local level. Their report should reflect their interests and their concerns. Finally, the 
citizens panels are asked to generate ideas on possible solutions in sense of ‘what must 
be done’ and ‘by whome’ in order to achieve the future hoped for in the common vision. 
They are also often asked to outline, where they see the central obstacles to realising the 
common vision and what thought have they given to ways of breaking down the barriers 
and making the best possible use of the potential. Typically, consensus reports of the 
citizen panels are disseminated to the general public attention as an annex to the reports 
on energy scenarios that are meant exclusively for the elite of policymakers. 
Mainstream policy analysts thus ignore the necessity to disseminate the scenarios to the 
citizens who, in deliberative democracy view, decisively influence the solving of policy 
problems, such as for example the global energy supply problem. 
 
This example shows that positivist approach to using FRM in participatory SGF 
severely limits the capacity of policy analysts to account for the epistemological needs 
of policy analysis for governance for SD. Mainstream policy analysts largely fall short 
of bringing the citizens, who increasingly gain power in frame of global governance, 
and their preferences to bear more directly on policy decisions. It deprives the citizenry 
from the essential condition of self-development and personal responsibility. The 
positivist tendencies behind mainstream policy analysts’ choice and use of FRM for 
participatory Foresight thus cause their failure to empower the citizens and provide 
them with self-help strategies to tackle the societal challenges.  
 
The heuristic for SGF advocates the necessity to adopt deliberative approach to choice 
and use of FRM in order to solve this dilemma. For example, policy analysts exercising 
SGF to create energy scenarios could decide to move beyond the focus on collecting 
merely the judgements of acknowledged experts in the frame of Delphi study. 
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Moreover, policy analysts could organise citizen panels to stimulate a broad debate and 
to bring the lay voices on future energy politics early in the SGF exercise, i.e., before 
and in the process of formulating the scenarios. Thereby, the citizens could be asked 
how they view the prospects, where do they see the obstacles to realising their vision 
and what thought have they given to ways of breaking down the barriers and making the 
best possible use of the potential. Moreover, they could be asked to seek the kinds of 
information that they find necessary to better answer these questions concerning the 
future energy policy challenges. In continuation, policy analysts would use these 
empirical data to review their research design and research questions in SGF and 
assemble additional information in order to better account for the concerns of the 
citizens when formulating energy scenarios.  
 
The methodological shift of policy analysts from quantitative to deliberative approach 
to choice and use of FRM has several epistemological benefits for SGF. First, 
deliberative approach allows policy analysts to better tackle the deep uncertainty of 
global change. In particular, it enables them to help policymakers to better capture the 
intensive nature of global change, i.e., the rise of political skills, capacities and 
responsibility of individuals and the alteration of their horizons of identification in 
patterns of global life. Deliberative approach to SGF also allows policy analysts to help 
policymakers raise the individual awareness of future problems within the broader 
community, to fuel the new individual personal responsibility of the citizens and to 
serve the interests of those with little but relevant power in governance. Moreover, 
deliberative approach to SGF enables policy analysts to better support policymakers at 
accounting for the multi-party nature of global change, for it allows for discussion with 
different social groups about the obstacles on the way to move towards sustainable 
futures, and for identification and discussion of the differences and similarities of 
problems and solutions as perceived by different groups of citizens. It also enables 
policy analysts to help policymakers account for and examine the fragmegrative 
dynamics of global energy (politics) change, which is characterised by contrasting 
simultaneous and interactive forces toward integration and fragmegration, i.e., by 
simultaneous emergence of politics at all levels of community. Nevertheless, policy 
analysts can better promote complex policy learning of policymakers, as deliberative 
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approach to SGF allows them to help policymakers to collaboratively and critically 
generate policy problems and work out policy solutions from multiple perspectives, 
including the grass-roots perspective.  
 
In order to become facilitators of citizen deliberation when exercising SGF, policy 
analysts need to critically reflect several research methodological questions, including 
how to choose and use FRM: 
 
- to support meaningful direct and active participation of actors that are affected by 
policymaking in all phases of policy process from policy formulation to policy 
evaluation?  
- to involve the citizens at all stages of policymaking, from problem definition to 
policy dissemination and to inform all relevant stakeholders about the bases of the 
governance processes? 
- to develop forums to promote and facilitate collaborative reflection and generation 
of policy problems and development of policy solutions from the grass-roots 
perspective?  
- to establish arenas, which would enable policy experts and the citizens to involve in 
intensive dialogue on policy situation that might eventually lead to reframing issues 
in a way that promotes broad consensus on the futures and on the necessary 
collective action? 
- to capture the intensive nature of global change (i.e., the rising of political skills, 
capacities and responsibility of individuals, the altering of their horizons of 
identification in patterns of global life, their increasing power)? 
- to raise the individual awareness of future problems among the citizens, which fuels 
their individual personal responsibility? 
 
In order to tackle these research methodological questions, policy analysts can draw on 
an extensive body of methodological literature. First, they can draw on the policy 
analysis discourse on deliberative approach868 emphasising the importance of citizen 
participation and of local knowledge to correct the ‘bias’, the unrecognised blinders of 
                                                 
868 Fischer, 1993; 2003b; Wagenaar, 2003b; Wagenaar / Cook, 2003; Yanow, 2003; Hajer / Wagenaar, 2003; 
Héritier, 1993.  
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rationalist policy analysis. Deliberative approach is thereby discussed as a new type of 
participatory policy analysis, which builds on the strength of the interpretive scholarship 
but brings it further by connecting policy analysis to the issue of democracy and more in 
particular deliberative democracy.869  
 
Moreover, policy analysts can draw on the literature about participatory policy analysis 
within the broader intepretivist policy analysis discourse. The participatory approach to 
policy analysis represents a symptom of the plead for democratisation of policy 
analysis, which is drawing on the Habermas’, Pateman’s and Barber’s works on 
participatory democracy on one hand and on the methodological discussions on post-
positivism on the other.870 Fischer871 thereby points out that the first attempts to develop 
participatory practices in interpretative policy analysis first took place in the third world 
in the frame of alternative social movements dealing with difficult and wicked problems 
such as environmental problems.  
 
Deliberative approach to policy analysis is also closely related with several other well-
known semi-derivates of the participatory policy analysis that are discussed inside the 
interpretivist policy analytic discourse and that thus represent promising reference 
frames for policy analysts aiming to become facilitators of citizen deliberation. They 
include the grass-roots approach, the network approach and the collaborative approach 
as well as the collaborative and participatory policy learning. Also the discourse on the 
action approach, which represents an earlier version of participatory approach, can be 
beneficial in coming to terms with the above methodological questions. In fact, the 
participatory approach to policy analysis represents a progressive version of action 
approach that is better known from the management sciences discourse. Action 
approach is characterised by horizontal and practice-near perspective (‘horizontale und 
praxisnahe Perspektive’), by scientific reflection at the level of everyday society (‘auf 
der Augenhöhe der Alltagsgesellschaft’) and by the focus on knowledge communication 
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(‘Kommunizierbarkeit’) to the everyday society, i.e., the necessity of exchangeability, 
reachability and addressability of their observations with the everyday society.872  
 
Nevertheless, policy analysts striving to become facilitators of citizen deliberation can 
also profit from the research methodological heuristic for social ecology research 
developed by Hunecke873 who identifies several cognitive operations behind the 
participatory approach to socio-ecological research. Hunecke argues that participation 
represents a central cognitive function, which needs to be explicitly accounted for and 
implemented in all phases of research process, reaching from problem formulation to 
evaluation of developed solution strategies. In his view, participation primarily serves to 
contextualise scientific insights through inclusion of science external actors. He calls for 
participation of all affected actors, who can take part in the participation processes 
either as representatives of different societal interest groups (stakeholders) or as 
individuals with specific living worlds. Hunecke874 argues that the affected actors need 
to have the status of experts of a specific living world, who act on an equal footing as 
scientific experts. Drawing on Mogalle,875 Hunecke876 also points out several benefits of 
participative approach for social research, including (1) account for living worlds and 
worldviews of all affected, (2) higher understanding and acceptance among actors of 
scientific knowledge, (3) information, control and revision possibilities for decision 
makers, (4) better identification of practical utility of research, (5) elaboration of context 
network between science and practice and development of mutual learning processes.  
 
 
6.3.5. Emancipatory Approach: Policy Analyst as Honest Broker 
 
So as to conduct SGF that is sensitive to the epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SD,877 policy analysts need to adopt emancipatory approach878 to choice 
and use of FRM in SGF.879 They have to become honest brokers, who explicitly reflect, 
                                                 
872 Hunecke, 2006. 
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what FRM-s to choose and how to apply them in order to (1) account for the signs of 
breaks and destabilisation and for the technological innovations as inherent features of 
the societal development, (2) to create a theoretical basis for the search of deviating 
alternatives and for securing the space of new ideas, and (3) to criticise the dominant 
beliefs so as to promote the ability of policymakers and the citizens to free themselves 
from the old ways of thought on the future and create new ideas that allow to make their 
own futures, i.e. transform impossible into possible.880  
 
In contrast, mainstream policy analysts following the quantitative research logics 
largely tend to base their choice and use of FRM for designing policy advice on the 
regularity principle.881 This means that they choose and use FRM to find and illuminate 
invariances, regularities and rules in the social development. These invariant rules are 
then used to predict the (alternative) future(s). The use of FRM on the basis of 
regularity principle is informed by the desire of policy analysts to forecast different 
probable futures in order to enable the policymakers to make plans and perform 
activities fitted into the desired future as perfectly as possible. The regulatory principle 
fuels the passivity of policy analysts toward the future in the sense that they see the 
future as a new yesterday.882 In consequence, mainstream policy analysts following 
positivist approach to Foresight use FRM to construct scenarios that would prepare 
policymakers and the citizens for the threats and the desirable alternatives in the future, 
without realizing and exploring the normative nature of the future, i.e., the possibility to 
make or shape the future. They force policymakers to understand the societal change as 
something bad and make them believe that they should protect themselves from its 
dangerous consequences.  
 
For example, when exercising in order to create energy scenarios, mainstream policy 
analysts typically apply FRM that enable them to use extremely narrowly defined data 
in order to find regularities in social transition. So as to explore and perceive the 
transition of society, mainstream policy analysts, among others, apply trend impact 
analysis and trend thinking to foresee the future by applying regularities from the past 
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into the future, and to anticipate the change of quantities under the condition of constant 
qualities.883 They use empirical data to discover a certain –linear, exponential, cyclical 
or wave - pattern of change in correlation between variables that in their view decisively 
determine the energy politics. When seeing the relation between technology and 
consumption habits as decisive for the price of different types of energy, they search for 
the patterns in relationships between these variables in the past. After finding a pattern 
or trend shown by a set of data, they extrapolate, i.e., they apply it for making forecasts 
about what will happen. They project the trend into the future. Numerous qualitative 
variables, which might influence the energy price, including for example the 
environmental degradation, the scarce resources, the wars or the natural catastrophes 
such as a tsunami are widely disregarded or seen as constant, when formulating the 
energy scenarios. The mainstream policy analysts also typically use econometric models 
applying several variables, parameters and equitations in order to measure the social 
transition and to express patterns in a more complicated way than the straightforward 
trend extrapolations. The energy scenarios generated on the basis of results of a trend 
impact analysis or/and of econometric research are then presented to policymakers as 
the most probable, probable, desirable energy futures.  
 
The above example shows that the use of FRM based on the regularity principle is 
highly inappropriate to meet the epistemological needs of policy analysis for 
governance for SD. First, positivist approach to using FRM clearly makes the 
representation of the non-linear (global) transition of societies incomprehensible, 
because the transition is a process that erases the rules. This is because policy analysts 
fail to account for the fact that in a continuously changing, complex world, 
policymakers can take the role of learning and acting subjects, who form and make their 
own future in a responsible way only if they succeed to redirect their worldview and 
cognitive maps, i.e., their perception into the unknown future instead into the past as 
this is the case with the positivist policy analysis. Policy analysts using FRM on the 
basis of regularity principle largely overlook structural changes or breaks. Also, by 
using FRM to extrapolate certain patterns from the past into the future, policy analysts 
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are not capable of making the problems of deep uncertainty of global change 
methodologically visible.  
 
Hence policy analysts aiming to conduct SGF need to emancipate themselves from 
using and choosing FRM in a way that enables them to explore future as a continuation 
of the past or present. Instead, the research methodological heuristic for SGF advises 
policy analysts to adopt emancipatory approach to use and choice of FRM that 
explicitly addresses the failures in choice and use of the scientific methods that is based 
on the regularity principle. In contrast to quantitative research logics described above, 
policy analysts relying on emancipatory approach ground their choice and use of FRM 
on the epistemological premise that the society is subjected to continuous and non-
linear socio-cultural change due to which the future will not be like the past.884 In other 
words, when choosing and using FRM for SGF, policy analysts need to account for the 
fact that policymakers cannot search for the solutions to their perceived problems in the 
past and the present. They also cannot solve the anticipated problems by extrapolating 
the customary and trusted patterns of resolution from the past into and present into the 
future. 
 
Policy analysts can adopt different methodological solutions in order to overcome the 
above shortcomings of positivist approach to choice and use of FRM for generating 
energy scenario. Policy analysts can for example use scenarios based on the regularity 
principle as reference scenarios, i.e., as business-as-usual descriptions of the future for 
stimulating further vision-building in the frame of the scenario workshops or to start 
constructing the truly interesting alternative worldview scenarios. Policy analysts can 
also use a range of further FRM to construct energy scenarios in emancipatory way, i.e., 
to critically reflect and deconstruct the prevailing concepts inside the contemporary 
energy politics discourses. They can use the CLA885 to locate and take apart those 
concepts inside the relevant discourses for discussion of energy policy, which serve as 
“the axioms or rules for a period of thought, those concepts which command the 
unfolding of an entire epoch of metaphysics.”886 The CLA allows them to deconstruct 
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the foot-prints behind the texts, i.e., to take a critical thinking gesture towards the 
speech. Policy analysts can also use the CLA to explore the competition of ideas and 
viewpoints and to systematically expose policymakers to competing policy arguments 
made by their opponents and stakeholders.  
 
The adoption of emancipatory approach to choosing and using FRM in SGF enables 
policy analysts to account for several epistemological needs of governance for SD. 
First, they are able to make the deep uncertainty of global change as a social matrix of 
meaning methodically ascertainable. By departing from exploring the non-existent and 
unknown in conventional patterns of reasoning and opening themselves to new, 
integrative, multiple-scale, north-south sensitive, human and natural systems 
perspective on global change, can better help policymakers account for the continuous 
unpredicted new emergencies due to global change such as the emergence of 
transnational society. They can also better help policymakers account for the fluid, 
pluralist and deeply uncertain nature of sustainability policies. By advocating the use of 
FRM in a way that enables to critically reflect the dominant beliefs, emancipatory 
approach also enables policy analysts to aid policymakers account for the pluralist and 
discursive nature of policy making and for multiperspective and multi-issue nature of 
global change. Moreover, it allows them to promote complex change learning of 
policymakers, promoting their critical reflection of and emancipation from their existing 
ways of thought. By striving to create opportunities for policymakers and the citizens to 
free themselves from old ways of thought and to create new ideas about the future, 
emancipatory approach to use and choice of FRM in SGF not only makes the plurality 
of SD discourse not only visible, but uses the differences as inspiration to de-routinize 
the routinized policy actions and political thinking and find new, harmonic solutions to 
policy problems. 
 
In order to do methodological shift towards emancipatory approach to SGF, policy 
analysts need to explicitly reflect, how to choose and use FRM in order: 
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- to deconstruct the routinized ways and the dominant categories of futures 
thinking, to create a hypothetical space of intelligent breaking of the rules and to 
find innovative and inclusive ways of political thinking and policy action? 
- to deconstruct the routinized social relationships and interactions and expose 
them to stress of mind deregulation, to differentiate the systems and to make 
policymakers aware of the unaware?  
- to capture how ideas and discourses can have a force of their own independently 
of particular actors and how the actors themselves are properties of the 
discourses? 
- to reflect upon discourses on futures not only as a social or political reality, but 
also as a constitutional force of much of the reality that has to be explained? 
- to reflect upon discourses not only “as a social or political reality”, but as a 
constitutional force of much of the reality that has to be explained?  
- to capture how discourses of interpretative policy communities generate 
permissible and advisable courses of action, while excluding or discouraging 
others? 
- to locate and take apart those concepts within the discourses that serve as the 
axioms or rules of futures thought and that command the unfolding of entire 
epoch of metaphysics? 
 
To answer these complex research methodological questions, policy analysts can rely 
on an extensive literature about the critical or poststructuralist approach. Both 
approaches are commonly conceived as the counterpart to reconstructive interpretative-
hermeneutic approach. Inayatullah for example distinguishes critical approach from 
interpretative approach by pointing towards the post-structuralist science theory 
tradition behind it.887 However, according to Angermüller,888 such distinction between 
the hermeneutic principle of social research and the critical or poststructuralist principle 
of policy research is somewhat misleading, because it disregards the synergies and 
overlappings between both approaches. According to Lamnek,889 both methodological 
principles represent derivates of one and the same interpretative paradigm that 
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represents a widely, adopted and accepted substantial theoretical position 
(‘grundlagentheoretische Position’) behind the qualitative methodology. Moreover, the 
discourse on deconstructivist approach to social research offers extensive input about 
the above methodological questions. It draws on Derrida’s890 concept of 
‘deconstruction’ that represents a research methodological answer to the crisis of 
structuralism. Policy analysts can also draw on Steinert`s891 discussion of ‘Befreiungs-
Wissen’ as an alternative to socially privileged ‘Ordnungs-Wissen’ that is primarily 
concerned with conceptions of ‘good order’ and ‘good governance’ for inherently 
chaotic society. Drawing on Steinert,892 the research aimed at generating ‘Befreiungs-
Wissen’ typically strives to abolish or at least attenuate the memorials structured society 
and supplement the ‘right’ terms and concepts with reflected and criticised terms and 
concepts.  
 
Nevertheless, policy analysts can also profit from the discourse on emancipatory 
approach in the futures field. Drawing on Habermas’ differentiation of interest of 
knowledge into technical, hermeneutic and emancipatory interest, Mannermaa893 
conceives the emancipatory interest of knowledge as the most important one when 
using FRM. He argues that “an emancipatory study does not simply study ‘probable’ 
developments or increase common understanding but searches for ‘deviating’ 
alternatives and criticizes even strongly dominant beliefs in order to give space to new 
ideas.”894 However, while the emancipatory approach to policy analysis represents an 
acknowledged research methodological approach in the policy analysis as well as in the 
futures field, it does not yet have a secure footing in the empirical policy analysis 
practice.  
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6.3.6. Transdiciplinary Approach: Policy Analyst as Transdisciplinary 
Knowledge Agent 
 
In order to exercise quality SGF that accounts for the epistemological needs of policy 
analysis for governance for SD,895 policy analysts should adopt transdisciplinary 
approach896 to choice and use of FRM. They need to act as transdisciplinary knowledge 
agents who aid policymakers take multiple perspectives and to coordinate, integrate and 
disseminate different types of knowledge across sectors, disciplines and time in order to 
find innovative governance solutions for tackling policy problems in a way that 
promotes SD.897 Thereby, they need to tackle a twofold challenge. First, due to high 
dynamic and complexity of global change and of policy problems, the research findings 
and knowledge are continuously contested. Thus policy analysts are permanently 
confronted with the problem of obsolete research findings and with an ongoing demand 
for new transdisciplinary types of knowledge that do not yet exist. Secondly, when there 
are existing bodies of knowledge that policy analysts can draw on in order to help 
policymakers tackle increasingly complex policy problems of multi-issue nature, then 
this knowledge is highly fragmented and needs to be integrated in a meaningful whole.  
 
In order to tackle these research methodological challenges, policy analysts should 
emancipate themselves from the positivist habit to ground their choice and use of FRM 
on the causality principle898, i.e., on the principle of sufficient cause. They should 
distance themselves from using FRM for finding the sufficient cause while seeing the 
rest of universe as irrelevant. Also, they need to distance themselves from using FRM in 
order to account for the futures exclusively from perspectives that are determined by the 
formal technical borders of perception (e.g., by geographic, disciplinary and sectoral 
perspectives) and naively multiply these without accounting for how a particular view 
of the worlds precludes or restricts the possibility of understanding reality.  
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Instead, when exercising SGF, policy analysts need to start choosing and using FRM in 
a way that enables them to overcome the disciplinary, geographic and other formal 
boundaries of knowledge and to account for the future in a holistic way. The use of 
FRM in the SGF exercises has to allow for integration of the marginalised with the 
principle points of view. In fact, knowledge integration represents the central cognitive 
operation of the transdisciplinary knowledge generation that demands very high level of 
cognitive integration to find solutions to policy problems that are not defined within 
science but instead derive from the living worlds.899 Transdiscipinary approach thus 
stands for productive organisation of research process in which not only scientists from 
diverse disciplines, but also other societal actors from relevant fields of practice 
cooperate in all phases of social research with the aim to produce problem oriented 
knowledge.  
 
Mainstream policy analysts are increasingly aware of the relevance of providing 
multiple perspectives on a research issue when exercising Foresight.900 They strive to 
adopt the multi-perspective approach to use of FRM, i.e., they include as numberless 
perspectives as possible when collecting, analysing and interpreting data in order to 
generate holistic knowledge. Thereby, they tend to choose and use the perspectives and 
sources for illuminating their research objects (e.g., single policy problems) and the 
contextual conditions on the basis of purely formal and technical borders of scientific 
discourse such as for example by geographic, sectoral and disciplinary borders as well 
as by personal preferences of policy analysts. Policy analysts thus typically adopt the 
more restricted multidisciplinary approach and the interdisciplinary approach to 
Foresight that are characterised by a lower level of knowledge integration than 
transdisciplinary approach. When taking the multidisciplinary approach to Foresight, 
policy analysts strive to address an externally determined problem and process it by 
different disciplines. The focal point of knowledge generation lies within the single 
disciplines. When adopting the interdisciplinary research, the problem definition takes 
place in participation of different scientific disciplines. Policy analysts strive to process 
the problem by all participating disciplines.  
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Moreover, when choosing and using FRM for exercising Foresight, mainstream policy 
analysts often tend to integrate different bodies of knowledge in a way that is insensitive 
to its temporal and epistemic nature. This research habit is informed by the positivist 
belief in the absoluteness of scientific knowledge, which causes that policy analysts 
largely fail to contextualise the knowledge collected. For example, policy analysts 
usually invite economists from all over the world in order to account for the economic 
perspective in the Foresight exercise. However, they widely fail to recognise different 
paradigms ranging from neoliberal to political economy paradigm that can inform the 
economists. Because they ignore the worldview differences among the economists that 
lead to differences in perceiving the policy problems and the solutions, they fail to 
integrate the knowledge of economists in a coherent way.  
 
Nevertheless, when integrating distinct bodies of knowledge, mainstream policy 
analysts tend to disregard the problems of language and rhetoric that occur because 
disciplinary, sectoral and other discourses have their own languages to treat one and the 
same research object. In particular, the mainstream policy analysts are insensitive to two 
problems that are related to translation and that occur when distinct disciplines and 
sectors observe the same research object from different perspectives. First, they are 
insensitive to the terminological problems which occur when the same term is used for 
different phenomena or when the same phenomena are labelled by different terms. 
Secondly, mainstream policy analysts integrating knowledge tend to disregard the 
problem of different levels for description of phenomena. Each of these levels follows a 
distinct 'Erklärungsanspruch' that results in different integration levels of knowledge.901 
 
So as to become transdisciplinary knowledge agents when conducting SGF, policy 
analysts, therefore, need to severely rethink the positivist research habits described 
above. They need to explicitly reflect the methodological questions regarding the 
integration of fragmented pieces of knowledge and perspectives (e.g., natural and social 
sciences, economic and social and environmental perspectives) in all phases of research 
process. In particular, they need to explicitly reflect how to choose and use FRM: 
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- to transcend the often implicit disciplinary, sectoral and geographic borders of 
highly fragmented bodies of knowledge and to define and enhance the relevant 
bodies of knowledge and perspectives on the basis of the living-world problems?  
- to integrate knowledge in a way that is sensitive to different descriptive levels of 
single disciplinary, sectoral and other social discourses? 
- to integrate relevant perspectives and bodies of knowledge in a way that is sensitive 
to temporality, norms and epistemics behind the distinct bodies of knowledge?  
- to integrate knowledge in a way that is sensitive to terminological differences 
between different sectoral and disciplinary discourses? 
- to capture the privileged as well as the marginalised perspectives on policy issues to 
be addressed at governance level? 
- to synthesise the expert-scientific disparate knowledge on transdisciplinary policy 
problems?  
 
Policy analysts can draw on an extensive literature on the transdisciplinary or 
integrated approach in order to answer these complex methodological questions. The 
increasingly popular discourse on transdisciplinary approach to social ecological 
research902 for example delineates a range of methodological questions and solutions so 
as to support vertical and horizontal integration of knowledge in a way that is sensitive 
to the world as framed through sustainability lens. In particular, Hunecke’s903 phase-
model of transdisciplinary knowledge production represents a promising meta-
theoretical frame for methodological reflection. The model was originally developed to 
analyse the social ecological research processes and to develop a research 
methodological heuristic for the social ecological research. It distinguishes three phases 
of transdisciplinary research process, including (1) the problem formulation, (2) the 
problem examination, and (3) the evaluation of the developed problem-solving 
strategies. The problem formulation phase concerns the division of the problem in 
several sub-areas to be processed with distinct methods. It thus constitutes common 
ground for formulation of the research questions. The departing point thereby represents 
either the living-world problems or the theoretical problems.904 The problem 
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examination includes the problem segmentation ('Problemzerlegung') that is aimed at 
processing and integrating the sub-areas of the problem and at translating the inquiries 
into a practically usable form. It demands communication skills, processing of explicitly 
living-world problems and adaptation of the scientific work on the context of praxis.905 
The evaluation of developed problem-solving strategies focuses on assuring the 
progress in knowledge and on benchmarking the successful strategies. It can be 
conducted at two levels: at the level of application concerned with the reception of the 
research results by the addressees and at the implications level concerned with the 
degree of the intended interpretations, of the use of research results and of the wanted 
consequences. 906  
 
Policy analysts struggling to tackle transdisciplinary approach to SGF can also draw on 
Inayatullah’s discussion of the CLA907 within the futures field. This FRM offers a 
matrix that distinguishes four levels of description for meaningful synthesising of the 
fragmented pieces of knowledge. The matrix represents a promising reference frame for 
managing and analysing data across layers of thinking after a great deal of divergent 
data on the research subject has been articulated. It enables policy analysts aiming to 
inform governance for SD to situate data at different levels of description and to explore 
how the way in which one frames a problem changes the policy solution. By using the 
matrix, policy analysts can systematically move up and down multiple layers so as to 
integrate analysis and synthesis and sideways through worldview level in order to 
integrate discourses, ways of knowing and worldviews. On one hand, the CLA matrix 
allows policy analysts to change between four levels of thinking in the vertical 
direction: the litany level (i.e., the level of quantitative trend and problem, the common 
rationality level), the systems level (i.e., the social causes level), the worldview level 
(i.e., the structure /discursive level) and the myth level908 (i.e., the metaphor level) of 
social reality. It also allows policy analysts to move between the levels in the horizontal 
direction (e.g., between different worldviews framing the issue) when analysing and 
interpreting empirical data. 
                                                 
905 Mogalle, 2001.  
906 Huncke, 2006. 
907 Inayatullah, 2001; 2001a; 2003. See chapter 6.3.3. 
908 Inayatullah, 2001; 2003.  
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The CLA matrix, therefore, enables policy analysts to control the consistency between 
the ‘first order explanations’909 (the litany/common rationality level and the social 
causes level) and the ‘second order explanations’910 (the discursive and the 
metaphorical/mythical level).911 It allows them to meaningfully integrate different 
pieces of knowledge from the worldview and myth perspective while preventing that 
this would lead to ‘holism’, which neglects the significance of the lower levels of social 
reality, i.e., the litany or systems levels. The matrix also enables to consider the 
temporality of knowledge. According to Inayatullah,912 the temporal dimension expands 
as policy analysts move down the levels of thinking. While the litany level concerned 
with quantitative trends is more immediate, the social causes level is more historical. 
The structure level is concerned with discourses and worldviews that legitimise the 
structures is much longer term. The metaphor/myth level is indeed a temporal, focused 
on notions of primordial identity.913  
  
                                                 
909 Luhmann, 1984.  
910 Luhmann, 1984. 
911 Inayatullah, 2003. 
912 Inayatullah, 2003.  
913 Inayatullah, 2003.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
Ever since 1997, SD represents an overarching objective of the EU, guiding all its 
policies and actions. However, there is still tremendous amount of conflict and 
disagreement with regards to management and futures of governance for SD. 
Policymakers in the EU thus increasingly turn to policy analysts for a reasoned 
knowledge-based policy advice. In its ideal form, policy analysis as a sub-discipline of 
political science applies theory and analytical methods in order to sharpen the focus of 
policymakers and identify critical issues and alternatives for public action. In particular, 
Foresight approach and FRM represent progressively more popular means to produce 
policy-relevant strategic knowledge. However, in practice, policy analysts lack the 
capacity to provide quality ex-ante policy advice on the ways to adapt governance for 
more SD. They often fail to revise and adapt the mainstream conceptions of policy 
analysis and their traditional role in policymaking in light of the new knowledge needs 
of policymakers involved in governance for SD. 
 
The thesis offers a first comprehensive analysis of this knowledge gap between 
policymakers and policy analysts involved in governance for SD at the second order 
observation level. It provides an in-depth comparative analysis of cognitive systems of 
policymakers and policy analysts in terms of their insight and blindness to frame and to 
study governance in the SD perspective. On this basis, the thesis critically discusses the 
applicative potential of Foresight approach and of FRM to bridge the knowledge gap 
between policy analysis and governance for SD. It proposes a comprehensive reference 
frame for SGF that is designed to enhance the theoretical, epistemological and 
methodological reflexivity and self-control of policy analysts exercising SGF. The 
frame should allow policy analysts to rethink and adapt their theoretical, 
epistemological and research methodological reference frame for using the FRM in a 
way that enhances their ability to aid policymakers perceive governance in the SD 
perspective. 
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All in all, the thesis argues that in order to aid policymakers adjust governance for more 
SD, mainstream policy analysts need to severely refocus their research priorities and 
reorient themselves towards new research frontiers. So as to help policy analysts tackle 
this complex task, the thesis first proposes a typology of cognitive barriers and 
challenges of policymakers in terms of perceiving governance in the SD perspective. 
The typology highlights that policymakers encounter three types of cognitive barriers to 
framing governance through sustainability lens which have to date remained largely out 
of sight of mainstream policy analysts due to their restricted positivist theoretical and 
methodological approach to policy analysis. 
 
First, policymakers in the EU severely struggle to tackle the discursive nature of the SD 
concept. The SD concept is pluralist and dialogue-based. It is characterised by more 
than three hundred partly competing and continuously changing definitions, which do 
not allow a blueprint for operationalisation and implementation of SD in policymaking. 
However, policymakers tend to disregard the dynamic nature of the SD concept because 
they conceive it as a temporally static concept. They also fail to position the SD concept 
within the broader political discourse on competing development paradigms and open it 
for disputes about quality of life. This is because they tend to frame SD as an absolute, 
ideal end-state of societal development. Moreover, policymakers exhibit insensitivity 
for the often opposing interpretations SD concept by policymakers and stakeholders 
because they tend to understand SD as a perspective independent concept. They thus 
encounter severe political controversies and deadlock situations when mainstreaming 
SD into policymaking.  
 
Secondly, the typology argues that policymakers struggle to adapt governance for more 
SD because the concept severely challenges the predominant modes of political 
thinking. The SD concept demands a new dimensionality of political thinking and 
argumentation. Policymakers need to rethink the temporal, spatial, fact, dynamic, power 
and ethical horizons of their political thinking in order to frame and understand 
governance in the SD perspective. For example, by arguing for the intergenerational 
justice and for the long-term well being of the humanity, the SD concept severely 
challenges the temporal dimension of mainstream political thinking that is characterised 
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by the structural preference of the present in contemporary democracy and by the short-
term, profit-oriented neoliberal view of world trade and global economy. By referring to 
intragenerational interdependence and by advocating the social justice for all 
humankind, the SD concept challenges the spatial dimension of mainstream political 
thinking that is commonly based on the absolute notion of space, resulting in a state-, 
local-, euro- and ethnocentric political thinking of policymakers. It highlights the need 
to redirect political attention toward global extensive interconnections across space and 
to consider a bigger global picture that is often contested and ignored.  
 
By advocating the necessity to account for the intensive interdependence and trade-offs 
between the social, economic and environmental dimension of policymaking, the 
concept of SD challenges the fact-orientation of mainstream political thinking that is 
commonly based on the principle of the necessary and sufficient cause. In particular, it 
challenges the resulting issue-centred perspective on policymaking, the sectoral 
compartmentalisation of regulatory responsibilities and the primacy of the economic 
perspective in political thinking of policymakers. The SD concept also contests the way 
in which policymakers think societal change. By arguing for the necessity to sustain the 
natural life support systems of the planet, and to account for the limits of growth as well 
as for the possibility of a system’s break down, the concept contests the tendency of 
policymakers to rest their cognitive function upon the principle of conservation of rules. 
In particular, it challenges their preference for trend thinking postulating societal 
development as unchanging (non)change, for futurism, for linear model of growth, and 
their cultural contempt to see the success in the past as the assurance for future growth. 
 
By advocating the multi-actor and multi-stakeholder approach in policymaking and 
calling for a new power ambience of policymaking, the concept of SD challenges the 
power dimension of mainstream political thinking. In particular, it contests the 
traditional, hierarchic concept of policymaking as ‘governing’ and the positivist notion 
of policymaking that disregards the importance of social values of people and of the 
narrative storytelling about policy problems. By calling for the re-privatisation of 
ethical responsibility of each and everyone for common wealth, the concept of SD 
challenges the ethical dimension of mainstream political thinking. It demands from 
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policymakers to reconsider the concept of representative democracy and the ‘I will of 
you will’ worldview, for these notions close their view for the micro-ethical perspective 
of policymaking. 
 
Nevertheless, the typology identifies a third type of cognitive challenges that 
policymakers struggle to tackle when adapting governance for more SD. They concern 
the capacity of policymakers to account for the implications of global change in the SD 
perspective. The thesis points out that policymakers typically rely on theories of IR that 
derive from old paradigm thinking such as for example the realist, the liberalist, the 
pluralist and the globalist theory of IR in order to draw a map of changing patterns of 
global affairs. While these theories allow them to observe change within existing global 
political structures and systems, they limit their ability to account for the temporal, 
spatial, fact, dynamic, power and ethical horizons of global change that are considered 
relevant in the SD perspective.  
 
The typology draws on the global governance theory in order to systematically point out 
the main cognitive challenges of observing global change through sustainability lens. 
The typology argues that policymakers need to sensitise their thinking of global change 
for the long-term futures perspective in order to better adjust governance for more SD. 
In particular, they need to account for the acceleration of the pace of politics at all levels 
of community, for the confounded spatial and temporal dimensions of global 
governance, and for the increasing fluidity and dynamic nature of sovereignty of states. 
Furthermore, in order to account for the spatial underpinnings of global change in the 
SD perspective, policymakers should focus on observing the increasingly nonterritorial, 
non-linear and dialectic nature of simultaneous shifts of authority toward transnational 
and sub-national level, the simultaneous forthcoming of the extensive interconnections 
across space, and the intensive interconnections reaching into the level of personal 
conduct.  
 
The typology also argues that policymakers should account for the multi-issue horizon 
of global change in order to better adapt governance for more SD. In particular, they 
should study the reciprocal interdependence between market and state and examine the 
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global governance patterns as systems centred on multiple issues. Moreover, they 
should observe multiple dimensions of changing patterns of global affairs, including the 
civil dimension of global change (e.g., the emergence of global civil society), the 
informational dimension (e.g., the growing importance of epistemic authority), the 
social dimension of global change (e.g., the emergence of new intellectual and political 
elites) and the environmental dimension of global change (e.g., th emergence of 
environmental governance) in addition to the economic dimension of global change. 
Furthermore, policymakers should take into account the non-linear dynamic of change 
in patterns of global political affairs. They should adopt a differentiated view on 
societal and economic growth. They should pay attention not only to the dialectic nature 
of economic globalisation with contradictory effects for the human well-being, but also 
to the limits that global order as an all-encompassing and organic whole poses to growth 
due to its universal interdependence on the biosphere. In this way, policymakers would 
be able account for the natural and social limits to global economic growth and for the 
importance of the self-sustaining nature of societal growth.  
 
Nevertheless, the typology points out that in order to account for the power dimension 
of patterns of global affairs in the SD perspective, policymakers should focus on 
studying the ongoing extension of democratic space in the patterns of global 
cooperative interactions, i.e. the multi-party nature of changing patterns of global affairs 
due to emergence of multiple spheres of authority and due to delocalisation of the 
authority of territorial states to subnational, transnational and non-governmental level. 
They should also explicitly examine the rising democratic and normative potential of 
diversified and engaged realm of global civil society, the increasing power of hyper-
capitalist elites, and the rising epistemic authority of emerging global informational 
elites such as for example epistemic communities and think-tanks. Finally, the typology 
points out that policymakers should account for the micro-ethical dimension of global 
change in order to better adapt governance for more SD. They should study the 
intensive nature of globalisation that is reaching into the level of personal conduct, i.e., 
they should frame global change as a bottom-up process. In particular, they should 
account for the rising skills and capacities of individuals and the alteration of their 
ethical horizons of identification due to patterns of global life. 
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Mainstream policy analysts exhibit only limited capacity to help policymakers tackle 
the above three types of complex cognitive barriers to and challenges of observing 
governance in the SD perspective. This is because they largely rely on theoretical 
approaches that are informed by the old paradigm thinking and by its derivates, the 
positivist and the critical rationalist mode of thought, which severely restrict their view 
on the relevant analytical dimensions of policy analysis for governance for SD. In order 
to aid policy analysts revise and improve their theoretical approaches, the thesis thus 
proposes a typology of shortcomings of mainstream theoretical approaches to policy 
analysis for governance for SD. The typology should allow them to bring relevant 
theoretical assumptions to surface for conscious critical reflection.  
 
The typology of theoretical shortcomings first points out that mainstream policy 
analysts struggle to help policymakers account for the discursive nature of the SD 
concept because they tend to adopt a highly fragmented, determinist and reductionist 
notion of policymaking. They study the policy process as a rationality project, in which 
political ideas such as the SD concept are conceived as serving the mere legitimisation 
of power and interests and as having only a peripheral function for real policy change. 
Moreover, policymakers tend to rely on the one-way cycle model of policymaking as a 
process that consists of rigid and closed phases that follow each other as if on assembly 
line, and that produce single, bounded, independent and invariable policies to achieve 
fixed policy goals. In this way, mainstream policy analysts remain widely blind for the 
struggles over the concept of SD as a mode of influence. They also fail to observe and 
explore the sustainability policies as self-generating and moving targets in need of 
constant public justification and negotiation. They remain blind for their embedding in 
policy landscape as well as for their sectoral, functional and international 
interweavement and their macro effects on the whole system.  
 
Secondly, the typology highlights that mainstream policy analysts lack the capacity to 
aid policymakers at making sustainability shift in their political thinking because they 
tend to rely on restricted notions of policy learning and knowledge, which derive from 
the positivist and critical rationalist line of thought. Mainstream policy analysts tend to 
frame policy learning either in behaviourist perspective, i.e., as a transfer of the 
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available ‘know-that’ knowledge from the heads of policy analysts to the heads of 
policymakers. They conceive information and knowledge as static goods, i.e., as 
commodities or substances that can be transmitted with the help of an appropriate 
stimulus that evokes the conditioned reflex of policymakers to adapt to external world. 
Such behaviourist stimulus-response notion of policy learning results in a highly elitist 
non-critical self-understanding of the role of policy analysts in the policy process. They 
see themselves as ‘Philosophenkönige’ who can produce absolute knowledge about 
what policymakers should do to adapt governance for more SD. Policy analysts thus 
typically focus on studying the efficiency and effectiveness of political programmes in 
order to provide frontal presentations and instruction and/or to elaborate expert reports 
that aim to stimulate the adaptation policy learning of policymakers. Thereby, they see 
policymakers’ brain as a black box. They leave the cognitive maps of policymakers 
largely out of sight. Cnsequently, they fail to offer targeted policy support that would 
enable policymakers to bring their reference frames and methods of perception to 
surface for conscious examination in order to make a sustainability shift in their 
political thinking. Alternatively, mainstream policy analysts follow the more 
progressive cognitivist notion of learning that frames policy learning as a problem-
solving process. In this perspective, they recognise the necessity to support 
policymakers at processing and transforming information into policy knowledge. 
Accordingly, they focus on defining the policy problems and on providing policymakers 
with the ‘know-how’ knowledge on the ways to solve them. They take the role of tutors 
who predefine policy problems and then help policymakers apply the right procedures 
and methods to solve them. However, such notion of policy learning prevents policy 
analysts to promote the capacity of policymakers to critically reflect their observation 
processes and question their horizons of political thinking in the SD perspective.  
 
Nevertheless, the typology argues that mainstream policy analysts lack the capacity to 
help policymakers improve their ability to account for global change in the SD 
perspective because they, too, rely on theories of IR deriving from old paradigm 
thinking in order to make sense of change in the global political affairs. By assuming 
that global affairs form a static order or structure that changes according to a certain 
pattern and that is manageable and controllable, policy analysts fail to help 
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policymakers account for the long-term futures horizon of global change. Moreover, 
policy analysts tend to depict and examine the patterns of global affairs as a two-level 
international system that is characterised by a clear division between the foreign and 
domestic affairs. In this way, they fail to help policymakers account for the truly global 
dimension of global change, i.e., for the transnational scope of change in patterns of 
global affairs in focus of the SD community. When studying global governance 
patterns, mainstream policy analysts, furthermore, tend to assume that these evolve 
around narrow single issues, and that they are primarily determined by the global 
market. Such an issue-centred and causalist notion of IR limits their capacity to assist 
policymakers at accounting for the multi-issue nature of global change. Mainstream 
policy analysts also lack the ability to aid policymakers at tackling the complex and 
dialectic nature of global change because they tend to frame growth dynamics as a one-
way linear process. Moreover, policy analysts fail to support policymakers at 
accounting for the multi-actor horizon of global political cooperation because they 
assume that sovereignty of states represents an absolute and static societal phenomenon, 
that governments and states are the essential underpinnings of the world’s organisation, 
and that cooperative political arrangements are formed by national interests. 
Nevertheless, the typology points out that by relying on the notion of individuals as 
peripheral and primarily rationally motivated actors in the world politics, policy 
analysts lack the capacity to help policymakers account for the micro-ethical dimension 
of global change that are considered relevant in the SD perspective. 
 
The typology of shortcomings of theoretical approaches taken by mainstream policy 
analysts in order to help policymakers overcome their cognitive barriers to observing 
governance in the SD perspective allows to aggregate three types of epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. These include: (1) the need to observe 
the discursive nature of policymaking in order to help policymakers account for 
discursive nature of the SD concept, (2) the need to account for the processes by which 
policymakers acquire knowledge in order to support them at sustainability mind-shift in 
the political thinking, (3) and the need to tackle the deeply uncertain nature of global 
change in order to help policymakers account for it in the SD perspective. These 
epistemological needs represent blind spots in the mainstream policy analysts’ 
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observations. So as to improve the epistemological value of policy analysis for 
governance for SD in the empirical practice, policy analysts thus need to exercise policy 
analysis that is sensitive to these epistemological needs. 
 
The thesis argues that policy analysts can profit from using the Foresight approach and 
FRM in order to meet the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for 
SD. Thereby, they need to emancipate themselves from the quantitative research logic 
that fuels the unreflected attitude towards their choice and use of FRM and that limits 
their capacity to adapt their research habits to the epistemological needs. However, the 
positivist logic commonly informs the educational programmes on policy analysis, the 
methodological discourse on Foresight and a large part of the empirical Foresight 
practice. For example, students are typically taught to use rigorous toolboxes of FRM 
that are conceived as neutral research techniques. They have little or no training in 
understanding the normative and interpretative foundations of FRM and in studying the 
social setting to which they are to be applied. The mainstream methodological debates 
on Foresight often fail to distinguish between the methodology (i.e., research logic) and 
the methods (i.e., research paths). This leads to lacking scepticism of policy analysts 
towards their own research logic and to their limited ability to use and choose FRM in a 
self-reflexive way. In empirical practice, policy analysts informed by positivist research 
logic typically assume that their choice and use of FRM is perspective independent, that 
the quantitative research is less scientific as quantitative research, that the existing 
research logics and methods are immune to conceptual shifts, that the quality of 
research improves with improved efficiency of single research methods, and that mixing 
the FRM automatically leads to better research results. Positivist research logic hence 
fuels the standardised, operationalised and unreflected approach to using FRM in policy 
analytical Foresight, which is highly insensitive to epistemological needs of policy 
analysts aiming to inform governance for SD. Also the systematisations of FRM are 
largely informed by the quantitative research logic. Consequently, they fail to account 
for the users of FRM as well as for the epistemological value of FRM. They are 
typically so engrossed with details and nuances in the varieties of FRM that policy 
analysts end up with a map which is almost as tangled and confusing as the jungle of 
FRM itself.  
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In order to help policy analysts choose and use FRM for exercising SGF that is sensitive 
to epistemological needs of policy analysis, the thesis thus proposes a meta-
epistemological and meta-theoretical frame for SGF. It argues that policy analysts 
exercising SGF need to continuously (1) examine the epistemological value of FRM for 
meeting the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD, (2) 
critically reflect the epistemological frame behind their practice of SGF and the related 
research interest and research goals of SGF, (3) examine their own research 
methodological logic and approaches to using FRM in relation to the epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for governance for SD, (4) and adapt them in a way that 
enables them to better tackle these epistemological needs.  
 
In order to promote such epistemological and research methodological reflexivity and 
self-control of policy analysts aiming to exercise SGF, the meta-epistemological and 
meta-methodological frame for SGF includes three elements. The paradigmatic 
typology of FRM aims at helping policy analysts to critically examine the 
epistemological value of FRM for SGF. It is based on the assumption that policy 
analysts can rely on any type of FRM for exercising SGF as long as they apply them in 
a way that is sensitive to their epistemological value. The typology hence brings the 
paradigmatic foundations of FRM to surface for conscious examination. It classifies 
FRM into three categories, each referring to a distinct generation of futures thinking in 
the futures research field.  
 
The first generation FRM are informed by the positivist desire to forecast the future, 
i.e., to make plans and to perform activities fitted to the ‘forecasted’ futures as perfectly 
possible. They include the Forecasting methods that have primary epistemological value 
within the quantitative research methodological approach to SGF as they enable policy 
analysts to explore the future and the societal change in the old paradigm perspective, 
i.e., as a linear process. The second generation FRM include different scenario 
techniques that are informed by futures thinking which acknowledges and embraces the 
uncertainty of the future and the existence of a range of possible alternatives, more or 
less probable, more or less desirable. They are primarily aimed at connecting together 
various driving forces, trends, and conditioning factors so as to envisage alternative 
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futures. They have primary epistemological value within both, the quantitative and the 
qualitative reconstructivist research logic. On one hand, they have high applicative 
potential within the quantitative research approach to SGF, i.e., for exploring futures 
alternatives on the basis of culturally defined present, while disregarding different ways 
that other cultures frame the world. On the other hand, they for example represent 
valuable methods for interpretative SGF, i.e., for creating alternative futures by 
discerning how different cultures create the future and what they think the future will be 
like. The third generation FRM comprise critical methods that are informed by the post-
positivist idea of ‘making the future’, which derives from futures thinking that realises 
its own normative and paradigmatic nature. They represent research paths for 
historicising and deconstructing the future in order to challenge the categories of 
thinking for constructing alternative futures and thus have primary epistemological 
value for deconstructivist approach to SGF. 
 
Secondly, the thesis proposes a three-dimensional typology of epistemologies in SGF 
that strives to aid policy analysts to explicitly reflect how different epistemological 
frames determine their capacity to exercise SGF that is sensitive to the epistemological 
needs of policy analysis for SD. The typology allows policy analysts to critically reflect, 
what epistemological frame is of high applicative value for exercising SGF in a specific 
research context, how it determines the research interest, the research goals and the 
research outcomes of SGF, and what is the epistemological value of such SGF in terms 
of meeting the epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. The 
typology shows that policy analysts can profit from all three central types of SGF that 
derive from the following epistemological positions: the positivist, the interpretative and 
the critical. However, different types of SGF and policy advice emerge from the three 
epistemologies in SGF.  
 
Positivist SGF aims to produce single-value deterministic images of the future that 
ignore uncertainty and underlying assumptions. It creates alternative visions in a given 
plan or episteme that simply reinscribe the present even while they ‘predict’ the future. 
In contrast, interpretative and critical SGF strive to make uncertainty of the images of 
the future and the underlying assumptions explicit. Interpretative SGF thereby strives to 
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decolonise the future by creating culturally self-aware interpretations in order to 
reconstruct the images of the futures in various contexts, cultures and organisation 
(‘systemic type visions’). While significant in expanding the discourse of the future 
across cultures, it relativises the future at the expense of politics. Critical SGF aims at 
reinventing the futures by historicing and deconstructing the futures. It creates new 
epistemological spaces for developing alternative ‘worldview visions’. Mainstream 
policy analysts thereby typically rely on the positivist epistemology that is captured by 
the predictive orientation.  
 
Nevertheless, the thesis sets out a research methodological heuristic for SGF that 
strives to help policy analysts emancipate themselves from the positivist unreflected 
approach to using FRM in SGF. It wants to help them critically reflect and adapt the 
research methodological approaches to using FRM in a way that is responsive to the 
epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD. Drawing on the 
interpretivist methodological discourse within the social sciences and the policy 
analysis and futures research field, the heuristic for SGF identifies the following six 
central heuristic principles for SGF: the explorative, the hermeneutic, the deliberative, 
the communications, the emancipatory and the transdisciplinary approach. Thereby, the 
heuristic for SGF argues that mainstream policy analysts not only need to drastically 
change their positivist research logics when exercising SGF. They also need to rethink 
their traditional role, tasks and profile in empirical and professional praxis. In fact, each 
research methodological principle in the heuristic for SGF demands from mainstream 
policy analysts to tackle new tasks and to adopt new roles.  
 
The heuristic first argues that mainstream policy analysts need to emancipate 
themselves from the operationalised research design based on the ex-ante hypotheses 
and become critical explorers in order to conduct SGF that empirically accounts for the 
epistemological needs of policy analysis of governance for SD. They should choose and 
use FRM according to flexible and opened research design that enables them to 
continuously adapt the research focus and inquiry on the basis of the new insights about 
the research object. Second, the heuristic for SGF points out that mainstream policy 
analysts should act as discoverers of frame conflicts who use FRM to detect conflicts in 
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framing of policy issues in order to exercise quality SGF. Thus they should distance 
themselves from using FRM in a way that is ignorant toward interpretative judgements. 
Instead, they should use them in a way that allows them to reconstruct frames as 
normative-prescriptive stories that shape different understandings which set out policy 
problems, course of action and basis for persuasion.  
 
Third, mainstream policy analysts need to distance themselves from using FRM in a 
way that disregards the discursive practices and hidden forms of communicative power 
behind them. Instead, they ought to become translators across discourses who translate 
the knowledge from one community to another by developing refined frames. Thus they 
should choose and use FRM to account for the debug the complexity of framings, and to 
clarify the multiple meanings and understanding of policy issues in such a way that 
policymakers are able to choose a set of efficacious and just governance solutions that 
promote SD. Fourth, so as to conduct quality SGF that is responsive to the 
epistemological needs of policy analysis for governance for SD, mainstream policy 
analysts should distance themselves from hierarchic notion of their relationship with 
citizenry and become facilitators of citizen deliberation. They should choose and use 
FRM in to bring to fore the grass roots knowledge and to empower the citizenry to 
participate in intelligent and egalitarian way in deliberations of public affairs.  
 
Fifth, in order to promote the search for deviating futures alternatives and new forms of 
knowledge, mainstream policy analysts need to emancipate themselves from conducting 
Foresight on the basis of regularity principle. Instead, they should become honest 
brokers who choose and use FRM in a way that allows them to deconstruct and 
challenge the routinized ways of political thinking on future and detect the signs of 
breaks and destabilisations as inherent features of societal development. Nevertheless, 
the heuristic for SGF advices mainstream policy analysts to distance themselves from 
the research design based on causality principle and become transdisciplinary 
knowledge agents who integrate specialised knowledge from different discourses, 
equalise information among different actors. When exercising SGF, policy analysts 
should thus choose and use FRM to promote transdisciplinary knowledge management, 
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i.e., the integration of different descriptive levels of disciplinary, sectoral and other 
social discourses.  
 
The utility of heuristic for SGF in empirical research practice largely depends from the 
competence and mind-set of policy analysts to use it in a critical and informed way. The 
research methodological principles identified in the heuristic for SGF do not represent 
static, didactic, prescriptive and rigid methodological rules, recipes or requirements that 
remove ambiguity and that need to be fulfilled by policy analysts to gain scientific 
insight. Rather, they are emergent and interactive methodological directions and 
guidelines with a degree of ambiguity that allows for adaptations to different and 
changing contexts. They form a matrix for bringing the underlying research logic that 
informs the choice and use of FRM by policy analysis to surface for conscious 
examination. Moreover, the boundaries between the single methodological principles 
advanced by the heuristic for SGF are fuzzy. The principles do not represent the 
opposition pairs, but are additive to each other. For example, emancipatory approach is 
different than hermeneutic, but it is additive to it. Opposed to each other they would be 
doomed to failure. The methodological principles are also highly interdependent in the 
sense that they reciprocally reinforce each other. For example, in order to act as 
transdisciplinary agents, policy analysts need to facilitate citizen deliberation. They 
need to use FRM in a way that supports active involvement of diverse actors from 
science and other relevant action fields in all phases of research process. The heuristic 
disregards these interdependencies so as to enable analytical clarity and to prevent that 
mainstream policy analysts become immobilized and overwhelmed by the complexity 
of methodological questions. However, policy analysts using the heuristic for SGF need 
to account for these interdependencies and explore how single methodological 
principles reinforce and complement each other in interaction with empirical practice.  
  
To conclude, the ability of policy analysts to successfully apply the reference frame for 
SGF offered in this thesis in order to improve their empirical research practice depends 
on twofold. First, it is conditioned by their capacity to create appropriate research 
conditions at the institutional level. The institutions not only define the rules of the 
game, but also affect the distinct theoretical and methodological approach to SGF 
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exercises, their purpose and outcomes. However, policy analysts themselves do not 
choose institutions, but institutions choose policy analysts. Moreover, there is no one 
agent or group of agents who decide how an institutional structure is to be arranged. 
Institutions thereby represent complex and dynamic coral reefs with layer upon layer. 
As the institutional conditions importantly influence the capacity of policy analysts to 
exercise SGF according to the research methodological principles as defined in the 
heuristic, there is further research needed on the institutional dimensions of SGF, i.e., 
on the institutional structures and practices that frame the SGF research activity. 
Thereby, the focus should be put on questions such as, how to embed SGF within and 
outside the organisations? What are the relevant institutional, organisational and human 
resources policy factors and questions that policy analysts need to explicitly consider in 
order to crate institutional structures that enable them to fulfil the methodological tasks 
advanced in the heuristic for SGF?  
 
Secondly, policy analysts need to keep the politics of Foresight in mind. In empirical 
practice, positivist approach to Foresight represents the dominating research 
methodological approach in the EU Foresight exercises. It is not only favoured by 
policy analysts and other experts such as planners, futurists or economists, but also by 
policymakers. One of the central reasons why the strategic discourse is most prevalent 
in the positivist framework is that policymakers often create obscure languages because 
that language serves particular interests. Hence they prefer to leave the language 
unexamined so that it continues to determine what images of the future are possible, and 
which are likely to achieve a given reality. This enables policymakers to stay focused in 
the present and prevent new futures that could undermine current power structures. 
Moreover, policy analysts need to bear in mind that the demand of policymakers for 
more and better policy advice does not necessarily lead to better policymaking, as 
policymakers often lack the will to make decisions in a way that promotes governance 
for more SD. In addition, policymakers often look for policy advice when decisions are 
already made, therefore, simply looking for advice that provides the legitimacy or the 
information to make that decision. While these questions exceed the frame of this thesis, 
they represent important issues for further research. 
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9. Appendixes 
 
9.1. Abstract  
 
Ever since 1997, sustainable development (SD) represents an overarching objective of the 
European Union set out in the Treaty, guiding all its policies and actions. As there is still 
tremendous amount of conflict and disagreement with regards to management and futures of 
governance for SD, policymakers increasingly turn to policy analysts for a reasoned policy 
advice. In its ideal form, policy analysis as a sub-discipline of political science applies theory 
and analytical methods in order to sharpen the focus of policymakers and identify critical issues 
and alternatives for public action. In particular, Foresight approach and futures research 
methods (FRM) represent progressively more popular means to produce policy-relevant 
strategic knowledge. In practice, policy analysts increasingly struggle to provide quality ex-ante 
policy advice on the ways to adapt governance for more SD. For governance for SD not only 
severely challenges the mainstream conceptions of policy analysis, but also the traditional role 
of policy analysts in policymaking.  
 
This thesis critically questions the applicative potential of Foresight approach and of FRM to 
bridge the knowledge gap between policy analysis and governance for SD. It argues that this 
potential largely depends from the ability of policy analysts to orientate and adjust their choice 
and use of Foresight approach and of FRM to two factors: to the cognitive barriers of 
policymakers in terms of framing governance in the SD perspective and to the resulting 
theoretical, epistemological and research methodological requirements of policy analysis for 
governance for SD. In order to support such reflexivity and self-control of policy analysts, the 
thesis develops a comprehensive frame for Sustainability Governance Foresight (SGF). The 
frame comprises: (1) a typology of cognitive barriers of policymakers in terms of perceiving 
governance through sustainability lens, (2) a typology of shortcomings of mainstream 
theoretical approaches to policy analysis for governance for SD, (3) a paradigmatic typology of 
FRM for SGF, (4) a typology of epistemologies for SGF, and (5) a research methodological 
heuristic for SGF. 
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9.2. Zusammenfassung 
 
Seit 1997 stellt nachhaltige Entwicklung (NE) ein im Vertrag festgelegtes übergeordnetes Ziel 
der Europäischen Union (EU) dar, welches für alle Maßnahmen und Strategien der EU 
maßgebend ist. Die entsprechende Anpassung von Governance für mehr NE stellt jedoch 
weiterhin eine höchst umstrittene Frage dar. Bei der Suche nach wissensbasierter 
Politikberatung wenden sich die Entscheidungsträger vermehrt an die Policy-Analysten. 
Idealtypisch verspricht die Policy-Analyse als Teildisziplin der Politikwissenschaft nämlich, 
durch gezielte Anwendung der Theorie und der analytischen Methoden den Fokus der 
Entscheidungsträger zu schärfen und die kritischen Fragen sowie Alternativen für öffentliches 
Handeln zu identifizieren. Insbesondere der Foresight-Ansatz und die 
Zukunftsforschungsmethoden stellen zunehmend populäre Mittel für die ex-ante Policy-Analyse 
für Governance für NE dar. In der Praxis stößt die Policy-Analyse jedoch an ihre Grenzen. 
Governance für NE stellt das etablierte positivistische Konzept der Policy-Analyse und die 
damit verbundene traditionelle Rolle der Policy-Analysten in Frage. Als Forschungsobjekt 
verlangt sie nach gezielter Refokussierung der Forschungsprioritäten und nach Erweiterung 
bestehender Forschungsgrenzen in der Policy-Analyse. 
 
Die vorliegende Doktorarbeit prüft kritisch das Anwendungspotenzial des Foresight-Ansatzes 
und der Zukunftsforschungsmethoden für die Schließung der Wissenskluft zwischen der Policy-
Analyse und der Governance für NE. Die Doktorarbeit zeigt, daß dieses Potential weitgehend 
von der Fähigkeit der Policy-Analysten abhängt, die Wahl und die Nutzung des Foresight-
Ansatzes und der Zukunftsforschungsmethoden an zwei Faktoren auszurichten: an den 
kognitiven Barrieren der Entscheidungsträger bei deren Wahrnehmung der Governance aus der 
Nachhaltigkeitsperspektive sowie an den daraus resultierenden theoretischen, epistemologischen 
und methodologischen Anforderungen der Policy-Analyse für Governance für NE. Zur 
Unterstützung solcher Reflexivität und Selbstkontrolle der Policy-Analysten wird in der 
Doktorarbeit ein umfassender Rahmen für Sustainability Governance Foresight (SGF) 
entwickelt. Der Rahmen beinhaltet: (1) die Typologie der kognitiven Barrieren der 
Entscheidungsträger bei deren Wahrnehmung von Governance durch die Nachhaltigkeitslinse, 
(2) die Typologie der Defizite etablierter theoretischer Ansätze für die Policy-Analyse für 
Governance für NE, (3) die paradigmatische Typologie der Zukunftsforschungsmethoden für 
SGF, (4) die Typologie der Epistemologien für SGF, und (5) die forschungsmethodologische 
Heuristik für SGF. 
 301
9.3. Curriculum Vitae  
 
Mag. Phil.  Ana JAKIL   
 
EDUCATION  
 
Oct. 03 - present  INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIENNA UNIVERSITY, Vienna, Austria 
  Ph.D. Studies in Political Science 
   
Jun. 07 – Mar. 11  FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION ACADEMY, Vienna, Austria 
  Basic Training in Law, Economy, and Public Administration 
   
Aug. 08  EUROPEAN FORUM ALPBACH, Alpbach, Austria 
  Seminar in ‘Climate Change and what we need to do about it’ 
   
Apr. 06  BUSINESS CIRCLE, Vienna, Austria 
  Training in ‘Management of Relationships and Networks’ 
  • Title: Certified Business Relationship Manager  
   
Sep. 01 – Jun. 03  SOUTHERN-STATE TEXAS UNIVERSITY, Austin, USA / COLORADO 
UNIVERSITY, USA / UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SIENA, Italy / VIENNA 
UNIVERSITY, Austria 
  Interuniversitary EU-USA MA Specialisation Programme in ‘ICT-s & 
International Organisational Communication’  
   
Oct. 03 - present  INSTITUTE FOR JOURNALISM & COMMUNICATION SCIENCE, VIENNA 
UNIVERSITY 
  MA in Journalism and Communication Sciences / Musicology  
  • Title: Mag.Phil., with Honours 
• MA Thesis: Möglichkeiten, Grenzen und Herausforderungen der Sicherung von 
Lern- und Lehrqualität in interuniversitären web-basierten Lernumgebungen 
   
Sep. 01 – Mar. 02  UNIVERSITÉ PARIS NORD, Paris, France  
  Exchange Semestre on the EU Grant ERASMUS-SOKRATES 
   
Sep. 93 – Jun. 97  II. GIMNAZIJA & MUSIC CONSERVATORY, Maribor, Slovenia 
  High School Graduation (Matura) with Honours & Graduation in Classical Piano 
 
FELLOWSHIPS AND SCHOLARSHIPS  
 
2004 - 2007 
 
2005 - 2006 
 
2003 - 2005 
 
2003 - 2005 
1997 - 2002 
 Research Fellowship at the American Council for United Nations University 
(ACUNU), Washington D.C., USA 
Dissertation Fellowship at the Ecosocial Forum Europe, Global Marshall Plan 
Initiative, Vienna, Austria 
Zoisova Dissertation Fellowship tenable for highly gifted students of the Republic of 
Slovenia  
Ad Futura Dissertation Fellowship of the Republic of Slovenia 
Zoisova Masters Scholarship of the Republic of Slovenia tenable for highly gifted 
students  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY (SELECTED) 
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 Jakil, A.: Operationalisation of Sustainable Development for the Austrian Mid-Term 
Strategy for Sustainable Development: A Note Towards Conceptual Clarification, 
Project Work in the Frame of the basic training at the Federal Chancellery of Austria. 
Vienna, 2011 
 
Freytag, E. / Jakil, A. / Müller, C.: Europäische Union / Suche nach Synergien 
 302
 
 
2010 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2005 
zwischen den Strategien, in: Journal Nachhaltigkeit, 2010/1. Wien, 2010 
 
Jakil, A.: Bundeskanzleramt als Partner der bundesweiten Initiative ‚Wachstum im 
Wandel’, in: VOTUM, 15, Wien. 2010 
 
Jakil, A,: Sustainability Governance Foresight as a Policy Tool for Informing 
Governance for Sustainable Development, in: Sitar, M. (Hg.): Urban Futures, 
Maribor, 2008 
 
Jakil, A.: Izzivi senzibiliziranja politik za dolgorocne globalne trende, in: Le Monde 
Diplomatique – Slovenija 2/10, 2006 
 
Glenn J. / Gordon T. / Jakil A.: Challenges and frontiers of futures research: What’s 
next?, in: Technological Forecasting and Social Change, No. 72, 2005 
 
PROJECTS (SELECTED)  
 
2011 - present 
 
 
 
2010-present 
 
 
 
2009-present 
 
 
 
 
2009-2010 
 
 
 
2009-2010 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 2004-2009  
 
 
2003-2006 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
2004-2005 
 
 
 
 
2003-2004 
 
 
 
 Gesamtösterreichische Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie des Bundes und der Länder, 
Interdepart-mental Project of Section IV of the Federal Chancellery of Austria, 
Working Group Member. 
 
Towards Institutionalising Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) within the OECD, 
OECD AMSDE project to explore design and institutionalisation options for SIA 
within the OECD, Chair of the SIA Steering Group.  
 
Growth in Transition, a project to advance the dialogue about reshaping the societal 
development towards sustainability and measuring growth beyond GDP, Consortium of
14 partner organisations including Federal Chancellery of Austria, Member of the 
Steering Group.  
 
SIA Screening of the Interim Report of the OECD Green Growth Strategy, an OECD 
AMSDE project to conduct Sustainability Impact Assessment of the OECD Green 
Growth Strategy, Member of the Green Growth Steering Group.  
 
Guidance on Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA), OECD AMSDE project to 
present a general approach to conducting Sustainable Impact Assessment, Member 
of the SIA Steering Group.  
 
International Education for Sustainable Development-Co-operation within UNECE, 
UNECE Reporting Project on Austrian activities to strengthen co-operation on 
Education for Sustainable Development within the UNECE region’, Member of the 
UNECE Reporting Working Group. 
 
SIA Screening of the Interim Report on the OECD Innovation Strategy, OECD 
AMSDE project to conduct Sustainability Impact Assessment of the OECD 
Innovation Strategy, Member of the SIA Steering Group.  
 
Global Challenges, Annual Research Contributions to Update Annual Reports on the 
‘State of the Future’, AC/UNU, Doctoral Fellow.  
 
Sustainability Governance Foresight / Bridging the Gap between the Policy Analysis 
and Governance for Sustainable Development, Doctoral Research Project funded by 
Ecosocial Forum Europe, Doctoral Fellow.  
 
Conceptualisation of Virtual Participatory Global Marshall Plan Think-Tank, 
Feasibility Study to Elaborate a Web-Based Platform for Global Dissemination and 
Advancement of the Ecosocial Market Economy Concept, Ecosocial Forum Europe, 
Doctoral Fellow.  
 
Futures Research Methodology, Series 3.0, Millennium Project Initiative to update the 
global collection of internationally peer-reviewed chapters on futures research 
methodology, Doctoral Fellow.  
 
‘‘DeScripto’ SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA Report, Joint Research Project of 
University of Vienna and University of Applied Sciences Vienna, under the auspices 
of the South East Europe Media Organisation, Research Project Manager for Prof. 
Thomas A.Bauer.  
 
Sustainability Communication: Setting the Sustainable Development Concept on 
Public Agenda, Plausibility Study for Environmental Bureau of Lower Austrian 
Provincial Government, Vienna University, Research Project Manager for Prof. 
Thomas A. Bauer.  
 303
2002-2004 
 
 
 
 
2002-2004 
 
 
 
 
2002  
 
European Master in Future and Foresight Studies', EC-Funded Plausibility and 
Feasibility Studies to Elaborate Curriculum and Web-Based Platform for European MA 
Program in Futures Studies & Foresight, Consortium among Vienna University and 11 
European Universities, Research Project Manager for Prof. Thomas A. Bauer. 
 
Conceptualisation of Ecological Awareness Campaign for 'Landesgartenschau 2008-
18' in Tulln, Research Project for the Environmental Bureau of Provincial Government 
of Lower Austria, Vienna University/GALLUP Institute, Research Project Manager for 
Prof. Thomas A. Bauer  
 
Cultural Analysis of the Environmental Comunication of Lower Austrian Provincial 
Government (LAPG), Feasibility Study for Environmental Bureau of LAPG, Vienna 
University, Research Project Manager for Prof. Thomas A. Bauer 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
SS 01 – WS 04/05  Institute for Journalism and Communication Sciences, Vienna University 
  Study Assistant for Univ. Prof. Dr. Thomas A. Bauer 
SS 04  696309 SE zum Praxisfeld Öffentlichkeitsarbeit: Future Studies 
SS 04  696308 SE Kommunikationswissenschaftliches Seminar, Umwelt im medialen 
Diskurs 
WS 03/04  609425 SE zum Praxisfeld Medienforschung. Umwelt im medialen Diskurs 
WS 03/04  609345 UE Kommunikationswissenschaftliches Seminar: Future Studies 
SS 03  609428 UE Umwelt im Mediendiskurs 
SS 03  607300 VO+UE zum Praxisfeld Öffentlichkeitsarbeit: International Organizational Comm
SS 03  600656 SE Kommunikationswissenschaftliches Seminar: Future Studies 
SS 03  600648 SE zum Praxisfeld Medienforschung.Medienkulturen: Stadt Kommunikation 
und urbane Kultur 
SS 02/03  609425 SE zum Praxisfeld Medienforschung. Medienkulturen 
WS 02/03  694137 SE zum Praxisfeld Öffentlichkeitsarbeit: International Organizational Comm. 
WS 02/03  600096 UE zum Praxisfeld Journalismus: Projekt Umwelt im Internet, 
Redaktionswerkstatt  
WS 02/03  609428 UE zum Praxisfeld Journalismus/Öffentlichkeitsarbeit: Umwelt im Internet 
SS 02  607300 VO+UE zum Praxisfeld Öffentlichkeitsarbeit: Organisation - Kultur - 
Gesellschaft  
SS 02  600648 VO+UE zum Praxisfeld Medienpädagogik: Medien- und 
Kommunikationskultur 
   
  Tutor for Univ. Prof. Dr. Thomas A. Bauer  
WS 04/05  696553 SE FOSE - Umwelt im Mediendiskurs 
WS 04/05  696841 SE FOSE - Future Studies. Krise, Hoffnung, Erwartung, Überraschung 
SS 01  607300 SE Filmische Visionen - Visionäre Filme 
   
WS 04/05  California State University, Dominguez Hills, Los Angeles, California, USA 
  Department ‘MA in Negotiation, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding 
  Teaching Assistant for Univ. Prof. Dr. Linda Groff  
  NCR 504.41: Theories of Conflict. Distance Learning Course. Graduate Program 
   
SS 04  Institute for Political Science, Vienna University, Austria 
  Tutor for Univ. Prof. Dr. Eva H. Kreisky  
  694170 PS Grundkurs Politische Theorien 
Invited Lectures:   
2007 
 
 
2003 
 Ist die EU auf dem Weg zur Nachhaltigkeits-Union? – Die erneuerte EU Strategie für 
nachhaltige Entwicklung, Lecture in the lecture series on ‚Europäische 
Reformagenda für Wachstum, Beschäftigung und Nachhaltigkeit’, Federal 
Administration Academy, Vienna.  
Assurance of the Research and Learning Quality in the Interuniversitary Web-Based 
Learning Environments, Interuniversitary EU-USA MA Specialisation Programme in 
‘ICT-s & International Organisational Communication’, Colorado University, Colorado 
Springs, Mai 03 
 304
PRESENTATIONS AND TALKS (SELECTED) 
 
2010  Jakil, A. / Steiner, T.: Die Gesamtösterreichische Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie ÖSTRAT, 
Presentation at the ‚Platform ÖSTRAT – Initiativenwerkstatt’, Leibnitz, 18. Nov. 
2010. 
 
2010 
 
 Jakil, A.: Sustainability Impact Assessment - Progress Report from Steering Group 
Chair (Austria), Presentation at the ‚Annual Meeting of OECD Sustainable 
Development Experts’, Paris, 18-19. Oct. 2010. 
 
2010 
 
 International Conference ‘Growth in Transition’, Planning and Organisation of the 
‘Governance Session’, Vienna, 28.-29. Jan. 2010.  
 
2008 
 
 
 Jakil, A.: Climate Change Policies in the EU, Introduction / Chairing of the Session 
‘The need for Innovative Philanthropic Engagement’ at the Int. Conf. ‘Global 
Philanthropists – Partners for a Knowledge based Response to Climate Change’, 
Portorož, 1. Jun. 2008.  
 
2007 
 
 
 Jakil, A.: Die Rolle der BürgerInnen in der Nachhaltigkeitsunion Europa: Aktive 
Mitgestaltung oder Ohnmacht?, Moderation des Arbeitskreises im Rahmen des 
Workshops ‚Steuert die EU in Richtung Nachhaltigkeitsunion?’, 14. Nov. 2007. 
2007 
 
 Jakil, A.: Future-Oriented Policy Analysis: A Tool for Creating Foresight on 
Sustainability Governance, Paper at the VIII. Bled Forum - Foresight Conference on 
‘Governing Futures’, Bled, 2. Mar. 2007. 
 
2007 
 
 
 Jakil, A.: Die klimapolitischen Rahmenbedingungen auf nationaler und EU Ebene, 
Presentation at the expert discussion ‚Wohin mit den Küchenabfällen? - 
Logistikkonzept zur effizienten Sammlung biogener Abfälle als Input für 
Biogasanlagen’, Vienna, 22. Nov. 2007. 
  
2006 
 
 
  Jakil, A.: Systematisation of Futures Research Methods: Exploring Limits, 
Opportunities and Challenges of Futures-Oriented Policy Analysis, Paper at the VII. 
Bled Forum - Foresight Conference on Global, European and Regional Governance, 
Bled, 3. Mar. 2006. 
 
2004 
 
 
 Jakil, A.: Systematisation of Futures Research Methods, Paper at the International 
Workshop 'Mastering the Future', Malaga University, Socrates Project 'European 
Master in Future and Foresight Studies', Malaga, 23.Oct. 2004. 
 
2004 
 
 
 Jakil, A. (for ACUNU): Integration and Frontiers of Futures Research Methods, 
Paper at the EU-US Seminar on ‘Technology Foresight & Forecasting Methods’, 
Seville, 13. Jun. 2004. 
 
2004 
 
 
 
 Jakil, A.: Future Studies. Zukunft als medienethische und medienpädagogische 
Herausforderung. Paper presented at ‚Fachtagung der EU-Projektgruppe Ethik-
Media’ of the ‚Gesellschaft für Pädagogik und Information’ des Instituts für 
Publizistik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft der Universität Wien, 11. Jun. 2004. 
 
FUNCTIONS (SELECTED) 
 
2010 - 
2010 -  
2010 -  
2009 -  
2009 - 
 
2009 - 
2008 -  
2008 -  
2008 -  
2008 - 
2007 - 
 2007 - 
2007 - 
2008 -2010 
 
 Member of the Steering Group ‚Gesamtösterreichische Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie’ 
Member of the Advisory Board for Environment of Statistic Austria 
Deputy Member of the Advisory Board forTransport of Statistic Austria 
Chair of the OECD AMSDE Steering Group ‘Sustainability Impact Assessment’ 
Member of the OECD AMSDE Steering Group ‚Post-2010 Sustainable Development 
at the OECD’  
Member of the OECD AMSDE Steering Group ‘Green Growth’ 
Member of the ‚Österreichische NachhaltigkeitskoordinatorInnenkonferenz’  
Member of the ‚Komitee für ein nachhaltiges Österreich’ 
Member of the European Sustainable Development Network  
Member of the BMLFUW Technical Working Group ‚Emission Trading’  
Member of the ‚Österreichischer Rat für nachhaltige Entwicklung’  
Deputy Member of ‚Kommission in Angelegenheiten des Österr. JI/CDM Programms’ 
Member of the Bled Forum Futures Committee  
Head of the Austrian Delegation at the OECD Annual Meeting of Sustainable 
Development Experts (AMSDE)  
 305
 2008 - 2010 
 
2008 - 2010 
2009 
2007 – 2009 
2007-2009 
 
2007 
Deputy Member of ‚Kommission in Angelegenheiten der Altlastensanierung und -
sicherung’ 
Deputy Member of ‚Kommission Umweltförderung im In- und Ausland’  
Member of the Working Group ‚Global Marshall Plan - Global Governance’ 
Member of the Austrian Interministerial Commitee Climate 
Deputy Secretary General of the Executive Committee of International Association 
for the Advancement of Innovative Approaches to Global Challenges 
Member of the Austrian Delegation to Climate Change Talks of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC 
 
OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (SELECTED) 
 
Jul. 07 – present  Federal Chancellery of Austria, Vienna, Austria 
  Department IV/2 – Coordination of Environment, Sustainability and Transport Policy 
  Desk Officer  
   
Oct. 08 – Dec. 08  Permanent Representation of Austria to the European Union, Brussels, 
Belgium 
  Federal Chancellery Department 
  Desk Officer on Rotation  
   
Sep. 01 - Sep. 05  PR Officer / Intern  
  On contract with Ecker & Partner, Vienna / Europainformationsagentur, Vienna / 
Wiener Taschenoper, Vienna / Atlantic Television, New York City, USA / New York 
City College, New York City, USA / Téle Cité Internationale de la Cité Internationale 
Universitaire de Paris (Head of Communications), Paris, France  
   
Sep. 97 – Mar. 02  Journalist / Foreign Affairs Correspondent / Editor 
  On contract with the Austrian National Broadcasting Corporation ORF (Radio Donau 
Dialog-Forum for Multilingual International Communication) / POP TV (Nightly 
Television News), Ljubljana, Slovenia / NBC Affiliate KSNF Channel, Joplin, Missouri 
(Nightly Television News), USA / Radio Television Slovenia (3. Radio Programme 
ARS), Ljubljana  
 
 
